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SUMMARY
The United States currently stands at a highly significant strategic juncture. Its leaders are contemplating 
substantial reduction in the U.S. level of involvement in global security affairs and a consolidation of its 
deployed military assets. The combination of an unsustainable fiscal policy and political gridlock has forced 
tangible adjustments to U.S. security policy. Recent trends have injected substantial uncertainty surrounding 
the ability and perhaps even the willingness of the United States to continue along its accustomed path of 
pre-eminence.
Mayer describes three key factors that influence U.S. security policy formation: evaluation of the strategic 
landscape, decision-making regarding the nation’s defense posture, and the domestic political environment. 
In order to more fully understand the trajectory of U.S. security policy, the formal policy processes are sepa-
rated from the substance of those policies. In this way, it should be possible to identify which aspects are 
temporally dynamic and which are more structural in nature.
Mayer identifies a number of recurring patterns (or trends) which, viewed collectively, suggest the United 
States may be undergoing a process of strategic adjustment. A greater acceptance of strategic risk regarding 
unstable regions, reductions to ground forces, growing reliance on unmanned systems, heightened budget 
pressures, and continued domestic political dysfunction will limit the ability of the U.S. to credibly project 
power abroad. This could have significant implications for NATO and Norway.
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TRENDS IN U.S. SECURITY POLICY 
 
TOWARDS A MORE INSULAR AMERICA?
The United States now stands at a highly signifi-
cant strategic juncture. Its leaders are contemplating 
substantial reductions in the U.S. level of involve-
ment in global security affairs and a consolidation of 
its deployed military assets. The combination of an 
unsustainable fiscal policy and political gridlock has 
forced tangible adjustments to U.S. security policy. 
Recent trends have injected substantial uncertainty 
surrounding the ability and perhaps even the willing-
ness of the United States to continue along its usual 
path of pre-eminence. This lack of clarity comes 
at a particularly crucial time given an exceptionally 
dynamic international security environment that in-
cludes widespread political instability throughout the 
Middle East and Northern Africa, fragile transitions 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the continued expan-
sion of Chinese influence in the Asia Pacific region.
The overall grand strategy of the United States has 
remained relatively stable since the end of the Cold 
War, albeit with significant adjustments by each of 
the past three administrations. This strategic frame-
work of military and economic dominance, or pri-
macy, has been predicated on two key pillars: the 
lack of a peer competitor in the international system 
and broad bipartisan domestic support for an active 
and military-focused security policy. China’s emer-
gence as a near-peer competitor in the Asia Pacific 
challenges the stability of the first pillar while a com-
plex set of domestic factors appear to threaten the 
second. Foremost among these domestic factors is 
the strained fiscal environment in the United States 
that has now halted the growth of the U.S. defense 
budget after a decade of strong growth fuelled by the 
global terrorist threat and two overseas conflicts.
The 2012 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) may, 
in retrospect, prove to be the watershed document 
that began to acknowledge that the U.S. global stra-
tegic posture required some tough choices. As Pro-
fessor Colin Dueck testified recently before a Con-
gressional subcommittee: 
The overall trend, which is growing worse, is that 
we have broad, declared international commit-
ments that are under-resourced militarily. Under 
such circumstances, fundamentally, only a few 
basic options exist. Either the country can boost 
its military capabilities, to match existing commit-
ments, or it can scale back dramatically on exist-
ing commitments, to match reduced capabilities. 
There is of course a third option, which is to claim 
that we will do more with less, while denying that 
any real tradeoffs exist. I would call this strategic 
denial. But this is not a true option. We can do 
more with more. We can do less with less. But 
when it comes to national defense, we can’t actu-
ally do more with less. (Dueck 2013) 
Or put more succinctly by Andrew Krepinevich of 
the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments: 
“Strategy is what you need when you don’t have any 
more money” (Economist 2010).
Therefore, the upcoming 2014 Quadrennial De-
fense Review, a strategic planning document pro-
duced by the Department of Defense every fourth 
year, may have particular significance. With the Pen-
tagon’s recent completion of the Strategic Choices 
in Management Review (SCMR), which took a seri-
ous look at matching ends with means due to the 
sequestration budget cuts, it appears that serious 
adjustments are in the offing. Will they follow the 
course staked out in the 2012 DPG – scaling back 
on commitments – and thereby solidify the reduced 
ambitions in U.S. grand strategy? Or will they modify 
the DPG and outline a different approach? What will 
the effect of a new administration in 2016 have on 
U.S. security policy? What effect will the domestic 
political situation have? 
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These questions may be summarized by the follow-
ing overarching query: What are the most significant 
processes in the formulation of U.S. security policy and 
what trends are most prominent? The term ‘security 
policy’ as used here denotes the broad collection of 
policies that seek to maintain the safety and security 
of the United States homeland, its overseas person-
nel and assets, and its friends and allies around the 
globe. While a great number of domestic agencies 
might then be included, this study will focus on those 
aspects of security policy that have international im-
plications. The use of “security policy” r ather than 
“defense policy” reflects the fact that securing U.S. 
vital interests also incorporates diplomatic and eco-
nomic measures, while highlighting the fact that the 
application of military force is a conscious policy 
choice.
In order to more fully understand the trajectory of 
U.S. security policy, this study will attempt to sepa-
rate the formal processes by which security policy is 
formed from the substance of those policies. In this 
way, we should be able to better understand which 
aspects are temporally dynamic and which are more 
lasting or structural in nature. In this study, there-
fore, the elements deemed most decisive for the for-
mulation of policy will be emphasized rather than 
those factors affecting policy implementation, which 
can vary substantially. 
The identification of trends – defined here as a col-
lection of reoccurring observations suggesting a 
discernible pattern – is an imprecise business but 
c onstitutes an important tool for evaluating not only 
the current direction of policy and policy formation, 
but also the prospects for changes to those policies. 
This study explores trends within three basic com-
ponents of U.S. security policy: strategic evaluation 
of the security environment (including threat analy-
sis, policy formulation and crisis response); formu-
lation of defense policies (including force structure, 
posture and doctrines); and domestic political trends 
(including the capacity to fund security policies, 
domestic support for overseas operations and the 
domestic political environment). For each of these 
three components, the formal processes will first be 
discussed before examining the substantive trends 
for each.
The details of U.S. security policy are in constant 
flux. One week, the administration may signal a de-
sire to have Egypt’s president resign, only in the next 
week to mention him as a stalwart ally. Assurances 
to extend diplomatic relations are given and retract-
ed, military assistance is granted then suspended, 
funding for a specific weapon system is authorized 
and then removed from the budget. The specifics 
of security policy are so fluid that any report delving 
into such details would be rapidly out of date. Iden-
tifying trends amounts to an imprecise evaluation of 
the data points and a judgment as to which are most 
relevant.
The presentation of the study reflects the relative 
importance of the factors involved in forming securi-
ty policy outcomes. The dominant role of the execu-
tive branch is first discussed before describing the 
set of relevant trends. Afterwards, the machinations 
of the Defense Department are reviewed along with 
associated trends. Finally, domestic political factors 
which are less decisive in the short term but have 
long-term effects, are discussed. 
The study therefore proceeds in the following man-
ner. Chapter two provides an overview of the relevant 
actors for the formulation of security policy, includ-
ing the president and other relevant entities within 
the executive branch. The broad freedom of action 
enjoyed by the president in foreign and security af-
fairs has continued to expand, although the occu-
pant of the Oval Office must contend with a range 
of structural factors that limit his options. Chapter 
three discusses the actual processes by which the 
strategic environment is evaluated, including the 
role of the National Security Council and the devel-
opment of strategic documents. This is followed by 
a substantive discussion of the trends in strategic 
evaluation in chapter four, highlighting the greater 
focus on “whole of government” approaches, the 
continued militarization of U.S. security policy and 
grand strategic approaches that herald a return to 
great power balancing and a greater acceptance of 
strategic risk in ungoverned areas.
Chapter five describes the formal and often highly 
complex processes for developing defense policies, 
including aspects of force structure planning, force 
8© Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, Oslo 2014. ISSN 1894-4795
IFS Insights 1/2014 Trends in U.S. security policy
posture, military procurement, and force doctrines. 
In chapter six, a substantive discussion of those 
elements examines recent trends in each of them, 
most prominently the rebalancing to the Asia Pacific 
region, the abandonment of force sizing based on 
security and stabilization operations, the shift away 
from counterinsurgency and toward stand-off deter-
rent postures emphasizing anti-access/area denial 
challenges and high intensity warfare, and the use of 
special operations forces and unmanned platforms 
to contain the threat from global terrorism. 
The domestic political environment and how it can 
affect security policy, along with a substantive dis-
cussion of current trends, is reviewed in chapter 
seven. Of note in this chapter are the worrying pat-
terns of political polarization, Congressional gridlock 
and economic instability that have now crossed the 
boundaries from purely domestic concerns to prob-
lems with clear strategic implications. In the con-
cluding chapter, a summary of the study’s findings 
will appear, followed by a brief discussion of some 
of the inherent tensions in U.S. security policy 
and the implications of the study’s findings for the 
NATO alliance. In short, the foundation has been 
laid for a more insular America. While it will never 
be completely isolationist, the United States appears 
to be on track to have a limited number of options 
in engaging the global security landscape with the 
same intensity as it has for the past twenty years. 
The NATO alliance might consider means by which 
it can maintain regional stability without an active 
U.S. role in Europe, and further develop stabilization 
capabilities to quell unrest on its periphery.
 
PRINCIPLE ACTORS IN U.S. SECURITY POLICY
Understanding U.S. security policy formation pos-
es a serious analytical challenge due to the highly 
complex and multifaceted nature of most policy 
decisions and the utilization of dissimilar decisional 
processes for the broad spectrum of issues in need of 
resolution. For certain policies – such as the Obama 
administration’s decision in 2010 to deploy an ad-
ditional 30,000 American troops in Afghanistan – 
the process appeared fairly linear with meetings of 
high-level officials discussing the pros and cons and 
narrowing the options until the president reached a 
decision with which he was satisfied. In other cases – 
such as the steady increase in targeted killings by re-
motely piloted aircraft – the decision making process 
was more circular, irregular and compartmentalized. 
The production of strategic documents such as the 
National Security Strategy or the Quadrennial De-
fense Review represents yet another, more bureau-
cratic, form of decision making with the potential to 
influence the gradual drift of policy – but it can also 
be nearly irrelevant for the practical implementation 
of policy. This chapter provides a general overview 
of the actors and processes associated with drafting 
long range strategic plans and the decision making 
processes often utilized when reacting to specific 
situations, before examining in the following chapter 
the set of trends in both the content and processes 
of national security policy.
In general, a distinction can be drawn between stra-
tegic and crisis decision making, whereby the former 
may be more influenced by bureaucratic dynamics 
and processes and the latter more focused on the 
president’s principle advisors and the personal in-
clinations of the president. Regardless of the pro-
cess, however, a core set of actors are most often 
involved, which includes the president and his per-
sonal advisors, members of the National Security 
Council (statutory members of the NSC, i.e. the vice 
president, secretaries of state, defense and energy, 
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the direc-
tor of national intelligence). Among this group of 
powerful players, though, the president is by far the 
most influential and decisive voice in the security 
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policymaking sphere. These and other actors may 
influence either the process or its implementation, 
but are ultimately advisors to the president, and it 
is he who solicits advice from them before making 
the final decision. It is worth noting that Congress 
can play an influential role during the implementa-
tion phase, as can public opinion, but each of these 
is nearly always a reaction to policy decisions that 
have already been made by the president. Therefore, 
the aforementioned positions are the primary actors 
in the development of long range strategic planning 
and crisis response.
THE PRESIDENT
In the formation of domestic policy, the president 
must compete with a range of other actors in order 
to exert influence, including members of Congress, 
powerful interest groups, media personalities and 
public opinion. The president’s legislative agenda 
often hinges on and can be waylaid by the vagaries of 
the domestic electoral cycle. In the realm of domes-
tic policymaking, the president is a powerful actor 
and the only nationally elected official charged with 
promoting the interests of the entire nation, but he is 
only one of many players on the domestic stage. This 
situation contrasts sharply with the realm of security 
policy, in which the president has much greater flex-
ibility and influence. Congress has much less power 
over the formation of security policies, and there are 
very few foreign and security policy interest groups 
that exert their power nationally (the American Is-
rael Public Affairs Committee or AIPAC is a notable 
exception). The general public is not particularly in-
terested in security policy and it rarely becomes a 
decisive issue at election time. Most domestic ac-
tors often react to policies that have already been 
established and exert their influence to alter these 
existing policies, but rarely are they actively engaged 
in shaping administration policy on a security issue 
prior to its implementation. The president has there-
fore substantial leeway in the formation of national 
security policy.
Another important reason for presidential preroga-
tive in this area is the continuous advancement in 
communications technology that accelerates the 
speed at which crises form and solutions are found. 
Satellite communications and secure video telecon-
ferencing have enhanced coordination among allies, 
just as social media and twenty-four-hour news out-
lets have quickened the pace at which events unfold, 
a phenomenon well illustrated by the 2011 Arab 
Spring. The political pressures to make a decision to 
react quickly – or perhaps to decide not to act – have 
intensified over the past two decades. Meanwhile, 
similar advancements in data gathering technologies 
have made vast amounts of information available for 
analysis. As one book notes, “the national security 
process has become saturated with information, and 
it is the executive who largely controls the organiza-
tions capable of assimilating large volumes of data 
and the communication channels through which 
decisions based on that information can be relayed” 
(Jordan et al. 2009). The accumulation of data can, 
on the other hand, be a security risk, as recent ex-
amples involving Wikileaks and the National Secu-
rity Agency have illustrated.
The centralization of power and influence infused in 
the office of the presidency with regard to the formu-
lation of security policy makes for a highly individu-
alistic process in which the personal qualities of the 
president can be of enormous consequence. Three 
aspects of presidential character are particularly 
useful for understanding the ways in which each 
president approaches the duties of the office: the 
president’s leadership style, his world view, and his 
ability to coordinate the national security apparatus 
to achieve coherent policy (Sarkesian et al. 2008: 
72).
LEADERSHIP STYLE
Scholar Sam Sarkesian notes that “the way in which 
a president governs is every bit as important as the 
inherent power of the office-as-institution” and 
identifies a number of leadership styles that have 
characterized past presidents:
In the magisterial style, the president places 
himself as the authoritative head of the govern-
10
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ment. The bureaucratic style is one in which the 
official leads as the chief bureaucrat, with all the 
mind-sets and perceptions that that role entails. 
In the managerial style, the president strives for 
efficiency in the administration through the close 
supervision advocated by managerial principles. 
In the corporate style, the president governs like 
the chairman of a large business, combining the 
managerial approach with commitment and loy-
alty. (Sarkesian et al. 2008: 73)
Anecdotal evidence suggests that President Barack 
Obama contrasts quite significantly from his prede-
cessor in the way he reaches a decision. As nearly 
all presidents must, President George W. Bush ex-
uded self-confidence and a strong belief in his ability 
to make tough decisions, noting that “I just think 
it’s instinctive. I’m not a textbook player. I’m a gut 
player” (Woodward 2002, 137). Bush approached 
issues instinctively rather than analytically and relied 
heavily on his personal religious faith to guide his 
decision-making process, resulting in an almost un-
questioning sense of moral certitude. He oftentimes 
appeared to exhibit an unwillingness to entertain 
dissenting opinions, personally delve into the details 
of a particular policy or engage in lengthy interagency 
debates over issues (Suskind 2004). 
It has been reported, for example, that no meetings 
were held to discuss the merits of invading Iraq in 
2003, and that the policy was instead developed 
incrementally. Paul Pillar noted “the absence of any 
identifiable process for making the decision to go to 
war.… There was no meeting, no policy options pa-
per, no showdown in the Situation Room where the 
wisdom of going to war was debated or the decision 
to do so made” (Pillar 2007: 55). Bush’s personal 
decision-making approach appeared to closely re-
semble Sarkesian’s corporate style of leadership. He 
viewed his role as being at the top of the policymak-
ing structure – less detail-oriented and reflective, but 
efficient and decisive.
President Obama, on the other hand, has often tak-
en a more active role in policy deliberations and ap-
pears to value extended debates over policy options. 
Numerous journalistic accounts describe an inter-
nal decision-making process that revolves heavily 
around the president himself, who routinely engages 
on the details and acts as his own “devil’s advocate,” 
searching out alternative policy options. Obama’s 
leadership style appears more magisterial in nature, 
with the president at the center of the policymaking 
process rather at than the top. His intense involve-
ment may result in more comprehensively vetted 
policies, but can also be inefficient and less decisive. 
Some critics contend that Obama too often acts as 
his own advisor, an impression exacerbated by the 
constant expressions of awe by the White House 
staff of the president’s analytical powers. Former 
Bush policy advisor Peter Feaver observes wryly that 
“Obama does not need a grand strategist like Henry 
Kissinger as his advisor because, we are told, Obama 
is his own Kissinger” (Feaver 2010).
In some aspects of presidential decision-making, 
however, President Obama appears particularly 
decisive. When confronted with the opportunity to 
hit bin Laden’s suspected compound in Pakistan, 
Obama chose to proceed with a risky nighttime air 
assault despite the advice of Secretary Gates and 
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff James 
Cartwright to opt for a B-2 bomber strike, the intelli-
gence community having emphasized the uncertain-
ty of their information, and the political and strategic 
risks of “invading” an ally without their knowledge 
(Sanger 2012a, 88–94).1 Similarly, Obama’s deci-
sion to utilize unmanned aerial vehicles for so-called 
“signature strikes” against suspected terrorists was a 
calculated strategic and political risk.
The office of the presidency is a lonely one and its 
occupant oftentimes experiences a feeling of isola-
tion. George Washington once remarked that it was 
not unlike a “culprit who is going to the place of his 
execution.” Other presidents have referred to the 
White House as a “prison,” as “the loneliest place in 
the world.” The presidency, as Harry Truman put it, 
was “like riding a tiger. A man has to keep riding or 
be swallowed” (Sarkesian et al. 2008: 69). In a pos-
itively-angled profile written for Vanity Fair, author 
Michael Lewis offers some insights into President 
Obama’s daily routines. After “a quick breakfast and 
a glance at the newspapers – most of which he’s al-
11
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ready read on his iPad – he reviews his daily security 
briefing. When he first became president he often 
was surprised by the secret news; now he seldom 
is” (Lewis 2012). Even Obama’s clothing reflects a 
conscious decision:
You also need to remove from your life the day-to-
day problems that absorb most people for mean-
ingful parts of their day. “You’ll see that I wear 
only gray or blue suits,” he said. “I’m trying to pare 
down decisions. I don’t want to make decisions 
about what I’m eating or wearing. Because I have 
too many other decisions to make.” He mentioned 
research that shows the simple act of making de-
cisions degrades one’s ability to make further deci-
sions. (Lewis 2012)
The bubble of isolation that inevitably surrounds the 
president can quickly lead to situations in which the 
full range of options is not presented during policy 
discussions, political or diplomatic consequences 
are not fully appreciated, and a White House en-
vironment in which interpersonal relationships and 
bureaucratic infighting have a negative effect on poli-
cymaking outcomes. Internal White House policy-
making processes are highly personalized and shift 
with each occupant. By controlling the composition 
of his White House staff, a president can seek to 
avoid the worst of these tendencies. Nevertheless, 
a small group of “gatekeeper” advisors who control 
access to the president play a particularly influential 
role in any administration.
WORLD VIEW
Due to the fact that the president wields tremen-
dous personal power in shaping U.S. security policy, 
the particular world view and assumptions of each 
individual are particularly relevant, even if it may 
sometimes be difficult to find tangible evidence of 
such factors in the policy process. Due to the inher-
ent challenges of obtaining complete information on 
any number of situations around the globe requiring 
action and the uncertain future consequences of a 
particular policy, most decisions ultimately are based 
on a set of assumptions about, among other things, 
the root causes of an issue, the desired end state that 
best serves U.S. interests, and the possible effects of 
a range of policy options. These assumptions often 
are based on a certain world view that may, in some 
instances, approximate a theory of international re-
lations. 
During the Cold War, for example, it was generally 
accepted that the “loss” of one western-oriented 
state to a communist regime could increase the like-
lihood that neighboring states in the region would 
follow suit. This geo-strategically-driven “domino” 
theory of communist expansion framed U.S. think-
ing in a number of ways and informed policy deci-
sions. In the current security landscape, similar 
“framings” might include the potential threat from 
international terrorism, the implications of China’s 
growing economic and military power, or the con-
sequences of global climate change. Former Under 
Secretary of State for Policy Michèle Flournoy mused 
recently that for many current security challenges 
and the changing nature of warfare, “we really lack 
a conceptual frame. I like to think we’re in a period 
analogous to, you know, the early nuclear period be-
fore Herman Kahn and Tom Schelling … when we 
didn’t have a conceptual frame for even thinking 
about this properly” (Flournoy 2012). 
President Obama offered voters a comprehensive 
examination of his world view in April 2007 while 
campaigning in Illinois. In a speech to the Chicago 
Council on Global Affairs, he argued that in the glo-
balized world of the 21st century, “the security of 
the American people is inextricably linked to the 
security of people” and “America cannot meet the 
threats of this century alone, but the world cannot 
meet them without America” (Obama 2007). Rogue 
states and terrorist networks pose a constant threat, 
particularly with the spread of weapons of mass de-
struction; collective action on this and other global 
issues such as climate change and poverty will be 
necessary, but Obama argued that many of these in-
stitutions were in need of reform. President Obama’s 
understanding of the world often appears complex 
and nuanced, for which there are few obvious policy 
choices except American leadership in cooperation 
with other nations.
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And when, in October 2009, President Obama was 
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, he set his speech-
writers Ben Rhodes and Jon Favreau to work drafting 
an acceptance speech. He directed them to review 
historic figures such as Martin Luther King, Jr. and 
Gandhi, in order to “reconcile” their non-violent 
principles with the violent world seen by the presi-
dent on a daily basis. Obama was dissatisfied with 
the speechwriters’ effort, though, and according to 
Michael Lewis (2012):
That evening he sat down at his desk in the White 
House residence, in the Treaty Room, and pulled 
out a yellow legal pad and a No. 2 pencil … he 
didn’t toss his speechwriters’ work in the garbage 
can, not right away. Instead he copied it out, their 
entire 40-minute speech. “It helped organize my 
thoughts,” he says. “What I had to do is describe a 
notion of a just war. But also acknowledge that the 
very notion of a just war can lead you into some 
dark places. And so you can’t be complacent in 
labeling something just. You need to constantly 
ask yourself questions.” … He finished around five 
in the morning.… A few hours later he handed his 
speechwriters six sheets of yellow paper filled with 
his small, tidy script. In receiving a prize for peace, 
speaking to an audience primed for pacifism, he’d 
made the case for war.
ABILITY TO COORDINATE AND MANAGE
The national security apparatus surrounding the 
president is highly personalized and unique for each 
occupant of the White House. A staggering number 
of executive branch positions are filled by presidential 
nominations and these bureaucrats can have some 
impact on the formation of long range security policy 
planning; more often, however, these appointments 
affect the daily implementation of the administra-
tion’s policies. Those individuals that most impact 
the formation of administration policy – and become 
even more influential during crisis management situ-
ations – form the small group of senior advisors that 
interact with the president on a regular basis. This is 
particularly so with a presidential leadership model 
such as the Obama administration’s in which the 
president himself plays an especially active role in 
the deliberative process. 
A presidential candidate often becomes associated 
with a number of foreign and security policy advisors 
during the election campaign, a handful of which 
will eventually follow the candidate into office. Oth-
ers may be well-established figures in Washington or 
have been actively recruited by other senior advisors. 
One advisor, Harvard professor Samantha Power, 
was invited to dinner by then-Senator Barack Obama 
after he had read A Problem from Hell, her Pulitzer 
Prize winning account of 20th century genocides. 
She then spent a year in his Senate office as a foreign 
policy fellow and served as a policy advisor to his 
presidential campaign before eventually becoming a 
senior director of multilateral affairs on the National 
Security Council staff and ultimately U.S. Ambassa-
dor to the United Nations (Lizza 2011). The intense 
pace and workload facing administration officials 
ensures that some turnover is inevitable, drawing in 
new personalities and influences. Regardless of the 
timing and origin of their appointment, however, the 
group of advisors with which the president has con-
tact on a regular basis has one thing in common: 
they serve at the pleasure of the president.
This represents one means by which a president can 
contribute to a smoothly operating national security 
policy operation. By appointing individuals able to 
work together in a professional manner and limit-
ing the inevitable personality clashes, bureaucratic 
infighting and political drama that often arise within 
an administration, a president improves the qual-
ity of advice he receives and the efficacy of his staff. 
Obama’s initial choices for important positions in 
his administration appeared to be a conscious ef-
fort to assemble a “team of rivals” that would offer 
contrasting views, particularly his Democratic Party 
rival from the primaries, Hillary Rodham Clinton, as 
secretary of state, former U.S. Marine Corps Com-
mandant and Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
(SACEUR) James “Jim” Jones as his national security 
advisor, and the retention of Robert Gates as Secre-
tary of Defense, a moderate Republican appointed 
by President Bush. 
During Obama’s first term, the cooperative atmo-
sphere that arose between Secretary of State C linton 
and Secretary of Defense Gates contributed to a 
much greater degree of policy consistency and less 
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internal tension. Clinton “repeatedly aligned herself 
with the most consistent realist in the Obama ad-
ministration [Gates] … if she and Gates both weigh 
in, they are much more likely to get their way” (Lizza 
2011). Conflicts arose, however, between Jones 
and other members of the White House security 
policy team, just as special envoy Richard Holbrooke 
proved to be a divisive figure, doggedly fighting for 
a policy shift in Afghanistan up until his untimely 
death in 2010. 
The structure of the security policy team itself is 
another means of influencing the efficacy of the 
policymaking process within the administration. 
The composition of the policy team varies based on 
the individual preferences of each president and al-
lows him to adjust the input received from various 
sources. During the Clinton administration, for ex-
ample, the inclusion of economic advisors such as 
the secretary of treasury and an official assistant to 
the president for economic policy in national security 
policy discussions, exemplified Clinton’s particular 
emphasis on global economic issues. Yet another 
structural feature of security policy planning was the 
inclusion by the Obama administration of a series of 
special advisors, envoys and “czars” to oversee par-
ticular aspects of U.S. security policy. While this may 
have ensured that a particular issue received added 
focus, it also appeared to have created additional 
layers of bureaucracy and, in some instances, further 
complicated an already complex network of planning 
agencies. 
THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR
The National Security Council (NSC) is the principal 
deliberative body for security policy in an administra-
tion. The NSC was created by the landmark 1947 
National Security Act that reorganized the security 
policy structures within the executive branch in an 
effort to improve coordination between the bureau-
cratic entities, an effort considered especially nec-
essary after the failure to detect the 1941 surprise 
attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor. President 
Truman was initially skeptical, but discovered the 
value of the advisory group once the Korean conflict 
began in 1950. Each successive administration has 
structured and utilized the NSC in different ways, 
but the current statutory members of the Council in-
clude the president, vice president, the secretaries of 
state, defense and energy, with the chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) as the military advisor to 
the council, and the director of National Intelligence 
as, naturally, the intelligence advisor. Formal meet-
ings of the NSC are usually convened intermittently 
based on the requirements of the president, in order 
to coordinate policy and discuss policy options.
In addition to these formal meetings, the National 
Security Council also has a sizeable bureaucratic 
staff (approximately 300) that provides advice and 
analysis for the president, coordinates policy across 
the executive branch and monitors the implementa-
tion of administration policies (Jordan et al. 2009, 
216). It is this staff that is often mistakenly referred 
to as “the NSC,” rather than the actual Council con-
vened by the president. The NSC staff is organized 
both geographically and thematically, with sections 
responsible for regions such as Africa, Europe or 
South Asia, as well as sections tasked with keeping 
tabs on topics as diverse as counterterrorism, inter-
national economics and human rights.2 The former 
national security advisor Thomas Donilon – now 
replaced by Susan Rice – approached the National 
Security Council in this way:
Like the President, [Donilon] values staff discre-
tion. His rule for hiring at the NSC is to find people 
who are, in his words, ‘high value, low mainte-
nance’ … Obama’s NSC adopted the model of the 
first Bush administration.…The most important 
feature, Donilon said, is that the NSC, based at the 
White House, controls ‘the sole process through 
which policy would be developed.’ (Lizza 2011)
NSC staff members often have a background in gov-
ernment, think tanks, academia, the private sector, 
or the military. This eclectic mix belies another note-
worthy pattern in policymaking circles: the so-called 
“revolving door” between public service and private 
institutions. Many Washington think tanks serve as 
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way-stations for high-level government bureaucrats 
and political appointees as they cycle in and out 
of administrations. A handful of these institutions, 
the Center for Strategic and International Relations 
(CSIS), Atlantic Council, and Center for Strategic 
and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) among them, 
also prepare analytical reports that buttress the con-
tinuous cycle of strategic documents flowing from 
each administration, including quadrennial defense 
reviews, posture reviews, and trend analyses for fu-
ture security scenarios. In a recent and noteworthy 
example of this, Andrew Marshall, the legendary 
head of the Pentagon’s Office for Net Assessment, 
contracted CSBA – headed by a Marshall protégée 
Andrew Krepinevich – to develop the widely dis-
cussed AirSea Battle concept, which was subse-
quently institutionalized with an office inside the 
Pentagon (Jaffe 2012).
Atop this bureaucracy sits the National Security 
Advisor, who is perhaps the most influential secu-
rity policy advisor in any administration. President 
Eisenhower created the position – first given the title 
“special assistant for national security affairs,” and 
later “assistant to the president for national security 
affairs,” and now most commonly referred to as the 
national security advisor – primarily to coordinate 
the meetings of the NSC, but its function has ex-
panded dramatically over the years. The National 
Security Advisor is an “honest broker,” ensuring that 
all options and arguments are presented to the presi-
dent. Free from institutional or bureaucratic inter-
ests, the advisor’s only constituency is the president, 
and can therefore provide unvarnished analyses and 
monitor the implementation of security policy. In 
crisis situations, the National Security Advisor may 
assume a more active coordinating role (Whittaker 
et al. 2011).
The individuals who have held the position of Na-
tional Security Advisor approached their responsi-
bilities in dissimilar ways and with varying degrees 
of success. As will be discussed in the following sec-
tion, the distinctive personalities and personal phi-
losophies of each advisor have influenced their role 
in the administration, as have the personal prefer-
ences of each president. 
The emergence of terrorism as an overarching se-
curity threat over the past decade has blurred the 
boundaries between national security and law en-
forcement policy due to the continued risk of ter-
rorist attacks on U.S. soil, either by radical factions 
affiliated with global terrorist networks or domestic 
groups. Protecting the country from foreign terrorist 
threats has increasingly included law enforcement 
measures such as tightened border security, port in-
spections, airline passenger checks, and enhanced 
electronic surveillance techniques. Other borderless 
security threats that have domestic law enforcement 
aspects include international narcotics trafficking 
and cyber defense. 
The massive new security apparatus constructed in 
the wake of the September 2001 terrorist attacks 
includes the Department of Homeland Security 
and the Homeland Security Council with a frame-
work and membership similar to the NSC but with 
its primary focus on domestic security matters. Due 
to the fact that these two entities deal with such 
overlapping responsibilities, the Obama administra-
tion merged the two and created a single National 
Security Staff. A 2011 Congressional Research 
Service report warned however that “the increasing 
intermingling of national security and law enforce-
ment issues could cause major difficulties for the 
NSC staff and the national security advisor who is 
not a law enforcement official,” and concluded that 
“in dealing with policies related to the protection of 
critical infrastructures, the national security advisor 
will have an important role, but one inherently differ-
ent from the traditional responsibilities of the office” 
and will serve more of a coordinating function (Best 
2011: 28–29). 
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THE VICE PRESIDENT
The role played by the vice president in national 
security matters can vary dramatically based on 
the particular preferences of the president and the 
personal relationship between the two. During the 
Bush administration, it was widely perceived that 
Vice President Cheney, as an experienced national 
security official and skilled bureaucratic infighter, 
was particularly powerful and exerted a great deal 
of influence over the decision-making process in 
the Bush White House. By most accounts, Vice 
President Biden has also filled an important role as 
a close advisor to the president on national secu-
rity matters – active and vocal in deliberations over 
A fghanistan, Libya, and the decision to send special 
operations forces to kill Osama bin Laden. Biden re-
portedly sends his thoughts to the president prior to 
NSC meetings via personal memo and has on more 
than one occasion been utilized as a presidential en-
voy. President Obama explained the usefulness of 
Biden’s counsel on Afghanistan to Bob Woodward: 
Obama later explained to me that he had encour-
aged the vice president to be an aggressive con-
trarian. “I said, Joe, I want you to say exactly what 
you think. And I want you to ask the toughest 
questions you can think of … I wanted every argu-
ment to be poked hard.… And so in that sense I 
think Joe served an enormously useful function.” 
At no point, Obama said, did he believe that Biden 
pushed too hard. (Woodward 2010, 160)
THE SECRETARIES
The national security advisor has no real constitu-
ency except for the president himself and is therefore 
in a position to offer more unconstrained counsel 
than, for example, the secretary of state or secretary 
of defense. As head of their respective departments, 
these two cabinet officials must constantly consider 
the interests of their bureaucracies when offering 
advice regarding the national security needs of the 
country. Obviously, these two sets of obligations are 
not necessarily at odds with one another, but an un-
biased analysis of U.S. security policy options may 
occasionally suggest adjustments that could weaken 
a department’s influence or budgetary position. In 
order to retain credibility within their respective bu-
reaucracies and therefore the ability to maintain an 
effective leadership role, the secretaries cannot be 
seen as openly advocating policies that would dam-
age their departments. This situation is complicated 
even more by the fact that these entities function in 
an advisory capacity and also as agencies responsible 
for implementing presidential policy on national se-
curity matters.
SECRETARY OF STATE
The secretary of state has historically been the prin-
ciple advisor to the president on foreign policy, but 
this status has diminished over the years due to a 
number of developments, most prominent among 
them being the expanding role of the national se-
curity advisor. The State Department comprises 
a massive bureaucracy divided into regional and 
‘functional’ desks in a manner somewhat similar to 
the NSC, whereby non-proliferation specialists and 
South Asia specialists, for example, have overlap-
ping responsibilities. As one scholar notes, this “can 
lead to striking contrasts in the nature of advice re-
ceived by the secretary.… As a consequence, the sec-
retary of state is often forced to sort out contradictory 
recommendations while shepherding a fragmented 
organization through the policy process” (Jordan et 
al. 2009, 89–90). 
The influence of the secretary in forming national 
security policy obviously varies according to the situ-
ation and the personal chemistry between the secre-
tary and the president. According to some sources, 
the State Department often fails to meet presiden-
tial expectations due to poor analytical work by 
staff, slow response times to requests, resistance to 
change, inadequate implementation of presidential 
policies, lack of leadership in foreign affairs, and a 
seeming lack of control within its own ranks (Jordan, 
Taylor et al. 2009, 90). Combined with the inevita-
ble loss of immediate proximity to the president due 
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to extensive overseas travel, the secretary of state is 
at a disadvantage in terms of influencing national 
security decision-making and policy formation. Nev-
ertheless, Secretary John Kerry may be renewing the 
influence of his office, having played a key role in the 
Syrian crisis and in negotiating an agreement with 
Iran.
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The waning influence of the secretary of state in 
security policymaking has been overtaken in recent 
years by the national security advisor and, in many 
respects, by the secretary of defense and m ilitary 
leaders. The defense secretary has a particularly 
challenging management role as the top civilian 
leader in the Pentagon, exerting civilian control 
over the expansive military apparatus with multiple, 
cross-cutting, long-standing institutional interests 
that are often at odds with the desired policies of a 
particular administration. It can often appear that the 
legitimacy of the president’s role as commander in 
chief of the armed forces – as viewed by the military 
services – can be either strengthened or weakened 
by the actions and character of a particular secretary 
of defense. 
Furthermore, the institutional differences between 
Defense and State are substantial. As one scholar 
noted:
The primary bureaucracy within the Department 
of State is deeply involved with traditional diplo-
matic and consular tasks, embedded in traditional 
notions of courtly, courteous, Old World diploma-
cy. The focus is on negotiations and compromise 
… The nature of the military profession, as well as 
the education and socialization of civilian officials 
and employees, shapes the institutional posture of 
the Department of Defense. Logically, the posture 
leans toward the military solution in responding to 
national security issues. In turn, there is an orien-
tation within the department to ensure adequate 
staffing levels, resources to develop sophisticated 
weaponry, and satisfactory compensation for ser-
vice personnel. (Sarkesian et al. 2008: 95, 101)
Given that the United States has been militarily en-
gaged in conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan for over 
a decade, and utilizes military force through non- 
conventional means such as Special Forces op-
erations and targeted strikes via unmanned aerial 
vehicle, these aspects of U.S. security policy have 
naturally taken on an oversized role. Correspond-
ingly, the secretary of defense will logically have a 
greater voice in the policymaking process regarding 
the planning of such operations and their role in the 
broader context of the nation’s overall security pos-
ture.
The divergent bureaucratic cultures and ideological 
proclivities of the State Department, the Pentagon 
and the White House appeared to surface during the 
first period of the Obama administration. According 
to some accounts, advisors were divided not only 
according to their preference for hard power or soft 
power, but also on their gender. Journalist Ryan L izza 
reported that “the realists who view foreign policy as 
a great chess game – and who want to focus on Chi-
na and India – are usually men. The idealists, who 
talk about democracy and human rights, are often 
women” (Lizza 2011). Former State Department 
director of policy planning Ann-Marie Slaughter 
similarly observed that “the world of states is still the 
world of high politics, hard power, realpolitik, and 
largely, men.… The world of societies is still too often 
the world of low politics, soft power, human rights, 
democracy, and development, and, largely, women” 
(Slaughter 2012).
THE MILITARY
In the formal policy process, military leaders have 
traditionally been viewed strictly as a source of pro-
fessional military advice on the application of force 
and its likely efficacy. While this has evolved over the 
past several decades, the expectation remains that 
military commanders – comprising the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, which includes a chairman and vice chair-
man along with the head of each of the four services 
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(Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps – collec-
tively and colloquially known as the Service Chiefs), 
the combatant commanders in the six regional 
Areas of Responsibility (Europe, Central, Pacific, 
Northern, Southern, Africa) and those of the three 
functional commands (Special Operations, Strategic, 
Transportation) – will provide the best nonpolitical 
military advice possible to the civilian leadership. 
D uring the past decade, ongoing operations in Iraq 
and A fghanistan have also given the commanders of 
U.S. forces in those conflicts a particularly significant 
role in providing military advice to the president and 
other policymakers within the administration.
The nonpolitical nature of this advice can often be 
a difficult standard to maintain, as military leaders 
have their own service-based interests and biases, 
just as the political leadership also have personal, 
ideological, and institutional stakes in finding “ob-
jective” military advice that supports their desired 
policy positions. In this way, military leaders may 
find themselves either co-opted to advocate a par-
ticular position by political leaders or rebuffed if their 
professional opinion is at odds with a desired policy 
outcome. In other cases, military commanders ex-
hibit keen political gamesmanship when providing 
advice in order to frame military options in such a 
way that the only politically viable choice is the one 
preferred by the military. Therefore, the president 
and his advisors – in a similar fashion to the advice 
received from the NSC or the Secretaries – attempt 
to centralize the policymaking process within the 
White House as much as possible.
When the Obama administration was at work on 
an intensive review of Afghanistan strategy, Gen-
eral Stanley McChrystal wrote a secret report rec-
ommending a comprehensive counterinsurgency 
approach, which immediately leaked to the press 
and left the President in a dilemma: accept the 
now-public advice of the military commander or re-
ject it. Soon afterwards, McChrystal further limited 
Obama’s political flexibility by publically stating that 
a limited counterterrorism operation favored by Vice 
President Biden would not be successful. When 
McChrystal’s troop request finally came, it contained 
three options: sending 80,000 additional troops for 
a robust country-wide counterinsurgency operation; 
a limited COIN operation with 40,000 more troops; 
and a 10,000 troop option focused primarily on 
training the Afghan military. The higher number was 
assumed to be politically infeasible and the lower 
number ineffective, thereby leaving McChrystal’s 
preferred troop increase as the only viable option 
(Baker 2009, Woodward 2010). Obama, frustrated 
by being presented with so few options, restarted 
the analytical process and ultimately decided upon 
a variation of McChrystal’s options.
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
This umbrella term includes the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI), and the intelligence entities organized under 
the Department of Defense, including the Defense 
Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency (NGIA), the National Recon-
naissance Office (NRO), the National Security Agen-
cy (NSA) and the smaller intelligence agencies within 
each of the service branches. The investigation into 
the 2001 terrorist attacks revealed a significant lack 
of coordination among these many agencies, result-
ing in a failure to “connect the dots” regarding the 
terrorist plot. Several investigating committees rec-
ommended amending the law to 
create and sufficiently staff a statutory Director 
of National Intelligence (DNI) who shall be the 
President’s principal advisor on intelligence and 
shall have the full range of management, budget-
ary and personnel responsibilities needed to make 
the entire U.S. Intelligence Community operate as 
a coherent whole. (Best 2010: 2) 
This resulted in the 2004 Intelligence Reform Act, 
establishing the DNI as head of the intelligence 
community, though the position has not been with-
out controversy regarding the ability of one individual 
to coordinate such a broad range of agencies.
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There has been explosive growth in intelligence col-
lection and analysis over the past decade. As Wash-
ington Post journalists Dana Priest and William Arkin 
wrote in the lead article of their two-year investiga-
tion ending in 2010:
The U.S. intelligence budget is vast, publicly an-
nounced last year as $75 billion, 2 ½ times the 
size it was on Sept. 10, 2001. But the figure 
doesn’t include many military activities or domes-
tic counterterrorism programs. At least 20 percent 
of the government organizations that exist to fend 
off terrorist threats were established or refash-
ioned in the wake of 9/11. Many that existed be-
fore the attacks grew to historic proportions as the 
Bush administration and Congress gave agencies 
more money than they were capable of responsi-
bly spending. The Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence 
Agency, for example, has gone from 7,500 em-
ployees in 2002 to 16,500 today. The budget 
of the National Security Agency, which conducts 
electronic eavesdropping, doubled. Thirty-five 
Joint Terrorism Task Forces became 106. It was 
phenomenal growth that began almost as soon 
as the Sept. 11 attacks ended. (Priest and Arkin 
2010)
Over the past several decades, intelligence estimates 
on a range of issues have played key roles in strate-
gic planning and added fuel to political battles over 
policy, from the much disputed 1995 National In-
telligence Estimate concerning the ballistic missile 
threat to the United States, the range of intelligence 
data gathered and presented to the Bush White 
House regarding Iraq and WMDs, to the intelligence 
briefing presented by Secretary of State Colin P owell 
before the United Nations during the run-up to the 
Iraq War. Even experienced and well-meaning in-
telligence experts can differ on the interpretation 
of data. During Congressional testimony in April 
2013, DNI James Clapper and DIA chief Michael 
Flynn offered a rare public acknowledgement that 
disagreement arose over the assessment of North 
Korea’s technical ability to construct a workable 
nuclear warhead, with the CIA being more skeptical 
of this possibility than the DIA.3
The intelligence community also generates a series 
of reports such as classified and unclassified versions 
of national intelligence estimates mentioned above, 
but also including a more lengthy report by the Na-
tional Intelligence Council that examines political, 
military, demographic and other societal trends in 
order to make some predictions as to the future state 
President
Department  
of Defense
Department  
of State
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director of National Intelligence/
Central Intelligence Agency
National Security Advisor
National Security Council
The principle actors responsible for evaluating the strategic environment and formulating U.S. grand strategy. The 
solid lines indicate relationships with direct access; the dashed lines show more informal or consultative relationships. 
Due to the fact that many policy decisions are crisis-driven, the actual processes of policy formation will vary, but will 
normally include these actors. (Sarkesian 2008: 80)
PRINCIPAL ACTORS 
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of international security. These Global Trend reports 
have been published roughly every four years since 
1996 and provide policymakers with input regard-
ing current global trends and suggesting possible 
near-term futures.
CONCLUSION
The power of the president to influence the direction 
and scope of security and defense policy is unrivaled. 
A host of other actors is intimately involved in the 
evaluation of the strategic landscape and the for-
mulation of policy options, but the extent to which 
this information is utilized depends on the individual 
occupying the Oval Office. The president and his 
closest advisors must nevertheless take a number of 
factors into account, including the practicalities of 
implementing policies. Variations among presidents 
regarding their individual decision-making prefer-
ences will affect the relative influence of the other 
actors such as the members of the National Security 
Council. But due to the centralization of decision-
making power and access to information, the broad 
conceptualization of U.S. security policy rests firmly 
with the White House.
PROCESSES OF STRATEGIC EVALUATION
An extensive body of academic literature has exam-
ined virtually all aspects of U.S. policymaking. This 
study emphasizes the processes associated with de-
veloping a strategic understanding of international 
political events and generating initial responses to 
those events. Within this narrow slice of policymak-
ing, there is a distinction between generating re-
sponses while in the midst of a particular crisis such 
as those in Libya or Syria, and long-term strategic 
planning that involves an interpretation of the secu-
rity environment and the generation of policy options 
to respond to systemic pressures over time. Many 
of the same actors may be involved in both types 
of policymaking, although crisis response decision-
making will obviously tend to involve a much smaller 
group of advisors than the strategic evaluation of 
the international system. The number of regional 
and subject experts that are relevant or useful in a 
particular crisis is more limited, as is the number of 
institutional stakeholders. Decision-making during 
crises must remain flexible and responsive due to the 
dynamic nature of such situations, making extensive 
advisory meetings impractical and inefficient.
In some instances, the policy process appears fair-
ly sequential and forms a straightforward loop. An 
i ssue is raised by one or more actors within the poli-
cymaking community. It is then analyzed and de-
bated until a set of policy options are agreed upon. 
The policies are approved by the administration and 
funds appropriated by Congress. One or more agen-
cies implement the policy, its effects are gauged and 
that feedback is incorporated into the issue analy-
sis for revision, whereby the loop is complete and 
the process begins anew. Despite the innumerable 
variations and complexities of American policymak-
ing, this basic model remains a useful baseline for 
understanding the first portion of the process to be 
focused on here.
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EVALUATION IN THE NSC
The structure of the NSC has remained fairly consis-
tent for several decades. The first national security 
memorandum issued by an administration u sually 
outlines the composition of its National Security 
Council – including members of three policy coor-
dination entities: the Principals Committee (PC); 
the Deputies Committee (DC); and the Interagency 
Policy Committees (or IPCs … these were termed 
Policy Coordinating Committees during the Bush 
administration). 
The least senior of the three, the Interagency Policy 
Committees, acts as the wide end of the policy coor-
dination funnel. The IPCs, according to one account, 
provides much of the
‘heavy lifting’ in analyzing policy issues and de-
veloping policy options and recommendations that 
provide policymakers with flexibility and a range 
of options that are politically acceptable and mini-
mize the risk of failure. Interagency groups must 
also develop policy options that advance U.S. in-
terests through coordinated actions often involving 
many departments and agencies. (Whittaker et al. 
2011: 34)
The IPCs are organized either by geographic or func-
tional expertise that gives rise to cross-cutting and 
interrelated analytical responsibilities. Membership 
in IPCs is flexible and can include political appoin-
tees (usually from the deputy assistant secretary lev-
el), senior military officers and other experts (J ordan 
et al. 2009, 221). The collection of participants 
from different departments and agencies, combined 
with the cross-cutting regional and functional policy 
specialization, results in constant tensions, disagree-
ments and diverging interests. According to some 
accounts, regional specialists tend to dominate the 
process despite lacking expertise on specific func-
tional issues. Disagreements arise not only due to 
dissimilar interpretations of a particular situation or 
conflicting departmental philosophies, but also due 
to more fundamental problems of finding workable 
solutions to complex issues – about which knowl-
edgeable experts will have diverse viewpoints.
The IPCs normally follow a five-part process that 
begins, naturally enough, by defining the problem at 
hand in order to determine what national interests 
are at stake, the actors involved, the type of infor-
mation that is known and that which must be col-
lected. Next, the IPC might issue terms of reference 
that lay out a framework for analyzing the issue and 
decide upon a procedural structure for IPC meetings 
on the topic. The committee assesses the policy op-
tions and outlines a strategy, in which it designates 
the implementing agencies, the operational capa-
bilities required and the level of coordination needed 
among the departments and with allies. Next, the 
group begins the operational planning for implement-
ing the strategy, including specific policy instruments 
and detailed plans for ensuring smooth cooperation 
among agencies. Finally, an integrated policy options 
document is drafted that describes the specific stra-
tegic approach, the objectives, scope and timeline, 
the actions required, the chain of command for im-
plementation, delegation of responsibilities, and the 
identification of what assets are required (Whittaker 
et al. 2011: 34–36).
There are very few issues handled by the IPCs that 
are completely new; the committees often re-work 
existing issues or react to new circumstances. For 
every issue it handles, an IPC has three basic choic-
es: compromise to achieve consensus; continue to 
work the issue in search of a consensus; or elevate 
the issue to the next level – that of the Deputies 
Committee. There is a strong incentive to reach a 
consensus view among the IPCs and avoid elevating 
too many issues to the DC. The desire to find com-
mon ground can therefore result in “watered-down, 
least common denominator policy” or gridlock: one 
NSC staff member noted that preventing policy from 
being made was the easiest outcome to achieve in 
the interagency process (Jordan et al. 2009, 221, 
Whittaker et al. 2011: 35).
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The Deputies Committee, as defined by presidential 
policy directive, currently consists of the deputy sec-
retaries of state, treasury, energy, homeland security 
and defense; the deputy attorney general; the deputy 
director of the Office of Management and Budget; 
the deputy to the U.S. representative to the United 
Nations; the deputy director of national intelligence; 
the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the 
meetings are usually chaired by the assistant nation-
al security advisor (Obama 2009). The DC normally 
convenes daily to review the recommendations and 
issue papers from the various IPCs or deliberate over 
issues that the interagency committees are unable 
to resolve. Often, a paper prepared by the NSC staff 
will be circulated amongst the DC members prior 
to meetings. At the DC level in particular, the sheer 
number of polices to be decided upon has led to the 
practice of circulating issue papers in lieu of formal 
meetings for members to review. This “paper DC” 
process may often have four or five papers simulta-
neously in circulation (Whittaker et al. 2011: 33). 
Issues that cannot be resolved at the DC are passed 
up to the most senior policy coordination entity, the 
Principals Committee.
The Principals Committee, which includes all the 
formal members of the National Security Council 
except the president and vice president, is tasked 
with finding consensus among the various depart-
ments and agencies in order to reduce the number 
of contradictory and uncoordinated policy recom-
mendations presented to the president. Whereas 
the entire NSC may meet only intermittently based 
on the needs of the president, the PC may convene 
as often as once or twice a week to discuss policy. 
Issue papers are often circulated among the PC in 
a manner similar to the “paper DC.” With modern 
technological options available for interactive discus-
sions, telephonic conference calls or the secure video 
teleconference system might be utilized for some 
meetings, but Principal Committee meetings have 
usually been held in person during the Obama ad-
ministration. Topics handled during 2010 included, 
for example, strategies for Iraq and Afghanistan, ter-
rorism threats, U.S.–China strategic and economic 
relations, relations with Pakistan, North Korea, Haiti 
and Iran, the tsunami in Japan, and the Arab Spring 
(Whittaker et al. 2011: 32).
In August 2010, President Obama penned a five 
page memo to the other members of his National 
Security Council, stating that “progress toward po-
litical reform and openness in the Middle East and 
North Africa lags behind the other regions,” and 
while there was “evidence of growing citizen discon-
tent,” regimes might “opt for repression rather than 
reform.” This might well put the U.S. in a disadvan-
tageous position whereby their authoritarian allies 
in the region were weakened by internal strife, but 
American credibility would be damaged if Washing-
ton continued to support the regimes (Lizza 2011). 
Unsatisfied with the intelligence analyses too heavily 
favoring status quo outcomes, Obama directed three 
NSC staffers to conduct a review to find tailored 
policies for encouraging political reform in each of 
the countries in the region. The effort, led by Dennis 
Ross, Samantha Power, Gayle Smith and Michael 
McFaul, became known as the “Nerd Directorate” 
and took on the air of a graduate seminar on demo-
cratic revolutions. The group was completing their 
work in December when a Tunisian street vendor 
set himself on fire in protest and sparked a chain 
reaction of revolutions throughout the region (Lizza 
2011; Sanger 2012a, 280–282).
EVALUATION VIA THE DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGY DOCUMENTS
Many of the policy recommendations resulting from 
the interagency process described above eventually 
surface in oral or written statements by an adminis-
tration. Presidential speeches accompanying a new 
policy or a shift in existing policy may include ele-
ments of the NSC’s work, just as the resulting policy 
reflects a consensus position hashed out within the 
interagency process. At other times, a presidential 
directive may be used to communicate a broad policy 
direction, while legally binding executive orders are 
usually reserved for more specific issues and require 
explicit actions to be taken by the agencies. The 
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document that most reflects the NSC’s interagency 
process, however, is the national security strategy. 
Since the passage of the landmark 1986 Goldwater-
Nichols Act that made significant adjustments to the 
defense bureaucracy, each administration is required 
to draft and submit to Congress a national security 
strategy (NSS) document annually. The National Se-
curity Strategy is the only government-wide national 
security document published – other related strat-
egies are narrower in scope and deal with specific 
functional or agency-wide strategies – and the NSS 
therefore serves as an “umbrella” strategy that pro-
vides guidance for other strategy documents such as 
the National Defense Strategy, the National Military 
Strategy or the Quadrennial Defense Review. Nota-
bly, the 2012 DPG stands outside the normal hier-
archy of documents as a National Security Strategy 
or a National Defense Strategy, in part because such 
defense planning documents are usually classified. 
The 2012 DPG has therefore been treated as an 
important policy signal, but lacks the institutional 
weight of an NSS.
The NSS report should, according to the legisla-
tion, include a description of the global interests, 
goals and objectives central to U.S. national security; 
the foreign policy, worldwide commitments and de-
fense capabilities necessary to deter aggression and 
implement the national security strategy; proposed 
use of various elements of national power (military, 
economic, political) to achieve the nation’s security 
goals; and an evaluation of the adequacy of these ca-
pabilities to implement the national security strategy. 
By requiring the submission of the NSS early each 
year, Congress also intended the NSS process to en-
courage administrations to pay more careful atten-
tion to the linkage between ends and means in its 
strategic planning. 
Despite these lofty ambitions, only the Clinton ad-
ministration has managed to produce an NSS each 
year while in office. The documents tend to be po-
litical in nature, often fail to reflect budgetary con-
straints and are characterized by vague formulations 
that are difficult to translate into actual policy guid-
ance. In many ways, the NSS does not signify a true 
strategic document: a true national security strategy 
would no doubt be classified. Nevertheless, as one 
author argues, the NSS
is the best example of “purposeful adaptation” 
by the American government to changing global 
realities and responsibilities. It expresses strategic 
vision, what the United States stands for in the 
world, its priorities, and a sensing of how the in-
struments of national power – the diplomatic, eco-
nomic, and military – will be arrayed. Since it is 
truly an interagency product, the NSS also serves 
to discipline the interagency system to understand 
the president’s agenda and priorities and to de-
velop a common language that gives coherence to 
policy. (Marcella 2008: 21–22)
For the 2010 National Security Strategy, the initial 
drafters included Obama speechwriter and Deputy 
National Security Advisor Ben Rhodes, who worked 
closely with several individuals at the National Se-
curity Staff (the combined NSC-HSC staff in the 
Obama administration) Office of Strategic Planning, 
led by Ambassador Mary Yates. After reviewing past 
security strategies and speaking with the drafters 
of the 2006 NSS (Peter Feaver and Will Inboden), 
the 2010 drafters based their initial work on a pre-
liminary strategy document that had been devel-
oped by the new administration, along with Obama 
speeches in Cairo and Oslo to ascertain the presi-
dent’s viewpoints. Over the course of the next six to 
eight months, they worked together with the NSC 
staff until an initial draft was eventually circulated 
among the various departments for feedback, nearly 
70 percent of which was incorporated into the docu-
ment. National Security Advisor Jones approved the 
final draft before it was subsequently approved by 
the DC and the PC before its approval and signature 
by President Obama (Stolberg 2012). 
Aside from the National Security Strategy, the most 
anticipated strategic document produced by an ad-
ministration is the Quadrennial Defense Review. 
Mandated by law to be submitted by the Department 
of Defense every four years, the QDR is intended to 
be a “comprehensive examination” of “national de-
fense strategy, force structure, force modernization 
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plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other ele-
ments of the defense program” to inform defense 
planning over a twenty-year time frame (Daggett 
2010: 5). The year-long QDR review process con-
sumes hundreds of hours and involves a broad swath 
of the security community both inside and outside 
of the Pentagon. Its purpose is to examine “defense 
strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, 
infrastructure, budget plan and other elements of the 
defense program and policies,” looking 20 years into 
the future.
The QDR is both highly discussed and anticipated 
among defense analysts, while it is also consistently 
derided after each release for its irrelevance and fail-
ure to prioritize. Jim Thomas of the Center for Stra-
tegic and Budgetary Assessments noted recently at 
a QDR conference hosted by CSIS that he couldn’t 
think of “a worse way of making good strategy” 
than the QDR, when the process involves “getting 
a couple of thousand people involved from across 
the bureaucracy, having lots of working groups, the 
coordination process, writing an unclassified docu-
ment with lots of glossy pictures” (Sayler 2013). His 
colleague at CSBA, Barry Watts, agreed and called 
for the entire QDR process to be discarded.
It is true that each of the three previous QDRs have 
generally failed to outline the specific military means 
required to achieve the nation’s strategic goals with-
in the Defense Department’s budgetary constraints. 
Like the NSS, it can by no means be considered a 
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An overview of the most important documents and processes in U.S. defense policy planning. The National Security 
Strategy lays out the overarching grand strategic concepts which are then operationalized in the National Defense 
Strategy and the National Military Strategy. Defense spending requirements are extrapolated and injected into the 
Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) processes, while operational plans are drafted based on 
force requirements gleaned from the strategy documents. The Quadrennial Defense Review, which ostensibly con-
ducts a holistic review of strategy, plans, force structures and budgets, is not included here as it has no formal authority 
within the policy process. (Meinhart 2006: 306)
DOCUMENTS AND PROCESSES IN U.S. DEFENSE POLICY PLANNING
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true “strategy” document. Rather, the value of the 
QDR seems to be as a concept document. Because 
the process incorporates such a broad group of se-
curity and defense actors, it offers a snapshot of how 
the U.S. views the international security environ-
ment, its national interests, threat analysis, how the 
U.S. conceptualizes conflict and under what circum-
stances policymakers anticipate the future applica-
tion of American military force.
For the 2006 QDR, the previous 2001 QDR was 
used as a reference point even though the adminis-
tration intended to use the new document to tran-
sition from the previous process, much of which 
o ccurred prior to the September 2001 terrorist 
attacks. Deputy secretary of defense and the vice 
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff co-chaired a se-
nior working group that reviewed the analysis that 
had been conducted by six separate study teams, 
each focused on a particular issue area. Each of the 
study teams coordinated its work with the other 
groups to avoid duplication, and held weekly meet-
ings to review substance and process. For the 2010 
QDR, Congress authorized an Independent Panel 
to act as a “shadow QDR” that would monitor the 
process, and issue its own report. The administra-
tion used the 2008 National Defense Strategy as its 
starting point. 
With the undersecretary of defense for policy coor-
dinating the effort, four issue teams worked through 
the analyses with a fifth team responsible for inte-
grating the work of the other four. The results were 
circulated among the various departments and final 
comments were obtained by the secretary of defense. 
The QDR was coordinated with the results of other 
analyses being conducted simultaneously, including 
the Nuclear Posture Review and the Ballistic Missile 
Defense Review. The process benefitted from hav-
ing leadership with experience from previous QDRs, 
including Flournoy, Jim Miller and Kathleen Hicks 
(Sayler 2013).
The QDR, despite being consistently ridiculed by 
defense analysts and pundits as a meaningless ex-
ercise, reflects an important analytical and organiza-
tional process with potential consequences for future 
force structure adjustments. As a result, the process 
has become increasingly bureaucratic and perma-
nent QDR offices have been established among the 
various stakeholders within the Pentagon and the 
service branches. With so many interested parties in-
volved, the QDR process has little hope of producing 
a truly strategic analysis upon which defense plan-
ning can be based. The release of the 2010 QDR 
was particularly poorly timed. The National Security 
Strategy, from which the QDR should formally take 
its guidance, was delayed until May, four months af-
ter the QDR had already been released. The d efense 
budget cuts later announced by Defense Secretary 
Gates and the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance 
also failed to reflect the QDR analysis, leaving many 
to view the document as less relevant than it oth-
erwise might have been. Some have warned that 
Congress may choose to refine or even eliminate the 
QDR process entirely if the 2014 edition proves to 
be unsatisfactory (Freedberg 2013).
EVALUATING SHORT-TERM STRATEGIC RESPONSES
Despite these attempts at long-term strategic plan-
ning, the substance of U.S. security policy often 
results from global events, trends and crises that 
d emand a response: The decision to conduct a spe-
cial forces operation to kill bin Laden, the 2010 
Afghan “surge,” the NATO operation in Libya, 
multiple crises on the Korean peninsula, the Arab 
Spring, the civil war in Syria. In these instances, the 
formal policy planning processes described above 
are supplemented – or even supplanted – by more 
informal, ad hoc policy development arrangements. 
Oftentimes, these arrangements are centered in the 
White House with the president’s National Security 
Council and military advisors. Whereas the more 
formal bureaucratic processes are prone to a number 
of factors that inhibit a highly rational, cost-benefit 
calculating a pproach to policymaking, including 
diverging departmental philosophies, bureaucratic 
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infighting over influence and agency interests, inter-
personal conflicts and psychological aspects of indi-
vidual decision-making, it is this final category that 
can have the most influence on short-term strategic 
responses.4
The president and his closest advisors are regularly 
called upon to make a range of policy choices for 
which a comprehensive and rational cost-benefit 
analysis is not possible, given the information avail-
able or the time frame within which a decision must 
be made. Most security policy problems are im-
mensely complex, involving crosscutting interests 
and significant levels of uncertainty – often irreduc-
ible uncertainties that include not only “known un-
knowns” but also “unknown unknowns” – which 
increases the degree of strategic risk. Individuals 
often employ a variety of tactics that allow them to 
make choices under these conditions. One common 
cognitive shortcut is to analyze by way of historical 
analogy, which leads some to speak about negotia-
tions with the Iranian regime as a policy of appease-
ment similar to Neville Chamberlain’s agreement 
with Adolf Hitler in 1938, or of the containment of 
China in similar terms as those of the Soviet Union 
during the early years of the Cold War. This example 
concerning Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, from 
journalist David Sanger’s latest book, provides an apt 
illustration of this tendency: 
“When Bibi says this is an existential threat,” one 
senior Israeli intelligence official told me, refer-
ring to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, “he 
means this moment is reminiscent of 1930” and 
the rise of Nazi Germany. To the Americans, he 
said, “it is more like 1949,” when the Soviets test-
ed their first nuclear device. That brought many 
confrontations that veered toward catastrophe, 
most notably the Cuban missile crisis. But with 
skill, sabotage, and diplomacy, the Soviets were 
contained.
The Israeli’s deepest fear was that Obama believed 
that ultimately Iran would succeed in its quest, 
and that America had a Plan B: Soviet-like con-
tainment. Inside the White House, the president 
was wrestling with exactly that question – whether
what worked in the Cold War could work in the 
Middle East. (Sanger 2012a, 151)
The Vietnam War was another obvious historical 
analogy for the conflict in Afghanistan, and a num-
ber of high-level officials in the Obama White House 
reportedly read Gordon M. Goldstein’s book on the 
Vietnam conflict, Lessons in Disaster. As Peter Baker 
of the New York Times reported, “Among the conclu-
sions that Mr. Donilon and the White House team 
drew from the book was that both President John 
F. Kennedy and President Lyndon B. Johnson failed 
to question the underlying assumption about mono-
lithic Communism and the domino theory – clearly 
driving the Obama advisors to rethink the nature of 
al-Qaeda and the Taliban” (Baker 2009). 
Other common cognitive patterns include “wishful 
thinking,”, which leads to difficult problems not be-
ing prioritized simply due to the belief that a solu-
tion will present itself once the problem has been 
identified; “negative imaging” that rules out par-
ticular policy options by assuming the likely out-
come of those options will have exceedingly negative 
consequences; or “inferences of impossibility” that 
question the premises upon which a policy option 
is based (Halperin 1974). These types of cognitive 
processes often operate in conjunction with an over-
arching world view that simplifies the complexities 
of the global security landscape. While these and 
other similar processes are commonplace and often 
serve a useful purpose, they nevertheless distort re-
ality through their simplifications. There is a tempta-
tion to view the world primarily as one infested with 
global terrorism and the growing spread of weapons 
of mass destruction, or an ideological battle between 
democracies and autocracies, or as a geopolitical 
contest for global dominance between great powers. 
Once a particular ideological framework is chosen, 
it is within this framework that national interests, 
threats, strategic goals and effective policy options 
are understood.
The Obama administration, and the president in 
particular, has shown a much greater appreciation 
of the complexities of the international security 
e nvironment than that of his predecessor, a trait 
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academics find refreshing and policy advocates frus-
trating. In a number of high-profile decision-making 
processes and key policy speeches, the president has 
acknowledged not only the overwhelming complexi-
ties and interconnected nature of the security land-
scape but also the limits of America’s ability to shape 
the outcome of events. Additionally, the Obama ad-
ministration has revealed a greater acceptance of 
operational risk than some observers expected, but 
the string of policy choices made over the past five 
years are nevertheless characterized by an emphasis 
on limiting the current and future role of the United 
States in almost every region apart from East Asia.
While extensive meetings of senior administration 
officials during crisis situations are hardly unique, 
the Obama administration appears to have con-
ducted lengthy review processes at the behest of 
the president that have actively sought out new ap-
proaches to existing security policy dilemmas. Over 
the past five years, a renewed emphasis on the hunt 
for Osama Bin Laden resulted in a successful special 
operations mission that killed the al-Qaeda leader. 
A long review of Afghanistan strategy in which the 
president was heavily involved resulted in a surge 
of 30,000 troops in combination with an agreed-
upon withdrawal date. And a review of the political 
instability inherent in the Middle East just prior to 
the chain of events known collectively as the Arab 
Spring, was designed to outline U.S. options in the 
region but found few obvious courses of action.
CONCLUSION
US security policy formation is extraordinarily com-
plex. Even the narrow focus of this chapter, which 
is limited to strategic interpretation and the formu-
lation of short-term responses to crises, involves 
dozens of agencies and individual personalities. The 
most noticeable trait in security policy formation is 
also the least surprising: the dominant role of the 
president in shaping policy outcomes. A president 
influences the type of policy advice he receives even 
before his presidency begins, through the policy ad-
visors that become associated with the campaign 
and eventually form the basis of his White House 
staff. The makeup of the NSC is quite influential, 
but only as far as the president is interested in using 
the formal policy processes at his disposal. President 
Obama has used formal processes often, though he 
often expands their mandate and becomes much 
more personally involved in the details than his pre-
decessor.
The personal involvement of President Obama is 
particularly interesting, given the fundamental dif-
ference in foreign policy approaches exhibited by 
the two men. Obama’s presidential ambitions relied 
heavily on his strong opposition to the war in Iraq 
and the overall direction of Bush’s foreign policy. But 
once in office, President Obama formulated a set 
of policies that have much more in common with 
his predecessor than his statements as a candidate 
might have suggested. As one anonymous senior of-
ficial commented to journalist David Sanger, Obama 
“comes at issues completely different than Bush did. 
Obama worries far more about collateral damage, 
about the precedent the United States sets when 
it acts. But when it’s decision time about whether 
to order a strike, or use a certain kind of weapon, 
he often comes out pretty close to where Bush did” 
(Sanger 2012a, xvi). 
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POLICY FORMATION, EVALUATION AND RESPONSE
The elements of strategic evaluation and policy for-
mation during the Obama administration suggest a 
number of trends in U.S. policy formation that have 
either been brewing since the end of the Cold War, 
emerged during the Bush administration and con-
tinued during the Obama period, or are new trends 
particular to this administration. This chapter will 
highlight three trends relating to the process of poli-
cy formation, then substantive issues regarding stra-
tegic evaluation – including threat perceptions and 
grand strategic approaches.
POLICY PROCESS TRENDS
President Obama has repeatedly demonstrated a 
tendency to become intensely focused on the details 
of security policy, often expressing frustration with 
the limited choices being presented to him. In March 
2009, he ordered an additional 21,000 troops to 
Afghanistan and replaced U.S. commander General 
McKiernan several months later with General S tanley 
McChrystal, who advocated a counterinsurgency-
based approach to the conflict. When M cChrystal 
requested even more troops later that summer 
with the three troop level options, Obama initi-
ated a three-month strategic review of Afghanistan 
policy that ultimately resulted in the combination of 
a temporary surge followed by a steady withdrawal 
of forces. The policymaking process was, according 
to veteran New York Times reporter Peter Baker, “a 
case study in decision making in the Obama White 
House – intense, methodical, rigorous, earnest and 
at times deeply frustrating for nearly all involved. It 
was a virtual seminar in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
led by a president described by one participant as 
something ‘between a college professor and a gentle 
cross-examiner’” (Baker 2009).
The president conducted ten meetings with his 
national security team over the three months, not 
including the countless hours spent by the State 
D epartment, Pentagon and NSC staff in meetings 
and preparing memos and briefings. As national 
security advisor at the time Jim Jones commented, 
“The process was exhaustive, but any time you get 
the president of the United States to devote 25 
hours, anytime you get that kind of commitment, 
you know it was serious business” (Baker 2009). 
Frustrated with the options being presented by the 
military commanders but in agreement that troop 
levels needed to rise, Obama sought out other strat-
egies and eventually forced a compromise solution 
supported by his NSC team: a more limited troop 
increase of 30,000 troops to focus on degrading the 
Taliban and training the Afghan military, with a spe-
cific announced date for starting the withdrawal of 
U.S. forces from the country.
President Obama wrote a sizeable memo during the 
review process staking out his views on the strategy, 
and acknowledged that “Maybe I am getting too far 
down in the weeds on this, but I feel like I have too” 
(Woodward 2010, 315). General David Petraeus 
expressed his surprise that Obama would become 
so focused on the policy details, observing, “There’s 
not a president in history that’s dictated five single-
spaced pages in his life. That’s what the staff gets 
paid to do” (Woodward 2010, 327). The detailed 
policy planning by the president occurred in other 
situations as well, including the operation in Libya. 
As Obama explained with regard to Libya, 
“It’s a hard problem. What the process is going to 
do is try to lead you to a binary decision. Here are 
the pros and cons of going in. Here are the pros 
and cons of not going in. The process pushes to-
ward black and white answers: it’s less good with 
shades of gray.” (Lewis 2012)
For the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance document 
entitled Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities 
for 21st Century Defense, which called for a rebalanc-
ing of U.S. strategic priorities toward the Asia-Pacific 
region, President Obama again became personally 
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involved in the details. According to media reports, 
the president “spent a substantial amount of time 
with military officials on the new strategy, which 
they defined as six meetings he had on the strategy 
with military leaders and regional commanders be-
tween September and late December” (Bumiller and 
Shanker 2012). He further demonstrated his per-
sonal involvement with a highly unusual appearance 
at the Pentagon for the press briefing unveiling the 
new strategy.
The strategic rebalance toward the Asia Pacific 
has been continuously under pressure since its an-
nouncement, particularly with regard to the civil 
war raging in Syria. Despite calls by a number of 
leading foreign policy figures in the United States 
and abroad, President Obama maintained a non- 
interventionist approach. Despite this, an apparently 
unscripted remark by the president at a press confer-
ence in August 2012 – in which he stated that the 
use of chemical weapons would cross a “red line” 
and change his calculus regarding non-intervention 
– put the integrity of the United States at stake 
when the Assad regime ultimately employed chemi-
cal weapons in May and August of 2013 (Baker et 
al. 2013). The administration certainly would have 
been pressured to act even without the “red line” 
statement, but the comments added the dangerous 
element of U.S. credibility the president could not 
ignore in order to maintain U.S. deterrence.5
GREATER INTEGRATION EFFORTS
Though the perfect coordination of a state’s policies 
is a desirable, however unachievable, goal towards 
which U.S. policymakers might strive, past adminis-
trations have paid varying amounts of attention to the 
pervasive problem of policy integration. According to 
a significant 2008 study, the Project on National 
Security Reform, the United States has consistently 
lacked effective processes for developing strategies 
that connect means to ends. While integration is 
much more challenging during the implementation 
phase, it has also proven difficult to integrate the 
elements of national power even at the conceptual 
of strategy formation. The number of stakeholders 
and the inefficient bureaucratic procedures involved 
in the process often hinder a coherent, whole-of-
government approach. A number of developments 
in the Obama administration, however, suggest that 
such an approach has received slightly more empha-
sis. 
The instances in which the president has devoted 
additional time and effort to the formation of policy 
details during his administration have often occurred 
when Obama has desired to develop a more coher-
ent approach or make a particular policy statement 
that establishes a broader framework within which 
his administration’s policies can be understood, 
such as the Afghan policy review, the Oslo speech 
in 2009, or the 2012 strategic guidance document. 
Additionally, the Obama administration partially ad-
opted one of the Project on National Security Re-
form study’s recommendations when it merged the 
National Security Council and Homeland Security 
Council staffs into one National Security Staff. Ac-
cording to one study, although the reorganization 
“did not substantially affect the normal practices of 
crisis response, policy development, and implemen-
tation oversight, it did have the effect of fully inte-
grating international, transnational and homeland 
security matters, and placing all policy matters under 
a single organizational chain of command” (Locher 
2008, Whittaker et al. 2011). 
The strategy documents released in 2010 – the 
Quadrennial Defense Review, the Nuclear Posture 
Review, and the Ballistic Missile Defense Review – 
also reflect a concerted effort to develop a strategic 
framework that displays internal coherence. With 
the ambition of coordinating the documents’ con-
tents, policymakers consciously included this goal 
in the drafting process. The finished products ex-
hibit a closer degree of amalgamation and cite one 
another when appropriate. The 2012 DSG should 
also be mentioned, simply due to the fact that the 
administration strove to develop a much more re-
source-informed strategy than with previous strat-
egy d ocuments, including the aforementioned 2010 
QDR. Although pressured to formulate a strategic 
justification for an impending round of defense 
budget cuts, the 2012 guidance appeared to be a 
serious attempt to prioritize strategic choices and 
develop a budget sensitive concept for U.S. defense 
and security policy.
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PENTAGON VS. FOGGY BOTTOM
In the post-9/11 world, the use of military force has 
driven the U.S. response to the threat from global 
terrorism. The national security apparatus has been 
greatly expanded both within the United States and 
abroad, with a broader mandate for intelligence col-
lection and kinetic operations around the world. As 
U.S. policymakers began to view counterterrorism 
operations through a counterinsurgency-strategy 
prism that prioritized development assistance as 
well as military action, the nation’s armed forces 
increasingly took on tasks traditionally reserved for 
diplomatic personnel – particularly in regions such 
as Central Asia and Africa. In addition, organizations 
such as the CIA that had previously been primarily 
intelligence and analysis organs gradually became 
important operational actors with small kill teams 
for liquidating terrorist suspects and a sizeable fleet 
of unmanned aerial vehicles for targeted killings.
The heavy emphasis on military affairs and opera-
tions in U.S. foreign policy has resulted in an imbal-
ance that favors the continued prioritization of the 
Defense Department. U.S. Combatant Commanders 
are treated with great respect within their regions 
due to the resources they have at their disposal and 
their ability to initiate not only highly beneficial mili-
tary-military cooperation. They also have the means 
and wherewithal to conduct humanitarian and so-
cio-economic projects that are viewed by the De-
fense Department as valuable preventative measures 
for the maintenance of regional security, but are also 
valuable for local leaders as a way to demonstrate 
their ability to provide for their various constituen-
cies. The State Department has far less flexibility 
and fewer resources to do likewise.
In some respects, the overall position of the State 
Department in security policymaking appears to be 
trending downward due to chronic underfunding. 
The department comprises two principle entities: 
a domestically-based Civil Service of diplomats and 
analysts, and the overseas Foreign Service consisting 
of the cadre of foreign diplomats conducting the day-
to-day diplomacy at overseas embassies and consul-
ates. It is this overseas component that has been 
especially vulnerable. One well-known Department 
assessment from 1999 warned that the agency was 
near “a state of crisis” because of its inadequate and 
outdated infrastructure, and due to an insufficient 
allocation of resources “our overseas presence is 
perilously close to the point of system failure” (State 
1999). During the Bush Administration, Secretary 
of State Colin Powell began addressing these short-
comings, as did his replacement Condoleezza Rice 
with the introduction of her plans for “transforma-
tional diplomacy.”
Still, the weakening of the Foreign Service has con-
tinued. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who real-
ized that military personnel were increasingly being 
used in missions better suited for diplomatic per-
sonnel, argued repeatedly throughout his tenure that 
funding for international diplomacy should be in-
creased. He noted that “we are miserable at commu-
nicating to the rest of the world what we are about as 
a society and culture.… It is just plain embarrassing 
that al-Qaeda is better at communicating its mes-
sage on the Internet than America” (Tyson 2007). 
Post-Cold War cuts to the U.S. Agency for Interna-
tional Development (USAID) and the disbanding of 
the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) had the effect 
of “gutting … America’s ability to engage, assist, and 
communicate with other parts of the world” (Tyson 
2007). Later, as defense secretary in the Obama 
administration, he repeated these warnings together 
with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. 
In his book Little America, Rajiv Chandrasekaran re-
ports that as recently as 2011, the State Department 
failed to deliver civilian personnel for counterinsur-
gency (COIN) inspired providential reconstruction 
teams in Afghanistan as promised. Chandrasekaran 
writes: 
After a year in Kandahar, Brigadier General Ken 
Dahl came to believe the military had set itself an 
impossible task by conceiving a COIN strategy that 
the State Department could not fulfill. “The main 
effort in COIN is civilians, but they never signed 
up for it,” Dahl told me. “So what you have is folly: 
We have a counterinsurgency doctrine we can’t 
execute.” (Chandrasekaran 2012, 324, 347)
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Throughout his reporting, the USAID mission to 
Afghanistan is generally portrayed as a hindrance to 
progress: insular, counterproductive, and bureau-
cratic.
The Foreign Service remains frail not only due to 
budgetary neglect, but also institutional issues. In a 
recent opinion piece in the Washington Post, several 
former diplomats argued that the Foreign Service is 
being “marginalized” due in part to “the overwhelm-
ing – and growing – presence of political appoin-
tees in mid-level and top leadership positions at the 
State Department” that “spawns opportunism and 
political correctness, weakens esprit de corps within 
the service and emaciates institutional memory” 
(J ohnson et al. 2013). They argue provocatively that 
“the professional career service that is intended to 
be the backbone of that diplomacy no longer claims 
a lead role at the State Department or in the forma-
tion or implementation of foreign policy” (Johnson et 
al. 2013). The reduced role of the State Department 
in implementing U.S. security policy abroad impacts 
its influence in shaping policy at the strategic level. 
Lacking adequate operational capacity within State, 
it is less likely that strategic planning will include 
measures that involve them and also less likely that 
the Department’s input is taken into account.
STRATEGIC EVALUATION TRENDS
Very few analysts believe that the security policy of 
any state resembles a rational, linear process that 
begins with an identification of national interests 
and the threats to those interests, followed by the 
creation of a set of strategic goals, and finally the 
drafting and flawless implementation of a grand 
strategy to accomplish those goals. Each administra-
tion produces a set of strategic documents that con-
tain many of the details that might be neatly placed 
in such a linear policymaking format, but such an 
analysis would be deceiving – just as it would be a 
mistake to ignore them completely. Obviously, a truly 
accurate set of strategic documents would be clas-
sified rather than openly distributed to the public, 
and the national security strategies and quadrennial 
defense reviews should be understood as carrying a 
political message as well as outlining strategic think-
ing. The set of documents – and the set of policy 
decisions – are best understood as points on scatter 
plot. A trend line can usually be discerned from the 
sometimes disparate collection of policy statements. 
This section will review some of the broad trend lines 
in American global threat evaluation and grand stra-
tegic response.
TRENDS IN THREAT PERCEPTIONS
With the end of the Cold War, decision makers in 
the United States quickly became aware that the 
new strategic environment presented a broader set 
of challenges than those of the previous era. Director 
for National Intelligence James Woolsey noted in his 
1993 Senate confirmation hearing that the num-
ber of threats to American interests had increased 
and become more complex, observing that “Yes, 
we have slain a large dragon. But we live now in a 
jungle filled with a bewildering variety of poisonous 
snakes. And in many ways, the dragon was easier 
to keep track of” (Jehl 1993). Even though most of 
the Soviet ballistic missile fleet conveyed to the Rus-
sian Federation, which retained the ability to credibly 
threaten the United States with an overwhelming 
and catastrophic nuclear attack, the perceived need 
to contain a constant existential threat to the home-
land vanished along with the Soviet Union. The U.S. 
could now focus on less consequential threats that 
proved more challenging to contain and on which 
good intelligence was more difficult to obtain.
PERSISTENT DUALITY: But great power worries were 
not entirely gone even in the early 1990s, as the 
Clinton administration recognized that China’s po-
litical and military trajectory would likely eventually 
solidify into a regional challenger in Asia. Thus, even 
as the United States became more active in dea-
ling with Woolsey’s “jungle of poisonous snakes,” 
it pursued a hedging strategy with regard to a new 
dragon: China. The military requirements for balan-
cing or containing a regional power in Asia differed 
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markedly from those needed to conduct counterter-
rorism, stability and reconstruction operations or 
humanitarian interventions, setting up a persistent 
tension in U.S. defense policy: prepare for high in-
tensity interstate conflict in East Asia or stability 
operations in what the Bush administration would 
later call the “arc of instability” that stretched from 
Northern Africa through the Middle East to Central 
and South Asia. The Clinton administration flirted 
with the latter throughout its eight years, with ope-
rations in the Balkans, Central Asia and Africa, but it 
was the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks that 
understandably caused the definitive shift toward 
the asymmetric side of the conflict spectrum.
The attacks on 9/11 served to remind the U.S. of 
the tremendous political and sociological impact of 
limited, non-existential threats. An attack that re-
sulted in anything similar to loss of the two buildings 
in New York, part of the Pentagon and a commercial 
aircraft over the skies of Pennsylvania constituted 
an unacceptable risk. Due to patterns of globaliza-
tion and the democratization of weapons technol-
ogy, non-state actors such as transnational terrorist 
groups could conceivably obtain, transport, and det-
onate a weapon of mass destruction resulting in truly 
horrific numbers of casualties. In a similar fashion, 
small states that appeared to threaten U.S. inter-
ests or act in ways that the international community 
found disconcerting, also became more worrisome 
due to their perceived ability to launch a limited at-
tack on the U.S. homeland. These so-called rogue 
states – which have in the past included Iran, Iraq, 
Libya, Syria and North Korea – were of concern dur-
ing the Cold War and remained a threat to the U.S. 
during the 1990s. The potential for these states to 
collude with terrorist organizations heightened U.S. 
concerns after 2001 and those concerns have been 
compounded as Iran and North Korea have marched 
steadily toward a useable long-range nuclear capa-
bility. These nuclear risks were among the factors 
that led the Bush administration to invade Iraq in 
2003 and the Obama administration to prioritize 
nuclear proliferation during his first year in office.
CYBER ON THE RISE: The modernization and de-
mocratization of violence has combined with the 
interconnectedness of globalization to minimize the 
value of the natural oceanic buffers enjoyed by the 
United States. Cyber threats headed the 2013 over-
view presented by the U.S. intelligence community, 
during which DIA chief Michael Flynn remarked that 
cyber attacks represented the most dangerous threat 
to U.S. security today. Illustrating this point, the 
Washington Post reported in April 2013 on a study 
by government and industry analysts who examined 
120 cases of government cyber espionage last year 
and found that China was responsible for 96 per-
cent of them (Timberg 2013). The insatiable thirst 
for networked technological solutions has made the 
United States especially vulnerable to cyber attacks 
from state and non-state actors that can harm nearly 
every facet of daily life, starting with an under-defen-
ded power grid but potentially including government 
and financial institutions as well. 
REGIONAL INSTABILITY REMAINS: As global commu-
nications and media outlets increase awareness of 
diplomatic crises and humanitarian disasters throug-
hout the globe, political pressures have grown for the 
U.S. to react – particularly when a substantial porti-
on of U.S. policymaking elites believe that the nation 
has a unique responsibility to promote democratic 
ideals along with peace and stability. In less political-
ly stable regions across Africa, the Middle East and 
Asia, environmental factors and demographic trends 
combine with weak governmental structures to pro-
duce conflict, mass migrations, and radicalization 
by terror groups. The so-called Arab Spring has in 
many respects made an unstable region even more 
so. The United States has consistently viewed these 
regions as presenting threats to regional stability as 
well as its own security. The projected effects of glo-
bal climate change will serve to exacerbate existing 
risk factors, creating greater water and food shorta-
ges, increasing the likelihood of mass migrations and 
the potential for conflict or radicalization.
The United States has, since the end of the Cold 
War, exhibited a fairly consistent understanding of 
the threat environment. Deterring and containing a 
high intensity interstate conflict with China – requir-
ing a large but relatively inactive military force – sim-
mered under the surface but never constituted the 
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principle organizing factor for the nation’s security 
policy, whereas interventions to address asymmetric 
and destabilizing threats became the primary activity 
of the U.S. military. The Clinton administration paid 
some attention to China and actively engaged on a 
range of asymmetric threats, but also exhibited some 
insular tendencies. The Bush administration greatly 
increased its focus on asymmetrical threats while 
de-emphasizing China, and the insular tendencies 
disappeared. During the Obama administration, the 
asymmetrical threats have been sufficiently weak-
ened and are being gradually de-emphasized, while 
the interstate challenge from China is becoming the 
predominate focus as other insular trends emerge. 
UNRESOLVED THREATS: Most noteworthy about this 
description is the fact that none of the threats has 
disappeared or been completely resolved. While the 
U.S. shifts its focus to East Asia, the same politi-
cal, social, demographic, and environmental trends 
that worried policymakers in the 1990s and 2000s 
remain and, according to the most recent intelli-
gence estimates, are worsening. There is no reason 
to believe that U.S. threat perceptions will remain 
static on the threat intensity spectrum. China’s po-
wer projection capacity will remain regional for the 
foreseeable future and perhaps over the longer term, 
too, while the U.S. ability to project power globally 
may be reduced but will likely persist. At some point, 
an acceptable equilibrium may be achieved between 
the two powers, whereas the sub-state threats at the 
other end of the spectrum may continue to worsen.
TRENDS IN GRAND STRATEGIC APPROACH
The Bush administration was strongly influenced by 
the 9/11 attacks and formulated an aggressive re-
sponse combining wide-ranging military counterter-
rorism and counterinsurgency operations with strong 
rhetoric promoting freedom and democratic prin-
ciples. The instruments of national power utilized to 
pursue its grand strategy relied heavily on military 
force, focusing its efforts on terrorist organizations 
and the rogue states that assisted them. A deep-
seated skepticism of institutional arrangements that 
could limit U.S. freedom of action led to bilateral and 
coalition-type arrangements that eventually drew 
criticism from the country’s traditional European al-
lies. The Bush White House had some success with 
regional coalition building on the Asia-Pacific Rim 
and for a number of years enjoyed reduced tensions 
with Russia, but its overall diplomatic approach was 
a source of considerable consternation among its 
allies and potential adversaries. The United States 
pursued unsustainable fiscal policies that, when 
combined with a domestically instigated financial 
crisis, created massive budget deficits and added 
trillions of dollars to the national debt. The adminis-
tration made a number of strategic adjustments dur-
ing its second term in office, toning down its tough 
rhetoric and placing more emphasis on cooperation 
and dialogue, but the strategic framework remained 
more or less intact.
The Obama administration inherited two ongo-
ing conflicts, an economic crisis, and an interna-
tional community at odds with U.S. policy. The new 
a dministration adopted a more conciliatory and co-
operative rhetorical tone and made significant ad-
justments to some policies, but the overall substance 
of U.S. security policy remained surprisingly consis-
tent. The drawdown of forces in Iraq proceeded as 
planned, allowing the administration to surge troops 
into Afghanistan in order to facilitate the eventual 
U.S. withdrawal from the conflict. Notably, Obama 
has expanded the use of targeted killings via un-
manned aerial vehicles and special operations mis-
sions for global counterterrorism efforts. Obama’s 
strategy has sought to reestablish America’s global 
diplomatic leadership role, facilitate the construction 
of regional security architectures underwritten by 
the United States, and ensure access to all regions 
of the world and overall freedom of action, especially 
in Asia. International partnerships and institutions 
are perceived to be valuable tools by the Obama ad-
ministration, but similar to its predecessor has yet to 
demonstrate any willingness to bind Washington to 
arrangements that would limit its strategic flexibility 
in any meaningful way. The administration reached 
out diplomatically to China, Russia and Iran – but 
with varying and often unsatisfactory results.
As the Obama administration began its second term, 
a number of grand strategic trends were discernible. 
Some of them were continuations of trends begun 
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during the Bush years or before, while others are re-
cent modifications to U.S. policy. As is the case with 
all such trends, they are not without exceptions and 
are subject to change. Nevertheless, the combina-
tion of system-level factors, along with engrained 
U.S. perceptions of threats and its own international 
role, increases the likelihood that these trends are 
robust.
LIGHT FOOTPRINT APPROACH: The Obama adminis-
tration has pursued a policy of reducing U.S. troop 
commitments in overseas conflicts, concluding the 
nation’s involvement in Iraq, and surging troops in 
Afghanistan to stabilize the situation to a sufficient 
degree (“Afghan good enough”) so that indigenous 
forces can assume security responsibilities after 
2014 with a small residual U.S. force. In Libya, the 
United States played a supporting role through the 
deployment of enabling assets, and has so far resi-
sted political pressure to become involved in Syria. 
Throughout Africa and the greater Middle East, the 
United States employs unmanned aerial vehicles (re-
ferred to a UAVs or “drones”) and special operations 
forces in tailored counterterrorism missions, rather 
than full-scale stability operations.
The light footprint approach relies on building part-
ner capacity through training and cooperative struc-
tures, so that regional allies are able to deal more 
independently with internal security threats before 
they become regional ones and necessitate greater 
levels of assistance by the United States. Similarly, 
the Obama administration is encouraging the forma-
tion of a global network of regional security structures 
that will have the capacity to deter aggression in the 
region, handle security threats that arise and provide 
political and strategic stability. While the NATO al-
liance is a unique collective security arrangement in 
Europe, it also acts as a regional security framework 
through which security issues can be handled. Less 
comprehensive but still potentially effective frame-
works are forming in the Middle East, East Asia, and 
elsewhere. The continued growth of such frame-
works will allow the U.S. to continue toward a “light 
footprint” approach. Nevertheless, the approach has 
been criticized for having too few military assets to 
safeguard American interests in regions such as the 
Middle East, and conflicts like Syria clearly call into 
question the ability of regional frameworks to handle 
crises (Sanger 2012b, Rachman 2013).
A combination of factors contributes to this trend. 
There is a realization after experiences in Iraq and 
Afghanistan that military force cannot accomplish 
many of the desired political objectives required to 
provide security and sovereignty in weak states with 
vast ungoverned regions that might be utilized by 
non-state actors such as terrorist organizations or 
transnational criminal enterprises. Strategic access 
to, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 
(ISR) capabilities within, those regions through solid 
military-to-military cooperation can allow U.S. and 
its partners to degrade the capacity of such actors 
to operate effectively. Additionally, there is a greater 
appreciation of the cost-benefit calculus to direct 
involvement, both in terms of blood and treasure. 
These attitudes are easily changed, however. Two 
other factors are key: finances and technology.
The domestic economic situation is showing signs of 
improvement, but the fundamental mechanics of its 
fiscal situation remain unaltered: a litany of budget-
ary demands driven by a mixture of structural forces 
and political realities. These include the significant 
and growing entitlements burden from the ageing 
“baby boomer” population, rising health care costs, 
an unwillingness to reduce popular spending pro-
grams and a hesitancy to meaningfully increase rev-
enues, the popularity of large defense expenditures, 
and the persistent (though shifting) expectation that 
U.S. power will be deployed globally. Minor adjust-
ments have already been made to most of these el-
ements, but not to a degree sufficient to alter the 
general trajectory of the nation’s dire fiscal situation. 
Meanwhile, the United States continues to invest in 
technological solutions such as unmanned aerial ve-
hicles that enhance its ability to conduct global ISR, 
as well as disrupt the capabilities of non-state ac-
tors and liquidate their leadership through targeted 
killings. Continued investments in a conventional 
prompt global strike capability are another sign of 
operational flexibility, whereby the U.S. can project 
power without exposing its personnel to additional 
34
© Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, Oslo 2014. ISSN 1894-4795
IFS Insights 1/2014 Trends in U.S. security policy
risk and without sustaining political costs. Anoth-
er power projection capability – though it is rarely 
viewed in this manner – is ballistic missile defense, 
which will ostensibly allow the U.S. to continue to 
operate in regions where state or non-state actors 
wielding ballistic missiles might otherwise be able to 
threaten U.S. military assets.
GREATER ACCEPTANCE OF STRATEGIC RISK: The 
Bush administration began its “war on terror” with 
the objective of “rolling back” and eliminating (to the 
degree possible) transnational terrorism, and coun-
terterrorism operations became the primary prism 
framing its security policy. This approach was ad-
justed and de-emphasized somewhat during Bush’s 
second term, however. The Obama administration, 
having benefitted from its predecessor’s aggressive 
counterterrorism campaign, viewed terrorism as a 
persistent but controllable threat that could be ma-
naged together with the rest of the nation’s secu-
rity interests. The perceived underlying root causes 
of terrorism and radicalization – political instability, 
repressive regimes that create resource shortages, 
mass migrations that leave large numbers of young, 
unemployed people crowded into small spaces with 
few basic commodities and limited government 
services, making them vulnerable to radicalization 
– were viewed by the Bush administration as a go-
vernance issue for which the spread of democracy 
would contribute to America’s security while remai-
ning true to its ideals.
The Obama administration has been forced to choose 
between traditional security interests in the volatile 
“arc of instability” and its liberal ideology, most poi-
gnantly during the so-called Arab Spring. The long-
standing U.S. relationship with the Mubarak regime 
in Egypt created an intractable diplomatic situation 
for the administration, as did extensive protests 
in Bahrain, the Gulf state hosting the U.S. Navy’s 
Fifth Fleet. The protracted civil war in Syria has also 
tested U.S. interests – the influx of refugees places 
political pressure on its ally Jordan and the conflict 
creates tensions on its other borders with U.S. al-
lies Turkey, Israel and Iraq. The administration has 
gone to great lengths and resisted strong domestic 
pressure to avoid deeper involvement in the highly 
complex conflict. The breadth and complexity of the 
Arab uprisings not only took the U.S. somewhat by 
surprise, but also left the administration with few 
real options for shaping outcomes in the region. As 
the strategic landscape is shuffled, the potential for 
continued unrest and new safe havens for terrorist 
groups remains substantial.
Therefore, the lack of any real diplomatic or military 
options that could be helpful in creating a more or-
derly situation in the greater Middle East and sub-
Saharan Africa resulted in two trends already clearly 
visible: greater risk acceptance and a light footprint 
approach. The U.S. will likely continue to work with 
the few regional partners available, providing mili-
tary training to partner governments and conduct-
ing small incursions with limited forces to target 
specific terrorist groups and contain the threat. Any 
broad-based governance programs such as the Bush 
administration’s Millennium Challenge Account 
will receive less priority, as will extended diplomatic 
outreach. The “transformational diplomacy” efforts 
focused on outreach to local populations in smaller 
cities outside the capitals, launched under Secretary 
Rice and continued (though not necessarily in name) 
under Secretary Clinton, may have been dealt a fi-
nal blow with the attacks on the diplomatic com-
pound in Benghazi that resulted in the deaths of four 
Americans. The attacks cast attention on the need 
to enhance the security of U.S. diplomats abroad – a 
requirement that will necessarily result in a retreat to 
more centralized and well-fortified compounds.
RENEWED INTEREST IN GREAT POWER BALAN-
CING: Perhaps the most recognizable trend develo-
ping over the past four years was embodied in the 
administration’s most recent strategic document, 
the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance: namely the 
process of rebalancing U.S. military forces toward the 
Asia-Pacific region. This is the one region that will 
most definitely not exhibit the “light footprint” trend 
occurring in other parts of the globe. Concerns about 
China’s anti-access/area denial capabilities in East 
Asia have been viewed as threatening Washington’s 
interest in retaining the ability to operate freely in the 
region and credibly meet their security commitments 
to allies such as Japan, South Korea, the P hilippines, 
and Australia. The primary objective for U.S. poli-
cymakers appears to be a desire to maintain a per-
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sistent presence in the region, ensure the security 
of valuable shipping routes, and have the ability to 
counter any attempts by the Chinese to pressure or 
coerce U.S. allies in the region through the use of 
military force. Due to the geographic characteristics 
of the region, naval and air power will be of great 
importance, and a 2010 AirSea Battle study from a 
Washington think tank, the Center for Strategic and 
Budgetary Assessments, appears to have been par-
ticularly influential in shaping the administration’s 
thinking (Van Tol 2010).
The shift toward a greater relative U.S. military pres-
ence in the Pacific has occurred gradually over the 
past several decades, as noted earlier, but the re-
balancing has taken a more prominent role in dis-
cussions over force size and composition. Just as 
Secretary Gates worked to institutionalize the coun-
terinsurgency and reconstruction missions within 
the Defense Department during the final years of 
the Bush administration, the Asia rebalancing ap-
pears to have taken over as the primary organizing 
principle for the military. This entails a much heavier 
emphasis on technologically advanced systems able 
to operate in contested battlespace, such as stealth 
aircraft, conventionally armed ballistic missile sub-
marines, and long-range strike capabilities. Due to 
the much-discussed potential for the development 
of an anti-ship ballistic missile, a serious debate is 
underway regarding the future of the aircraft carrier 
as the definitive tool for U.S. naval power projection.
It should be noted that these assets will predomi-
nately be deployed to deter aggression by the Chi-
nese, ensure strategic access to U.S. forces, provide 
reassurance to allies and enable U.S. participation in 
joint regional training missions with allies and part-
ners. Deterring a high intensity interstate conflict will 
result in routine deployments to establish “presence” 
and therefore will remain operational in the region, 
but (hopefully) static in terms of their actual use in 
combat. The limited deployment of smaller military 
units in conflict situations will therefore likely oc-
cur in other regions such as the greater Middle East 
and Africa, when regional security frameworks have 
been unable to resolve crises or cope with growing 
threats. Even as the United States shifts its focus to 
deterring high intensity conflict in Asia, the underly-
ing trends that create security threats in ungoverned 
and unstable regions will continue to fester. It would 
be unreasonable to assume that any administra-
tion, even one as intent on “leading from behind” as 
President Obama’s, will be able to completely ignore 
these regions – the threats remain real and the trend 
lines are negative. The potential for another substan-
tial military engagement in the greater Middle East, 
Africa or Central Asia will depend largely upon the 
ability of the United States and its partners to keep 
security threats in check through special operations 
forces and drones and leverage bilateral and mul-
tilateral relationships in order to maintain regional 
stability. 
CONCLUSION
The global security environment has become even 
more complex than was the case at the end of the 
Cold War, leaving policymakers with even more 
threats to monitor and a less effective set of tools 
for dealing with those threats. The United States 
has long had a tendency to favor the use of military 
force as a policy tool, and this trend is unlikely to 
completely reverse itself even as the current strategic 
and fiscal climate suggests a pause in U.S. military 
interventions. Even so, the underlying variables that 
drive the security threats facing the United States 
in most parts of the world are not solvable with the 
application of military force due to political, social, 
demographic, and environmental forces at work. The 
U.S. military may, along with their regional partners, 
be able to keep some the more dire consequences of 
these changes from disrupting regional security, but 
will not be able to ‘solve’ the problems either with 
diplomatic or military instruments. 
The personal involvement of President Obama in 
policymaking contributes to a greater level of un-
certainty regarding the near-term future of U.S. 
security policy. The current administration has an 
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a ppreciation for the complexity in the global secu-
rity landscape, but its successor may be more willing 
to accept operational risks. Nevertheless, the next 
administration may also have fewer options for de-
ploying forces as the current trends unfold. The sub-
stantial increase in U.S. ground forces that seemed 
almost certain to occur during the transition from 
Bush to Obama disappeared, replaced by a reduc-
tion in those forces and an increased focus on naval 
and air forces. A large-scale intervention force may 
again require activation of reserve forces and would 
therefore raise the political threshold. The reduced 
capacity of the State Department lowers the ability of 
U.S. to work in a preventative fashion within at-risk 
regions and increases the likelihood of instability and 
crisis. The U.S. economic situation will undoubtedly 
improve, but rising entitlement costs will continue 
to grow and budgetary pressures are likely to persist 
beyond the current “sequester” arrangement that re-
quires automatic cuts to many sectors of the budget.
The rebalancing toward Asia will likely continue as 
China continues its military buildup. The channel-
ing of military assets into the region appears likely 
to create a classic security spiral as each side reacts 
to the deployments of the other, until some type of 
stable relationship is attained that both sides deem 
satisfactory. The deployment of high-intensity con-
flict assets will be predominately for deterrence and 
assurance purposes, and “shooting war” conflict 
scenarios are unlikely to occur. Regional threats in 
the greater Middle East, Africa, and Central Asia 
may continue to grow, however, and force the U.S. to 
remain involved in some capacity – testing the newly 
developed ‘light footprint’ approach.
U.S. DEFENSE POLICY PLANNING PROCESSES
While the Obama administration garnered atten-
tion with its 2012 strategic guidance document, 
the strategy remains conceptual in nature until its 
intent is reflected in the actual force posture of the 
United States. Donald Rumsfeld famously remarked 
in 2004 that “you go to war with the army you 
have, not the army you might want or wish to have” 
(Schmitt 2004). Even though decisionmakers are 
free to make choices regarding the use of military 
force based on strategic and/or political calculations, 
these future decisions are necessarily framed and 
sometimes limited by the actual capabilities at their 
disposal, about which decisions have already been 
made. During the Bush administration, it was evi-
dent that the U.S. lacked the ability to fully prosecute 
two military campaigns and the Pentagon resorted 
to lengthy deployments, involuntary retentions and 
lowered recruitment standards in order to maintain 
troop levels. Despite these adaptations, the U.S. 
was still unable to devote the necessary manpow-
er to Afghanistan while fully engaged in Iraq, and 
the military was routinely described as “frayed” or 
“strained.” Troop end strength therefore constituted 
a conscious decision that played a significant role in 
the implementation of U.S. defense policy. Similarly, 
decisions made today regarding specific weapons 
platforms and other military assets will create tan-
gible limits to policymakers in the future.
Obviously, defense policy choices are influenced by a 
great number of factors, with strategic planning rep-
resenting only one such variable. This chapter briefly 
examines the driving factors behind three sets of 
defense policies – military capabilities requirements, 
force posture, and force doctrines – in order to better 
understand the decisions behind 
 > what type of military assets are deemed neces-
sary; 
 > where those forces are deployed and in what 
amounts; and 
 > decision making about doctrines governing their 
use. 
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Despite Rumsfeld’s comment about extant versus 
desired military capabilities, the fact of the matter is 
that military planners are constantly evaluating fu-
ture force requirements. The perennial question of 
“how much is enough?” can be answered in a variety 
of ways, depending on any combination of assump-
tions about threat perceptions and trends, U.S. secu-
rity interests, and the role of military force in securing 
them. But while the preceding discussion focused on 
how the civilian leadership determines whether mili-
tary power may be necessary, the processes by which 
the U.S. military make decisions about which assets 
to field and in what amounts are more complex and, 
in many cases, the center of gravity often lies outside 
the White House. Nevertheless, the impetus for mil-
itary planning regarding force structures stems from 
the political leadership within the administration and 
begins with the National Security Strategy and the 
Quadrennial Defense Review.
Because the acquisition and fielding of military ca-
pabilities is such a time consuming and expensive 
prospect, decisions regarding force structure have 
lasting and consequential effects. The long lead 
time required to develop weapons systems or train 
and equip additional personnel encourages decision 
makers to attempt to anticipate future requirements, 
often at the expense of current needs. Meanwhile, 
unanticipated crises regularly occur, for which poli-
cymakers may determine that some type of military 
response is required. During the Cold War, prepara-
tions for a large-scale, high-intensity conventional 
conflict with the Soviet Union took place alongside 
a build-up of U.S. strategic forces to balance the So-
viet arsenal. Planning included force sizes sufficient 
to conduct two major theatre wars in addition to a 
smaller contingency operation, or, in other words, 
two and a half wars.
This dominated force planning until the end of the 
Cold War, when the George H.W. Bush administra-
tion and, in particular, JCS chairman Colin Powell, 
devised a construct that would ensure a global pres-
ence while also achieving some reductions so that 
a ‘peace dividend’ could be realized. Powell’s “Base 
Force” concept involved a 25 percent reduction in 
force structure and the evolution of the U.S. military 
from a more stationary garrison force relying on large 
fixed bases, to a light and flexible expeditionary force 
able to deploy more rapidly. The incoming Clinton 
administration was focused on domestic policy and 
conducted what would become the first QDR-like 
process, the Bottom-Up Review, released in Octo-
ber 1993. It called for additional cuts to personnel 
but overseas forces remained close to the levels pro-
scribed by Powell’s Base Force, due to the anticipat-
ed need to engage in low intensity operations (Hicks 
and Brannen 2010).
Additionally, the administration instituted what be-
came known as an “acquisition holiday” after the 
Reagan administration’s military build-up in the 
1980s, which was itself a reaction to the post-
Vietnam drawdown that had resulted in what many 
believed to be a “hollow force” by the late 1970s. 
The George W. Bush administration, with Secretary 
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld taking a particularly 
active role at the Pentagon, accelerated the military’s 
evolution toward an expeditionary and flexible force, 
initiated a Global Defense Posture Review upon 
which force structure and basing decisions could be 
made. 
FORCE STRUCTURE PLANNING
Force structure planning over the past several de-
cades has followed a somewhat linear process of 
decision making regarding force size, beginning with 
studies that evaluate the strategic requirements of 
the United States and the forces necessary to meet 
those needs. Obviously, assumptions about force 
sizing have not always been correct. The public 
disagreement between General Eric Shinseki and 
Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz in late 
2002 over troop requirements for Operation Iraqi 
Freedom – in which Wolfowitz argued successfully 
for lower troop numbers but Shinseki’s rough esti-
mate for a much larger residual force was ultimately 
vindicated – illustrated the tensions between civilian 
and military perspectives on force planning (Fitzsim-
mons 2006). Further, the fallacy of utilizing a broad 
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force planning construct anchored in the ability to 
wage two major regional conflicts (or contingen-
cies) simultaneously was clearly apparent during the 
Bush administration, as the U.S. military struggled to 
wage conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and the force 
was routinely described as strained.
Gauging the future military requirements of the 
United States is clearly a challenging task and 
fraught with uncertainty surrounding the multitude 
of unknown mission parameters. Nevertheless, a 
basic format can be discerned. Prior to the release 
of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, scholars 
Kenneth McKenzie and Michèle Flournoy – then 
a research professor at the National Defense Uni-
versity – suggested a more formal methodology for 
force sizing and described four distinct approaches 
(Flournoy 2001):
THREAT SCENARIO: Force structure is based on spe-
cific threats identified by the intelligence community 
and is therefore heavily based on developing scena-
rios from which force requirements can be extrapo-
lated. The disadvantage of this approach lies in fiel-
ding a force that is less adaptable to unanticipated 
events or long-term threats.
REGIONAL MISSION: Force structure is based on mi-
litary requirements in each of the geographical regi-
ons from the Unified Command Plan, often better 
known by their acronyms: Europe (EUCOM); Asia 
and Pacific (PACOM); Middle East and Central Asia 
(CENTCOM); Central and South America (SOUT-
HCOM); and the continental U.S. (NORTHCOM). 
This approach would identify peacetime engage-
ment and presence requirements as well as contin-
gency operations.
GENERIC MISSIONS: Force structure is based on ge-
neric missions generated by a particular strategy and 
its priorities, such as homeland defense, major re-
gional conflicts, or overseas presence. Force sizing 
is closely tied to the strategic guidance, but may be 
inflexible regarding unforeseen missions.
FUTURE CAPABILITIES: Force structure is based on 
fielding capabilities needed to handle future threats 
based on the identification of the likely future se-
curity landscape. Forces are sized to deal with the 
most likely scenarios, but retain flexibility as a hedge 
against developments that are deemed less possible. 
The model may emphasize future capabilities at the 
cost of near-term needs.
This typology of force planning models clearly 
doesn’t reflect actual U.S. planning processes, but 
elements of each of these four approaches can be 
easily identified in strategy documents and other 
sources describing force sizing considerations.
Defense Department official Kathleen Hicks, veteran 
of several QDR iterations, detailed the latest review’s 
force sizing deliberations in the pages of Joint Forces 
Quarterly. She identified three trends in U.S. force 
planning that informed the 2010 QDR. Echoing the 
typology above, the first trend was the need to bal-
ance current operational requirements with the need 
to develop forces for future contingencies – mak-
ing sure sufficient institutional attention was paid 
to current conflicts while preparing for future ones. 
The second trend identified by Hicks was a greater 
appreciation for the unpredictability of future opera-
tions. Related to this was the third and final trend, 
a realization that “contingency operations” are be-
coming increasingly difficult to categorize and might 
better be understood as hybrid operations in which 
adversaries might “move quickly from one ‘type’ of 
warfare to another, often converging in time and 
place” (Hicks and Brannen 2010).
Hicks described a force planning process that con-
sidered both near-term force sizing needs from five 
to seven years and long-term needs from seven to 
twenty years. By leveraging past experience and 
considering the components of the national security 
strategy, planners projected U.S. force structure re-
quirements for the next several decades. The 2010 
QDR proposes four key objectives: prevailing in cur-
rent conflicts; preventing and deterring further con-
flict; preparing to defeat adversaries and succeed in 
a range of scenarios; and preserve and enhance the 
force. The QDR authors then tested or “red-teamed” 
the resulting force construct by considering a range 
of other scenarios through simulations, modeling 
and wargaming. 
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As part of the congressionally mandated QDR pro-
cess, the legislation calls for an independent review 
as an additional safeguard providing an outside per-
spective on the conclusions reached in the QDR 
document. The duties of the Independent Panel in-
cluded 
examining the force sizing construct used in the 
2010 QDR to distinguish enhancements related 
to near-term threats, review the QDR process to 
determine necessary and enduring capability en-
hancements and the capacity of forces needed 
to meet long-term threats, and assess (against 
the current Department of Defense program) re-
source requirements for optional force-structure 
enhancements. (Hadley and Perry 2010: 48)
The panel’s findings were much discussed, as were 
the conclusions of the panel following the previous 
iteration of the QDR, and contributed to the overall 
discussion surrounding U.S. force structure require-
ments.
The QDR is far from the only significant policy plan-
ning endeavor. Former U.S. Army officer Nathan 
Freier, who was instrumental in the writing of the 
2005 National Defense Strategy, recently prof-
fered a detailed description of the drafting process. 
Reportedly, upon reviewing a draft of the 2005 
National Military Strategy that had emanated from 
inside the Pentagon, Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld questioned why his office was not more 
involved in issuing statements of policy, particularly 
given the principle of civilian control of the military. 
It was decided that a National Defense Strategy – 
which naturally enough sits a level above the NMS in 
the hierarchy of strategic policy documents – would 
be written and released prior to the issuance of the 
2005 NMS. According to Freier, civilian defense of-
ficials regarded this as an opportunity to “reassert ci-
vilian primacy over defense strategy,” adjust defense 
policy given the momentous changes since 9/11 
and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
and influence public debate regarding strategy prior 
to the release of the 2006 QDR (Freier 2012: 97). 
As Freier relates,
Initially, two staff officers (one military, one civil-
ian) in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense 
for Policy (OUSDP) were tasked to review and 
revise QDR 01’s strategy to more fully account 
for the conditions that had changed since 9/11. 
Thus, NDS 05 was originally intended to be an 
update, not a rewrite … the strategy team recom-
mended a ‘back to the drawing board’ approach 
early in its initial review of QDR 01. Given both 
political considerations and limited time, there 
was naturally some reluctance for a complete re-
write at higher levels. However, again the author 
understands that the SecDef himself endorsed the 
idea of wholesale revision when the option was 
briefed to him. (Freier 2012: 98)
The resulting document represented a significant 
conceptual shift in U.S. strategic thinking, particu-
larly given the fact that the 2001 QDR had primarily 
been drafted prior to the September 2001 terrorist 
attacks and the dramatic shift they precipitated in 
U.S. While the circumstances and the timing ap-
peared driven by bureaucratic and institutional mo-
tives, the content of the document itself was based 
upon a considered and earnest evaluation of the 
strategic environment, along with the nation’s de-
fense priorities and interests.
Sometimes even more mundane bureaucratic and 
institutional factors are instrumental in shaping force 
structure and acquisition policies. For example, the 
experiences of the U.S. Marine Corps in World War 
Two – in particular the lack of air cover during the 
battle of Guadalcanal after the U.S. Navy withdrew 
their aircraft carriers – left an indelible mark upon 
the USMC and became the primary driver behind 
the creation and maintenance of the Corps’ own air 
power capability, first with helicopters and then with 
the Harrier jump jets capable of vertical/short take-
off and landing (V/STOL). This institutional demand 
eventually led to the inclusion of a V/STOL capa-
bility included in the multi-service F35 Joint Strike 
Fighter, a significant design feature that some argue 
has compromised the aircraft’s performance (Axe 
2013).
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FORCE POSTURE PLANNING
Decisions regarding U.S. force posture are, under-
standably, closely related to deliberations on force 
structure, but are not completely interlocking. Not 
only must the United States determine the overall 
size of its military forces, but also where these forces 
are to be located. A 2004 Defense Department re-
port defined the U.S. global defense posture as “the 
size, location, types, and capabilities of its forward 
military forces. It constitutes a fundamental element 
of our ability to project power and undertake military 
actions beyond our borders” (Feith 2004: 2). The 
processes by which decisions are taken regarding the 
placement of these forces can have strategic conse-
quences, as the most recent shifts in U.S. defense 
policy have illustrated. 
In a manner similar to the force structure inherited 
from the Cold War legacy, so too was an expansive 
global network of military bases and installations. 
According to a comprehensive report released by 
the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 
(CSBA), U.S. posture during the Cold War was char-
acterized by
[l]arge numbers of combat forces along an es-
tablished and well-defined defensive perimeter. 
These forces were sustained by and through a 
robust theatre logistics and basing infrastructure. 
As a result, the requirements to project intact, 
ready-to-fight U.S. combat units into contested 
theatres was replaced by a requirement to deliver 
reinforcements rapidly to forward-based, ready-
to-fight combat garrisons. (Krepinevich and Work 
2007: 114) 
Therefore, the collapse of the Soviet Union also 
erased the principal organizing logic behind the na-
tion’s global force posture. Conceptualizations for 
new basing structures were explored during the early 
1990s discussion of Powell’s Base Force concept, 
during Les Aspin’s Bottom-Up Review from 1993, 
as a result of the aforementioned basing report is-
sued in 2004, and the three post-Cold War rounds 
of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) pro-
cess – in 1993, 1995 and 2005. In general, the 
gradual reorganization of overseas facilities has 
largely stemmed from strategically anchored analy-
ses emanating from the Department of Defense, 
whereas the base closure processes have, not unex-
pectedly, involved a much greater degree of domestic 
political engagement and influence.
Over the past two decades, the QDR process has 
often served as a conduit for strategic thinking on 
global force posture and the document has acted as 
a harbinger of change regarding its organizational 
principles. Additionally, the congressionally man-
dated independent reviews of the QDR process have 
also been a source of input into the ongoing discus-
sion of global posture. Finally, a number of studies 
have been conducted by the Defense Department, 
such as the 2004 Global Defense Posture Review 
(GDPR). But do such reports and reviews make any 
impact on implemented policy? From these analy-
ses come both sweeping and incremental changes 
to the global defense posture. As one RAND study 
observed, “although many of the 2004 GDPR’s ini-
tiatives were successfully implemented, that process 
has proceeded slowly and has been fraught with 
complications and setbacks.… Nevertheless, as a re-
sult of the 2004 GDPR, [the Defense Department] 
today thinks differently about posture” (Pettyjohn 
2012: 93)
The U.S. global force posture has undergone three 
important shifts since the end of the Cold War – 
first during the Clinton administration as the draw-
down from Europe and elsewhere codified the end 
of the bipolar balance of power contest; then dur-
ing the George W. Bush administration as it ad-
justed to a more global expeditionary force tailored 
to counterterrorism; and finally during the Obama 
administration as it began a “rebalancing” toward 
the Asia- Pacific region. Notably, each of these was 
precipitated by shifts in the international security 
landscape and constituted a strategic top-down 
adjustment by Defense Department decision mak-
ing, but was prompted each time by serious and in-
tense debates within the policy community on the 
future direction of the force. As mentioned above, 
the processes linked to domestic base closures stand 
in contrast to this, following a much less discernible 
pattern due to the vagaries of domestic political con-
stellations and internal bargaining.
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MILITARY ACQUISITIONS
Unsurprisingly, this genuflection regarding the con-
ceptual force structure and posture requirements of-
ten stands in stark contrast to the processes involved 
in deciding precisely which capabilities are to be 
acquired to satisfy those requirements. Purchasing 
or developing cost effective and reliable weapon sys-
tems and other military equipment ranks among the 
most important processes carried out by a defense 
department, but acquisition policies have regularly 
attracted criticism. In 1862, during the height of the 
Civil War, the House of Representatives released a 
1,100 page report on corruption and mismanage-
ment in the War Department, noting purchases 
of diseased horses, rotten food, and weapons that 
did not work. Over one hundred studies have been 
conducted on defense acquisition practices in the 
United States since the end of World War Two and 
significant challenges remain unsolved despite a se-
ries of reforms (Schwartz 2010).
Generally, a weapon system is created to fulfill a par-
ticular need or “requirement” for the military, often 
based on strategic guidance found in the National 
Military Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, or 
the Quadrennial Defense Review. Once a need is 
identified, a three-step process usually follows: the 
detailed requirements are identified by the Joint 
Capabilities Integration and Development Sys-
tem (JCID); resources and budgeting is organized 
through the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and 
Execution System (PPBE); and the development and 
purchasing are conducted through the Defense Ac-
quisition System.6 Platforms are obviously developed 
or purchased outside this framework – and certain 
acquisition programs never progress beyond the 
development stage to production and operational 
use – but such exceptions may be best understood 
in comparison to the formal processes currently in 
place.
The JCIDS was created in 2003 as the U.S. military 
shifted from a threat-based to capabilities-based 
approach for determining force structure require-
ments; it emphasizes “jointness” and collaboration 
among the services rather than the more proprietary 
departmental approaches. In this first step of the ac-
quisition process, a Capabilities Based Assessment 
is conducted to identify gaps in military capabilities 
and suggests either material (such as a weapon sys-
tem) or non-material (new training or doctrinal ad-
justments) to correct them. If a material need such 
as a weapon system is identified, an Initial Capabili-
ties Document is prepared which justifies a particu-
lar solution. This ICD will then be approved by the 
Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) after it 
validates the capabilities needed for a specific mis-
sion, the existing capability gap, and the need to ad-
dress that gap.
The PPBE follows a two-year cycle, whereby the 
planning for even years (such as FY2014) are re-
ferred to as the “on-year” process and odd years as 
“off-years.” During the on-years, the Defense De-
partment drafts a complete six-year budget cycle 
known as the Future-Years Defense Program. As 
its name suggests, the Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting and Execution System consists of four 
separate activities corresponding to the acquisition 
process for a specific military system. During the 
planning phase, the PPBE analyzes the established 
capability gap and publishes its findings in the Joint 
Program Guidance document which guides the vari-
ous DOD entities in proposing acquisition programs. 
During the programming phase, a Program Objec-
tive Memorandum (POM) is prepared which details 
the missions/objectives and budget of the proposed 
weapon system; the memoranda are then integrated 
into one of the eleven Defense Programs.7 During 
the budgeting phase (occurring while the program-
ming phase is ongoing), the proposed budget for the 
system is reviewed and a Program Budget Decision is 
issued. Finally, the execution phase (occurring while 
the programming and budget phases remain ongo-
ing) examines the implementation of the acquisition 
project and compares it to performance benchmarks.
The Defense Acquisition System is the process gov-
erning the development and purchase of military 
systems and utilizes a system of three “milestones” 
to manage individual acquisition programs. When 
milestone A is passed, technologies necessary for the 
program are developed and tested in an operational 
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and relevant environment, and prototypes may also 
be built by competing industrial teams during this 
phase. When an affordable program can be identified 
and a viable manufacturing process demonstrated, 
the program advances past milestone B: the engi-
neering and manufacturing phase. Most acquisition 
programs actually begin at this milestone, for which 
mature technologies, approved requirements, and 
full funding are necessary. Programs must complete 
a Post-preliminary Design Review and a Post Criti-
cal Design Review in order to pass milestone C and 
begin the final phase in the acquisition process: pro-
duction and deployment. It is during this final phase 
that Low-Rate Initial Production is authorized and 
models are produced for Initial Operational Test and 
Evaluation prior to achieving Full Operational Capa-
bility (Adams and Williams 2010; Schwartz 2010).
Clearly, there is a gaping hole in the procurement 
story that has yet to be mentioned: the role of do-
mestic political actors and defense contractors in the 
acquisitions process. Many have written of an “iron 
triangle” linking the Defense Department, Congress, 
and private contractors. Significant amounts of 
money are spent by defense contractors developing 
new products to sell to the military and additional 
millions are spent on advertising in order to position 
their products for DoD purchasers. Nevertheless, it 
is worth noting that despite the massive size of the 
U.S. military and the constant pressure to develop 
new systems as well as modernize existing equip-
ment, there exists the robust set of processes rough-
ly outlined above. 
The effects of the “iron triangle,” or what President 
Dwight Eisenhower called the “military-industrial 
complex,” are often revealed when attempting to 
cancel poorly performing programs. The initiation of 
particular weapons systems programs based solely 
on domestic political considerations may certainly 
have occurred (some argue that ballistic missile 
defense is such an example, while others, includ-
ing this author, dispute this), but more prevalent 
are examples of weapons systems legitimately de-
veloped to satisfy a particular strategic requirement 
but which fail to deliver (on specifications or cost) as 
promised, yet remain in production due to domestic 
pressures (Mayer 2013).
FORCE DOCTRINES
The combination of decisions regarding military ac-
quisitions, force structure, and force posture provides 
the United States with a particular combination of 
military capabilities of a particular size and character 
deployed to particular places across the globe. The 
piece of the puzzle yet to be addressed is the set of 
doctrines governing its use. The civilian leadership, 
and more specifically the president as commander in 
chief, makes the ultimate decision regarding when 
and where military force will be utilized. One way 
the Defense Department constantly prepares for de-
ployment is through the development of conceptual 
doctrines that guide the service branches in practic-
ing their craft. Doctrinal developments have implica-
tions beyond the U.S. military as well, being quite 
influential to allies and partners that train with U.S. 
forces either bilaterally or in a NATO context.
On a strategic level, nuclear weapons doctrines must 
be separated from the warfighting guidelines and 
best practices that steer the U.S. military in an op-
erational environment. The precise wording of U.S. 
nuclear policies can have important signaling effects 
to allies and potential adversaries regarding the na-
tion’s deterrence posture. It is therefore closely man-
aged by the elected civilian leadership and only rarely 
adjusted. The doctrines pertaining to military opera-
tions in the field have been slowly evolving from the 
large-scale conventional conflict scenarios during 
the Cold War to a much broader range of missions. 
Over the past decade, the U.S. military has engaged 
in large-scale, high-intensity maneuver warfare, 
massive security and stability operations, widespread 
special operations missions, deployment of assets 
for strategic deterrence, shows of force and military 
exercises, military to military training missions, hu-
manitarian assistance, and a host of other special-
ized deployments. On a strategic level, the military 
must determine around which of these mission sets 
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U.S. forces should be structured as it is impractical 
to prepare and train for such a diverse set of missions 
requiring dissimilar equipment and tactics. 
On an operational level, however, contingency plan-
ning must be performed and ‘best practices’ c ollected 
from prior engagements, such as the counterinsur-
gency manual FM 3-24 from December 2006. 
More recently, the creation of an AirSea Battle office 
within the Pentagon appears to be a dedicated effort 
to develop a new doctrinal approach for organizing 
air and naval assets in anti-access environments. In-
creasingly, military planners are acknowledging the 
complex and unpredictable nature of the interna-
tional security environment – and are searching for 
doctrinal approaches to cope with so-called “hybrid” 
warfare scenarios.
But will the U.S. military be ready for such c hallenges? 
Much of the discussion in Washington surrounding 
the recent budget-cutting process of sequestration 
focused on force readiness. The chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff defines strategic readiness as
The ability of the joint force to perform missions 
and provide capabilities to achieve strategic ob-
jectives as identified in strategic level documents 
(e.g., National Security Strategy (NSS), National 
Defense Strategy (NDS), and NMS). Assessing 
strategic readiness requires a global perspective to 
account for demands between regional and func-
tional responsibilities. (CJCS 2010) 
Readiness can be divided into three categories: per-
sonnel, training, and equipment. The choices out-
lined above – including force structure, posture, and 
doctrine – can have a direct impact on the strate-
gic readiness of the force. The number of ground 
troops affects overall capacity to maintain a constant 
presence in stabilization operations, the network of 
installations from which these troops can be trans-
ported and supported, and the training provided to 
them before the operation can all be crucial to its 
success. These variables may therefore be influential 
in discussions regarding the ability of the military to 
undertake such an operation and therefore may in-
fluence political decision making. 
The “American way of war” has gradually evolved 
during the post-Cold War period, but warfighting 
doctrine remains firmly anchored in the utilization 
of advanced technology for intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance (ISR) purposes as well as for ki-
netic effects. Such technologies are costly – as are 
health care and pension benefits for military person-
nel. Budget decisions may be increasingly based on 
strategic prioritizations about force structure and 
posture taken at the civilian level, but in ways that 
will require adjustments at the doctrinal level in or-
der to maintain readiness.
CONCLUSION
Decisions regarding force structures, posture, and 
doctrines have the potential to frame and limit the 
range of military capabilities, and therefore the stra-
tegic and political options, available to policymak-
ers in the future. The processes by which both force 
structure planning constructs and U.S. global pos-
ture have been formulated generally reflects a fairly 
top-down pattern of decision making that has taken 
into account the global security environment and 
U.S. strategic interests. Despite significant global 
shifts, however, changes to force structure and pos-
ture have occurred gradually and reflect the highly 
bureaucratic nature of the Defense Department. The 
initiation of new military acquisition projects has 
often been generated from strategic requirements, 
although project implementation and viability has 
relied on domestic political support and patronage 
within the service branches. Doctrinal development 
has often been driven by the necessities of current 
conflicts, such as the gradual acceptance of counter-
insurgency tactics. Nevertheless, institutional pref-
erences for the status quo and resistance to course 
corrections have challenged this evolution within the 
services.
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TRENDS IN U.S. DEFENSE POLICY
The most notable of the current set of defense pol-
icy trends in the United States is also the most well 
known: the combination of growing budget pres-
sures and the shift of U.S. military resources to the 
Asia Pacific region. Although a range of post-Cold 
War trends have become firmly established over the 
past several decades and merged with other even 
more entrenched defense policy trends, the “pivot” 
to Asia occurring under sequestration represents a 
thick layer of uncertainty resting atop everything else. 
Budgetary pressures have clearly influenced not only 
the strategic thinking within the administration but 
also its decisions about defense posture, acquisition 
policies, and force structure. Planned drawdowns 
in troop strength and basing facilities are, however, 
more easily accomplished in the current environ-
ment, given the broad consensus that the conflicts 
in Iraq and Afghanistan were less successful than 
had been hoped and placed a great deal of stress on 
the U.S. military. 
While former Defense Secretary Robert Gates suc-
cessfully institutionalized many of the ‘lessons 
learned’ from a decade of protracted large-scale se-
curity operations and counterinsurgency campaigns, 
the Iraq and Afghanistan missions may ultimately be 
seen as an exception to the general trajectory of U.S. 
military operations as primarily geared toward short 
expeditionary-type operations and a “steady state” 
of global presence, training, and shows of force for 
deterrence purposes. The emphasis has shifted to 
ensuring U.S. access to regions of strategic inter-
est, countering anti-access and area denial (A2/
AD) capabilities with strategic stand-off offensive 
systems, ballistic missile defenses and penetrating 
systems relying on stealth or speed. Force planning 
and acquisitions reflect the readjustment back to this 
normal pattern, albeit at lower numbers due to the 
budget squeeze. But tension between the desired 
strategic direction of the United States and trends in 
the international security environment may present 
challenges in the near future.
FORCE STRUCTURE TRENDS
The removal of the Soviet military threat at the end 
of the Cold War and 1991 Gulf conflict precipitated 
a re-evaluation of the U.S. force planning construct. 
Rather than preparing to counter a global threat from 
the Soviet Union, the Defense Department began to 
transition to countering regional challenges and con-
ducting so-called “major regional contingencies” – 
with particular emphasis on the Korean and Arabian 
peninsulas. This shift, which began to take shape in 
Powell’s Base Force proposal and became fully vis-
ible in the 1993 Bottom-Up Review, amounted to 
a restructuring of its military capabilities while con-
tinuing to leverage its expansive global basing net-
work. Over the next twenty years, the ability to wage 
two simultaneous regional wars would constitute 
the core force planning principle and remains clearly 
visible in the DoD’s current planning construct even 
after recent modifications.
The 1993 Bottom-Up Review sized the force to 
have the ability to defeat two regional threats based 
on a 1991 Gulf War scenario: a conflict in which 
the United States responds to a ground invasion of 
a regional ally by first deploying air and naval forces, 
followed by ground forces able to mount a counter-
offensive. The 1997 QDR, drafted during a period 
of sustained budget reductions and a “procurement 
holiday,” added a requirement to conduct smaller-
scale contingencies such as the crisis in the Balkans, 
in addition to fighting two major theatre wars, but 
nevertheless proposed a reduction in military per-
sonnel end strength in order to meet budgetary caps. 
The 2001 QDR, mostly written prior to 9/11 and 
revised only slightly after the September terrorist 
attacks, adjusted the two-war paradigm further by 
introducing the “1-4-2-1” sizing construct: defend 
the homeland, deter aggression and coercion in four 
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key regions, defeat adversaries in two overlapping 
conflicts, and conduct smaller contingency opera-
tions.
The 2006 QDR, drafted in the midst of two regional 
conflicts and an expansive global counterterrorism 
effort, acknowledged a “steady state” status quo of 
perpetual low-level conflict consistent with the idea 
of the “long war” on terrorism. It modified the “1-
4-2-1” construct by including an irregular conflict 
or stabilization operation as one of the two regional 
contingencies the military should be prepared to 
face. By the time of the next QDR in 2010, the 
United States had concluded operations in Iraq and 
was surging forces in Afghanistan in order to begin 
extricating itself from that conflict as well. 
The new administration retained Secretary of State 
Robert Gates and the resulting QDR deviated only 
slightly from the previous document with only mi-
nor modifications to the two-war paradigm. It was 
not until the budgetary situation became more pro-
nounced that a new strategic direction was staked 
out in 2012 with the Defense Planning Guidance 
(DPG), which reduced the level of ambition by re-
quiring sufficient forces to prevail in one regional 
conflict and be able to deny an adversary’s objec-
tives or impose unacceptable costs in a second re-
gion. Forces would no longer be sized to support 
prolonged stability operations and the United States 
would rebalance its forces to the Asia Pacific region 
to counter the security challenges associated with a 
rising China (Panetta 2012).
A number of significant trends in force structure 
planning can be identified from these documents 
and other sources. First, there has been a growing 
appreciation for strategic surprise and the inherent 
uncertainty which characterizes the current interna-
tional security landscape. Whereas the Cold War’s 
seemingly stable bipolarity offered some predictabil-
ity for military planners, the post-Cold War era has 
been unstable. During the George W. Bush adminis-
tration, the Department of Defense shifted from sce-
nario-based planning to capability-based planning 
in an attempt to address this problem, arguing that 
scenarios were less useful in the highly dynamic and 
quickly changing world. This strategic uncertainty 
has been emphasized in documents released by the 
Obama administration as well: the 2010 QDR not-
ed the “complex and uncertain security landscape 
in which the pace of change continues to acceler-
ate” (Gates 2010: 5). This uncertainty adds an ad-
ditional element of risk to proposed force reductions 
and represents an incentive to retain as large a force 
as economically feasible to hedge against unforeseen 
developments.
In addition, strategic planners have expressed con-
cern for anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capa-
bilities. Policymakers have long viewed the interests 
of the United States as global in reach, with security 
commitments to allies and an intention to counter 
threats abroad before they threatened the home-
land. Strategic access and freedom of movement are 
therefore considered to be a vital national interest 
for which policymakers have frequently expressed 
concern. The growing proliferation of technology to 
state and non-state actors has, according to the two 
former Defense Department officials Flournoy and 
Brimley, eased the acquisition by foreign actors of 
“anti-access and high-end asymmetric technologies 
that can put allied infrastructure at risk and hamper 
U.S. power projection.” Rising or resurgent powers 
such as China, India, and Russia might also “de-
mand a role in maintaining the international system 
in ways commensurate with their actual or perceived 
power and national interests” (Flournoy and Brimley 
2009). 
The AirSea Battle concept is a tangible expression of 
this concern, as it was designed to negate Chinese 
and Iranian asymmetric capabilities in order to retain 
U.S. freedom of movement (Gates 2010: 31–32). 
This focus was reinforced by the 2012 Defense 
Strategic Guidance document that emphasized the 
importance of countering A2/AD capabilities in Asia 
and the Middle East (Panetta 2012). The U.S. mili-
tary continues to develop assets to forcibly gain ac-
cess to denied territory, including stealth technology, 
unmanned systems, precision strike capabilities, and 
ballistic missile defenses. It is thought that such ca-
pabilities would not only allow the United States to 
retain global strategic access to regions where it has 
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vital national interests, but also to safeguard mari-
time shipping routes and maintain stability in the 
other realms of the global commons.
Even while engaged in stability operations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, the United States has also redis-
covered the importance of deterrent capabilities. Es-
tablished nuclear powers such as China and Russia 
are developing new ballistic missiles, as are lesser 
state actors such as Iran and North Korea. A con-
ventional conflict with any of the established nuclear 
states is much less likely than coercive threats, giving 
rise to the need to credibly counter such threats with 
strategic forces. The same holds true for smaller re-
gional actors for which forcible regime change is ei-
ther militarily or politically unfeasible. Paradoxically, 
then, as President Obama spoke of working towards 
the abolition of nuclear weapons, the role of strategic 
forces in U.S. security policy remain highly relevant, 
particularly the balance of strategic arms with China. 
Even if the administration chose to implement fur-
ther reductions to its nuclear forces, the remaining 
weapons will represent an important component in 
overall U.S. defense posture, particularly as the U.S. 
shifts its gaze to the Asia Pacific theater.
In addition to its well-established strategic deterrent, 
the United States has emphasized regional deter-
rent structures grounded in bilateral and multilateral 
military partnerships, arms sales, and cooperative 
endeavors such as networked ballistic missile de-
fense assets. Additionally, Washington has placed a 
premium on “forced entry” assets not only to ensure 
access in regions where adversaries have A2/AD 
technologies, but also to deter their deployment and 
use. By engaging allies and partners in Europe, the 
Middle East, South Asia and East Asia, the United 
States hopes to maintain regional stability and deter 
aggression using stand-off assets.
Perhaps the most noticeable, controversial, and po-
tentially game-changing trend in U.S. force struc-
ture is the explosive growth in the development, 
deployment, and utilization of unmanned systems. 
From 2002 to 2010, the Department of Defense 
inventory of unmanned systems grew from 167 to 
almost 7,500 aircraft. The Bush administration de-
ployed unmanned platforms almost immediately in 
Afghanistan, using the Global Hawk for intelligence 
gathering and the Predator, which soon transitioned 
from a reconnaissance asset to a “hunter-killer” or 
armed reconnaissance platform with the addition 
of the AGM-114 Hellfire missile. A newer version 
of the Predator outfitted with a more diverse array 
of armaments, the Reaper, has taken over many of 
these mission sets from the Predator. New UAVs 
are being developed, including the much-heralded 
stealthy carrier-based X-47B system designed for 
use in contested airspace.
ACQUISITION TRENDS
Throughout the past decade of irregular warfare 
and stabilization operations, the Pentagon received 
substantial increases to its base budget and size-
able annual supplemental appropriations, of which 
a portion was normally used to purchase weapons 
systems. The U.S. military spent nearly $1 billion 
on acquisitions from 2001 to 2010, of which 22 
percent came from wartime supplemental appro-
priations. During that time, the Defense Department 
saw its procurement budget balloon from $62 bil-
lion in 2001 to $135 billion by 2010. In general, 
the Defense Department used this acquisitions lar-
gess to modernize a military that had yet to fully re-
cover from the lag resulting from the “procurement 
holiday” of the 1990s. It devoted a sizeable portion 
of the acquisitions budget to investments in new 
weapons for the conflicts in which it was currently 
engaged but also for the deterrence missions that 
are anticipated in the Asia Pacific region (Rumbaugh 
2011). 
In line with U.S. strategic culture, many of the 
weapons platforms purchased rely on cutting edge 
technologies and come with a significant price tag. 
In searching for continued technological domina-
tion of any potential opponents, the U.S. military has 
sought out increasingly complex weapon systems 
– which in turn increase per unit costs and cause 
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production delays. A 2006 RAND study of naval 
shipbuilding over the past five decades found that 
ship costs had increased at twice the rate of infla-
tion and concluded that “the economy-driven fac-
tors (material, labor, and equipment) account for 
roughly half of the overall rate of increase, whereas 
the consumer-driven factors (complexity, standards 
and requirements, and procurement rate) account 
for the other half” (Arena, Blickstein et al. 2006). 
Notably, defense contractors have more frequently 
relied on a development model in which systems are 
designed, tested, and produced with a significant 
level of “concurrency” – that is, the initial production 
begins before the design is completely stable and be-
fore testing has been completed. This has resulted in 
significant delays in fielding new technologies such 
as fighter aircraft and missile defense systems, and 
has increased acquisition costs and in some cases 
produced less reliable weapons systems. 
Some large programs were ultimately cancelled (the 
Future Combat Systems program for the U.S. Army, 
the U.S. Marine Corps Expeditionary Fighting Ve-
hicle, the Medium Extended Air Defense System, 
transatlantic BMD effort with Italy and Germany), 
others have been scaled back (the F-22 program, 
the Standard Missile 3 program), and some have 
not evolved as expected (the Littoral Combat Ship), 
which is less able to defend itself and less modu-
lar than originally planned, and the Ground Based 
Midcourse Defense system, which has experienced 
repeated test failures with its Ground Based Inter-
ceptors). Overall, the growing demand for ever- 
increasing capability and technological refinement 
on these weapons systems seems to have produced 
a significant number of costly yet potentially opera-
tionally unreliable assets.
The Army has, despite over a decade at war, retained a 
modern force – arguably the best equipped and most 
technologically advanced in the world. The Navy has 
steadily reduced the overall number of ships in its 
fleet, but has nevertheless kept quite close to its ten-
year shipbuilding plans and represents a substantial 
and highly capable maritime force. The service chose 
to procure upgraded versions of existing fighter and 
electronic warfare aircraft rather than invest solely in 
fifth generation technology and therefore has a mod-
ern fleet of aircraft as it awaits the naval version of 
the F-35 Lightning II (Rumbaugh 2011). The Air 
Force made the conscious decision not to invest fur-
ther in fourth generation technology due to concerns 
about aircraft survivability. Air Force Chief of Staff 
Norm Schwartz argued that the service would rather 
wait for cutting-edge planes than buy newer versions 
of older airplanes with 40 years of service life but 
only 10 years of survivability (Tirpak 2011).
The F-22 became one of the most costly acquisition 
programs ever, leading to a decision to purchase far 
fewer aircraft than originally planned. Despite hav-
ing been deployed for over a decade, and at a time 
when the United States has been intensely engaged 
in two regional conflicts and an operation in Libya, 
the F-22 has for various reasons yet to see com-
bat. Recent problems with the pilot oxygen supply 
have caused repeated groundings of the fleet and 
may have been implicit in one fatal crash, but the 
fighter’s flight status has been reinstated without 
a satisfactory resolution of the problem. The F-35 
program continues to suffer delays and cost over-
runs but is expected to be a highly capable weapons 
system when deployed near the end of the decade. 
The services appear so committed to fielding the air-
craft that other alternatives are difficult to envision; 
questions remain regarding total numbers to be pur-
chased but little doubt exists regarding the ultimate 
acquisition of the F-35. The U.S. Air Force has also 
invested substantially in unmanned aerial systems, 
which are poised to assume a much greater portion 
of airborne operations.
FORCE POSTURE TRENDS
The U.S. military’s overseas presence, a holdover 
from the global U.S. Cold War posture, plays a cru-
cial role in U.S. strategy. Not only do the hundreds 
of military installations located in nearly every region 
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of the world allow the U.S. to respond quickly to 
threats, their presence assists in shaping the strate-
gic environment in regions deemed especially vital to 
U.S. interests. A 2005 review of U.S. basing strat-
egy noted that “we cannot hope for much influence 
without presence – the degree of influence often cor-
relates to the level of permanent presence that we 
maintain forward” (Cornella 2005). According to 
the Bush administration, a new global defense pos-
ture would shift away from “legacy Cold War struc-
tures” in Europe, reform U.S. posture in the Pacific 
“to assure allies … dissuade potential competitors, 
deter aggressors, and defeat adversaries if called 
upon to do so,” and develop “the operational flexibil-
ity and diversity in options needed to contend with 
uncertainty in the ‘arc of instability’” (Henry 2006, 
38). On a practical level, the global redeployment of 
U.S. forces entails closing a significant number of fa-
cilities in Europe and shifting to smaller installations 
with a lighter “footprint” closer to unstable regions.
Almost a decade later, many of these adjustments re-
main visible. The shift to the Pacific proceeds apace, 
accelerated by the drawdown from conflicts in the 
Middle East and Central Asia. Revamped counter-
terrorism efforts remain a priority in those regions as 
well as throughout the continent of Africa, though 
the infrastructure for the persistent and expansive 
use of ground forces will no longer be required. 
Rather, as the U.S. attempts to shift away from per-
sonnel-demanding stability operations to a deterrent 
stand-off posture, the need for large operating bases 
has diminished. Smaller basing options and part-
nership agreements such as those in A ustralia and 
S ingapore will provide rapid and flexible force pro-
jection options, while U.S. forces are consolidated 
onto well-established facilities in places like Guam 
and in legacy bases in Europe such as Rota, Spain. 
Reliable basing options in Africa continue to repre-
sent a challenge, while Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti 
which hosts the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn 
of Africa contingent will remain crucial to U.S. op-
erations on that continent. 
The termination of combat operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan represents a significant juncture in 
U.S. force posture when combined with the type 
of challenges requiring attention in the Asia Pacific 
region. The geography and strategic realities in that 
region suggest a reduced role for significant num-
bers of ground troops, many of whom will likely be 
transitioned stateside. The U.S. will continue to po-
sition air and naval forces necessary for deterrence 
and force projection purposes throughout East and 
South Asia while retaining some assets in Europe 
and the Middle East. However, the location of U.S. 
military facilities may be less dramatic than the com-
position of assets deployed there – greater numbers 
of unmanned systems, littoral combat ships, Virgin-
ia-class attack submarines, B2 bombers, F35 Light-
ning II fighters, and ballistic missile defenses. 
After a decade of land-based stabilization opera-
tions, the United States is on the cusp of a return to 
balancing and containment. Large basing facilities in 
Europe have been (and continue to be) replaced by 
smaller, more flexible basing arrangements in places 
like Australia, Singapore, and (once again) Subic Bay 
in the Philippines. Three island groups in the Pacific 
maintain a special status (a Compact of Free Asso-
ciation) with the United States – the Republic of the 
Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Microne-
sia, and Palau – and provide some “strategic depth” 
alongside the expanding U.S. military presence on 
nearby Guam.
In a recent article in Foreign Policy magazine, Admiral 
Jonathan Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations, out-
lined the U.S. Navy’s shift to the region. By 2020, 
the day-to-day naval presence in the region will grow 
by 20 percent to 60 ships, an increase to be made 
possible by three developments. First, the four Aegis 
BMD destroyers to be based in Rota, Spain as part of 
the Phased Adaptive Approach will replace ten ships 
currently serving that function through rotations 
from the United States. The resulting six extraneous 
ships will be deployed to the Pacific. Second, new 
Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSV) and Littoral Com-
bat Ships (LCS) being added to the fleet will take on 
security cooperation and humanitarian missions in 
Africa and South America, freeing up destroyers and 
amphibious ships currently performing those tasks 
to deploy to the Pacific. Finally, more ships will uti-
lize rotating crews (rather than the ships returning 
home), including the JHSVs, LCSs, and new sea-
basing assets (Greenert 2012). 
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FORCE DOCTRINE TRENDS
The most obvious and dramatic development in U.S. 
force doctrine over the past several years has been 
the abandonment of counterinsurgency (COIN) as a 
guiding principle for stabilization and counterterror-
ism operations. COIN was once considered the op-
timal set of tactics for addressing the root causes of 
armed resistance against foreign governments allied 
with the United States, particularly where terror or-
ganizations such as al-Qaeda have, at the very least, 
a symbiotic relationship with the armed resistance. 
The idea of providing stability, increased security, 
and government services to regions that are par-
ticularly vulnerable to influence or co-option by ex-
tremist groups seemed to be a logical solution to the 
problem of “safe havens” for terrorists, from which 
they could plan, train, and launch attacks. A well-
executed COIN operation – conducted alongside 
more purely counterterrorism operations – could 
support the local population and host government 
while at the same time addressing some of the un-
derlying causes of radicalization. 
Ultimately, however, such operations have proven 
to be too demanding in almost every regard, includ-
ing economic costs, the number of troops required 
to have a sufficient presence in local communities, 
obtaining reliable host government cooperation, or 
having sufficient local cultural and political aware-
ness. Experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan seem to 
have convinced military planners and policymakers 
in Washington, many of whom were skeptical of 
COIN from the outset, that the significant invest-
ments in blood and treasure required were both 
unsustainable and ineffective – and that these types 
of operations would likely be unsuccessful in the fu-
ture. Even Robert Gates, who as defense secretary 
advocated successfully for the institutionalization of 
counterinsurgency doctrines in the U.S. military in 
order to be fully invested in the wars the country was 
engaged in at the time, observed in his farewell ad-
dress to the Army that “any future defense secretary 
who advises the president to again send a big Ameri-
can land army into Asia or into the Middle East or 
Africa should ‘have his head examined,’ as General 
MacArthur so delicately put it” (Shanker 2011). 
The failure of counterinsurgency/counterterrorism 
operations to sufficiently reduce the risks associated 
with fragile states acting as safe havens for extremist 
groups has led the United States to pursue a strategy 
that is more heavily dependent on counterterrorism 
missions involving raids by special operations forces 
and strikes from unmanned aerial vehicles. This 
combination has proven to be quite effective in elim-
inating the leadership ranks of the various al-Qaeda 
franchises in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia, and 
Yemen, although the opportunity costs – resentment 
from foreign governments, popular protests over ci-
vilian deaths, and potential radicalization – have yet 
to be quantified. 
Despite these potential drawbacks, the United States 
continues to view global terrorist networks with ap-
prehension and, in the absence of other options, has 
continued to rely on kinetic operations in order to 
keep the threat from groups such as al-Qaeda to a 
minimum. Rather than “rolling back” the terrorist 
threat, the United States has reduced its level of am-
bition to one of containment, using tactics that have 
temptingly few operational and political risks, par-
ticularly given the cloak of secrecy surrounding such 
operations. Despite signaling a reduced reliance on 
targeted killings in a speech at the National Defense 
University in May 2013, President Obama did not 
hesitate to unleash a wave of drone strikes in Yemen 
only three months later, when credible intelligence 
reports indicated a serious threat against U.S. inter-
ests in the region and prompted a wave of embassy 
closures (Baker 2013, BBCNews 2013).
The transition from a land-based counterinsurgency 
focused on sub-state actors has allowed military 
planners to continue the build-up of capabilities of 
greater use against other states. In order to retain 
its ability to react to crises around the globe, defend 
its interests, and intervene on behalf of its allies and 
partners, the United States has invested heavily in 
systems designed to counter the A2/AD capabilities 
of states such as China and Iran. This emphasis on 
access has driven U.S. military planners for several 
decades, but gained even greater momentum with 
the advent of increasingly advanced technologies 
that could negate the advantages enjoyed by the U.S. 
50
© Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, Oslo 2014. ISSN 1894-4795
IFS Insights 1/2014 Trends in U.S. security policy
military. Many of the weapons acquisitions, basing, 
and conceptual thinking occurring within the Penta-
gon today have concerns about access at their core. 
The much-discussed AirSea Battle concept repre-
sents an attempt to develop new organizing principles 
for air, sea, and land power in order to retain a ccess 
to the global commons or gain access to denied ar-
eas. The concept involves engaging and destroying 
A2/AD assets (whether Chinese, Iranian, or other) 
early in a crisis in order to retain strategic freedom of 
action. U.S. military leaders argue that the concept 
will ensure American power projection capabilities 
and promote regional stability (Schwartz and Green-
ert 2012). As two veteran RAND researchers point 
out, however, this “strategy” is a classic case of crisis 
instability where each side has an incentive to strike 
first (Gompert and Kelly 2013). Nevertheless, the 
service branches have recognized the gravitational 
pull toward AirSea Battle and are institutionalizing 
their approaches accordingly.
Outside the Asia-Pacific region where the adminis-
tration’s “light footprint” approach is in effect, the 
combination of unmanned systems, special opera-
tions forces and cyber capabilities may comprise a 
new sort of strategic triad. Recently retired SACEUR 
Admiral James Stavridis proposed this idea recent-
ly in the pages of Foreign Policy magazine, arguing 
that the military must be more prepared for the fu-
ture electronic battlefield (Stavridis 2013). Scholar 
Gordan Adams, however, points out that the idea 
of strategic “retrenchment,” with a shift away from 
large-scale military operations to smaller missions 
using elements of this new triad, is misunderstood 
as carrying less risk. Adams sees these develop-
ments as more secretive (“going underground”), less 
accountable, easier to misuse, and potentially dam-
aging to long-term U.S. interests (Adams 2013).
CONCLUSION
The United States is transitioning away from sta-
bility and counterinsurgency operations in Eurasia 
and moving toward an offshore deterrent posture 
emphasizing two main missions: the containment 
of global terrorist groups (primarily al-Qaeda and 
its franchises) through SOF missions and targeted 
killings, and ensuring continued strategic access 
(particularly in the Asia-Pacific) through the de-
velopment of systems and tactics to counter sym-
metric and asymmetric A2/AD capabilities. All the 
elements of U.S. security policy – force posture and 
structure, procurement and doctrinal trends – are 
currently in general alignment and moving toward 
such an offshore deterrent posture.
DOMESTIC FACTORS IN U.S. SECURITY POLICY
The formal processes of U.S. security policy forma-
tion – at least in their ideal form – have an implicit 
presumption of rationality. Despite bureaucratic ma-
neuvering, personal relationships and institutional 
biases, a generally distinct set of policies is often 
decided upon and implemented by the executive 
branch with few domestic influences. Clearly, while 
each administration has significant flexibility regard-
ing the formulation of the nation’s security policies, 
there are structural, political, and cultural factors 
that limit the available choices. The tangible effects 
on policymaking of some of these factors may often-
times be less obvious than those discussed in the 
previous chapters, but collectively they signify an im-
portant and powerful influence on long-term policy 
trends. 
It is not uncommon to measure a state’s capacity to 
exert influence in the international system using a 
measurable set of criteria such as population, gross 
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national product, defense budgets, military person-
nel, numbers and types of weapons systems, and so 
on. While these variables are useful for determining 
a state’s potential for wielding economic and military 
power, a differentiation should be made between 
the potential power derived from a large economy or 
standing army, which can be inherently significant, 
and the active employment of such resources in 
specific instances in order to achieve some strategic 
goal. As the United States has repeatedly discov-
ered, economic and military superiority alone can be 
insufficient for coercive or deterrent purposes. Fur-
thermore, it cannot be assumed that a country such 
as the United States is able to effectively channel its 
economic or military resources in a strategically pru-
dent manner.
TRENDS IN DOMESTIC POLICY FORMATION
While some theories of international relations as-
sume a relatively direct relationship between the 
elements of national power and their utilization, a 
number of factors determine how efficiently a state 
can transform latent power into actions that might 
lead to concrete results. As scholar Gideon Rose 
has noted, a state may harbor the sources of ma-
terial power but an “international power analysis 
must take into account the ability of governments 
to extract and direct the resources of their societ-
ies” (Rose 1998: 161). Among the multitude of do-
mestic variables that might affect the ability of the 
United States to harness its vast resource, several 
factors have become particularly relevant over the 
past decade. Three of these factors will be consid-
ered here: the structural and political capacity of the 
government to fund security and defense efforts; do-
mestic political support for overseas operations; and 
the stability of the domestic political environment. 
Afterwards, three significant trends related to those 
domestic factors will be identified and discussed.
CAPACITY TO FUND SECURITY POLICIES
Collectively, funding for national security operations 
– whether for the Departments of Defense, Veteran’s 
Affairs, Energy, Homeland Security or smaller enti-
ties among the host of other security actors in the 
United States – makes up roughly a quarter of all 
federal expenditures. Apart from the costs of waging 
the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and conducting 
a range of counterterrorism operations throughout 
the world, the United States continues to conduct 
routine military overseas deployments. Since Sep-
tember 2001, massive growth in security sector 
spending has also led to an expansion in the num-
ber of agencies and private actors within the United 
States, much of it cloaked in secrecy. After a two-
year investigation, respected journalists Dana Priest 
and William Arkin of the Washington Post concluded 
in 2010 that 
the top-secret world the government created in re-
sponse to the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, 
has become so large, so unwieldy and so secretive 
that no one knows how much money it costs, how 
many people it employs, how many programs ex-
ist within it or exactly how many agencies do the 
same work. (Priest and Arkin 2010)
Continued funding for these activities constitutes a 
significant burden on the federal budget at a time 
when other fiscal obligations have grown steadily 
and create additional budgetary pressures.
Variables of a more structural nature can impact 
the government’s ability to fund national security 
programs. One might consider the capacity of the 
U.S. economy to generate sufficient overall wealth 
for corporations and individual taxpayers, which in 
turn generates revenues for the federal government. 
The economic recession in the United States and 
the resulting combination of falling tax revenues 
and massive stimulus spending led to the budgetary 
squeeze and decision to enact “sequestration” legis-
lation, which ultimately reduced defense spending. 
Analysts often measure defense expenditures as a 
percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), which 
in recent years has hovered around 4 percent when 
supplemental funding for Iraq and Afghanistan is 
included in the totals. While GDP is a useful tool 
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for estimating the total amount of national wealth 
available for federal collection, it does not indicate 
which percentage of GDP will be channeled into 
federal coffers and thereby made available for use. 
In other words, GDP determines the potential size 
of the federal budgetary pie, but says little about its 
actual size.
Furthermore, as pensions and growing health care 
costs demand a larger portion of the budget, dis-
cretionary spending for security programs will be 
increasingly squeezed – the classic “guns or butter” 
dilemma. In the United States, about 63 percent of 
the federal budget consists of spending obligations 
dictated by existing laws (Austin 2013). This man-
datory spending is comprised primarily of the pen-
sion system (Social Security), health care spending 
for the elderly (Medicare) and low income citizens 
(Medicaid), and interest payments on the national 
debt. 
Without Congressional legislation to adjust these 
obligations, such programs will continue to demand 
a large and growing portion of the budget, leaving 
less funds for year-to-year spending – including de-
fense spending that accounts for about one quarter 
of the total budget. The structural trends – both de-
mographic and economic – tend towards even larger 
expenditures on social programs as the so-called 
baby boomer generation reaches retirement age at 
a time when average life expectancy is creeping up-
wards and health care costs are projected to remain 
exorbitantly high despite the anticipated effects of 
the Affordable Care Act. Legislative adjustments to 
control the costs of these programs will be exceed-
ingly difficult, both practically and politically.
DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR OVERSEAS OPE-
RATIONS
The high levels of defense spending in the United 
States – even if the system’s substantial bureaucrat-
ic inefficiencies are taken into account – reflect the 
country’s ambitious role as an international security 
provider with an overseas strategic posture that em-
phasizes a pro-active approach to security threats. 
This global posture and leadership role, solidified 
during the early years of the Cold War, has now be-
come detached from the structural systemic require-
ments imposed by the bipolar balance of power with 
the Soviet Union. In a way that was unimaginable 
thirty years ago when faced with a Eurasian super-
power, the U.S. leadership role can now be consid-
ered voluntary. The lack of a global peer competitor, 
and the real doubts surrounding the ability of China 
to sustain their economic growth, maintain domestic 
political stability or have a real global power projec-
tion capability in the foreseeable future, means that 
an active U.S. overseas military presence may con-
stitute a strategic choice that must retain domestic 
political support for the constant and substantial fi-
nancial burden it imposes.
This point raises the important yet often neglected 
question of how exactly domestic public opinion 
affects foreign and security policy. Political science 
scholars have suggested two models for transmitting 
public opinion to the political leadership in a demo-
cratically elected government. In a trustee model, 
elected representatives are expected to exercise their 
best judgment to make decisions reflecting the best 
interest of their constituents rather than what the 
public desires at any given time. In a delegate model, 
representatives follow the wishes of the voting pub-
lic as reflected through (for example) public opinion 
polls. From an international relations perspective, 
public opinion is often viewed as a restraint on gov-
ernment actions or a powerful force which policy 
elites attempt to sway in support of a particular 
policy (Sobel 2001, 11). Scholars such as Richard 
Sobel and others divide the public into three groups: 
an uninformed and disinterested “mass public”; an 
informed but ultimately un-influential “informed 
public”; and an informed and influential “elite.”
Based on newspaper circulation and random tests of 
public knowledge on foreign policy issues, it is es-
timated that the “mass public” constitutes around 
90 percent of the population, the “informed public” 
around 10 percent, and the “elites” about 1–2 per-
cent. Therefore, concluded scholar James Rosenau, 
[t]he mass public is uninformed about either the 
specific foreign policy issues or foreign affairs in 
general.… Its members pay little, if any, attention 
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to day-to-day developments in world politics and 
lack structured opinions.… Thus their response to 
foreign policy matters is less one of intellect and 
more one of emotion. (Sobel 2001, 12) 
Public opinion therefore offers little guide to policy. 
Interestingly, individuals are able to retain strongly 
held, coherent, and structured beliefs and prefer-
ences about foreign policy matters precisely because 
they lack information about the highly complex and 
confusing realities of world politics – which seldom 
lends itself to simplistic interpretations and solutions 
(Sobel 2001, 14).
Nevertheless, public opinion matters. Due to the fact 
that the president and his administration are mostly 
directly responsible for the conduct of U.S. foreign 
and security policy, the president’s popularity acts 
as a direct measure of the public’s approval of his 
policies. A popular president can more easily pres-
sure Congressional representatives of both parties 
to approve his legislative agenda and thereby gain 
more freedom of action in the foreign policy realm. 
In general, the American public has tended to be 
“ideologically interventionist and operationally anti- 
interventionist.… In principle, people support an ag-
gressive posture, but in practice they are more re-
luctant to get involved. Once involved, however, the 
public tends to ‘rally’ around the president and sup-
port interventions in response to presidential leader-
ship as long as the involvement is brief or success-
ful” (Sobel 2001, 16). This squares with IR scholar 
Colin Dueck’s analysis that Americans are “reluctant 
crusaders” that support the spread of a liberal creed 
of individual freedom and majority rule, while ex-
hibiting a cultural preference for avoiding costs and 
commitments (Dueck 2006, 26).
DOMESTIC POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
A relatively stable domestic political environment 
offers several advantages in the formulation and 
implementation of U.S. foreign and security policy. 
Simply from a practical political perspective, an 
administration that can avoid frequent and overly 
burdensome political battles at home will be better 
positioned to focus on challenges abroad and will be 
able to do so while exuding the confidence gained 
from the knowledge that the American people are 
supportive. While the formulation and much of the 
implementation of foreign policy is conducted by the 
executive branch, departmental staffing and agency 
funding relies on Congressional approval. Domes-
tic support for an administration’s foreign policy 
in Congress and among the general public speeds 
those processes. Additionally, a popular president 
can more convincingly make promises and threats to 
other actors in the international system – increasing 
the chances of a successful policy outcome.
During the Cold War, there was broad consensus 
within both parties in Congress and among the for-
eign policy “elites” in the United States regarding the 
general direction of security policy. The existence of 
an overarching security threat made this consensus 
easier to maintain, in a manner similar to that ex-
perienced in the years following 9/11. In times of 
crisis or the perception of an overwhelming external 
threat, disagreement often ends at the water’s edge 
and the American public tends to rally around its 
leaders. When that threat subsides and the policy 
direction is less obvious, there is greater domestic 
discord surrounding U.S. security policy. This was 
the case during the 1990s and appears to be the 
current situation as well. In such instances, domes-
tic politics has often consumed the American public 
discourse – an arena in which bipartisanship and 
consensus are far from the norm. 
The intense political wrangling over domestic politics 
can make it difficult for opposition leaders to lend 
support to the administration on issues that they 
otherwise might be inclined to do – simply to avoid 
giving the president a political boost. Given Senate 
Republicans’ stated (but ultimately failed) ambition 
of making Barack Obama a one-term president, the 
words of scholar James Sundquist, writing in 1988, 
remain relevant: 
If the president sends a proposal to Capitol Hill 
or takes a foreign policy stand, the opposition … 
simply must reject it. Otherwise they are saying 
the president is a wise and prudent leader. That 
would only strengthen him and his party for the 
next election, and how can [they] do that, when 
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their whole object is to defeat him when the time 
comes?” (quoted in (Lee 2008)) 
In this manner, domestic political stability can have 
an impact on security policy.
TRENDS IN DOMESTIC POLITICAL FACTORS
There is a host of observable developments inside 
the United States that touch upon some of the most 
fundamental elements of American strength – eco-
nomic, demographic, social, and political trends 
which, while not devastating in their immediate con-
sequences, have the potential to hinder the full utili-
zation of U.S. national power. As mentioned above, 
a state must not only have the capacity to generate 
military, economic, and diplomatic sources of power, 
but also the means by which those resources can be 
mobilized and purposefully channeled. A number of 
intensifying domestic trends threaten the ability of 
the United States to both mobilize and channel its 
resources effectively. Discussions about such trends 
can often become alarmist in nature, and it should be 
emphasized that none of the negative trends identi-
fied here need have an observably deleterious effect 
on the conduct of U.S. security policy. Nevertheless, 
they are sufficiently numerous and deep-rooted to 
warrant closer attention. 
SHRINKING DEFENSE FUNDING
The most obvious domestic trend impacting secu-
rity policy is the constrained budget climate in the 
United States – specifically the effects of the Budget 
Control Act (BCA) of 2011, which introduced the 
mechanism of sequestration that will cut just un-
der 10 percent annually from non-exempt defense 
spending for the next decade. These congressionally 
mandated reductions will force the Defense Depart-
ment to undergo total budget reductions to the or-
der of $1 trillion over the next ten years compared 
with the spending levels proposed by the Obama 
administration’s Fiscal Year 2012 budget request 
prior to the BCA (Belasco 2013). The sequestration 
legislation is particularly challenging due to the re-
quirement that uniform cuts be made to each DoD 
account (personnel, operations, and maintenance, 
procurement, military construction, etc.) rather than 
allowing the flexibility to shift funding among ac-
counts to soften the effects of the reductions. 
While some observers argue that defense spending 
has enjoyed unnatural growth over the past decade 
and can easily be reduced without threatening na-
tional security, the Defense Department has become 
accustomed to and planned for these higher levels. 
Now that reductions are a reality, both the admin-
istration and the Pentagon are in the process of ad-
justing their strategic ambitions downwards. The 
cuts appear likely to have a real and tangible effect 
on U.S. strategic posture for the foreseeable future. 
For a number of years, the strategic planning docu-
ments released by the United States have been char-
acterized by an unwillingness to prioritize or match 
means with ends. Beginning with Secretary Gates in 
2010 and continuing through Secretary Panetta and 
now Secretary Hagel, the administration has slowly 
begun to make more disciplined choices regarding 
personnel costs, overseas posture, and expensive ac-
quisitions programs. Nevertheless, the total effect of 
these adjustments should not be exaggerated.
The Pentagon avoided planning for sequestration 
for several years, perhaps hoping that proposed cuts 
might become actual ones even if Congress found a 
way to nullify the BCA and the process of sequestra-
tion (Shane 2012). Now that the mandatory reduc-
tions have actually arrived and appear to have gained 
a modicum of acceptance in Congress, the Pentagon 
recently conducted a study outlining the potential 
options. In the Strategic Choices in Management 
Review (SCMR), seen as a precursor to the 2014 
Quadrennial Defense Review, three scenarios were 
considered with varying levels of reductions. The 
review based the nation’s strategic requirements on 
the president’s defense strategy from 2012 and, ac-
cording to Hagel, concluded that “the ‘in-between’ 
budget scenario we evaluated would ‘bend’ our 
defense strategy in important ways, and sequester-
55
© Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, Oslo 2014. ISSN 1894-4795
IFS Insights 1/2014 Trends in U.S. security policy
level cuts would ‘break’ some parts of the strategy no 
matter how the cuts were made” (Parrish 2013). In 
general, it found that defense spending could not be 
cut both quickly and strategically, and urged that de-
fense cuts be delayed or “backloaded” to minimize 
impact.
Seen more broadly, the portion of the federal budget 
available for security funds will be increasingly under 
pressure, irrespective of the sequestration cuts. Due 
to the structural forces outlined earlier, the capacity 
to fund security operations will be continually chal-
lenged as demographic trends and fiscal realities 
cause entitlement programs to consume a growing 
portion of the budget. While it might be assumed 
that defense spending would enjoy broad bipartisan 
support due to domestic political dynamics (Repub-
lican eagerness to maintain the nation’s military 
strength, the Democrat’s desire to avoid appearing 
soft on national security, both parties’ interest in re-
taining important defense industry jobs in their dis-
tricts, and so on), cuts to pension levels or elderly 
health care benefits may be even more politically 
problematic. If forced to choose between guns and 
butter, therefore, it appears that the Congress may 
view cutting “guns” as less politically damaging. Par-
adoxically, Americans appear weary from a decade 
of international military operations despite the pro-
nounced isolation of the professional military from 
the rest of society – from which neither engagement 
nor sacrifice was required during the prolonged “war 
on terror.” A recent national survey revealed broad 
support for significant reductions (up to 25 percent, 
on average) to the defense budget (Kull et al. 2012). 
FRAGILE SOCIO-ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS
The country had the luxury of avoiding such choices 
for many years, as GDP kept pace with the grow-
ing national debt which could be kept within “ac-
ceptable” limits or even reduced, as was the case at 
the end of the Clinton administration. But sluggish 
economic growth followed by a deep recession led 
to lower federal revenue, a situation exacerbated by 
broad-based tax cuts in 2001 and again in 2003. 
At the same time, federal spending ballooned as 
the Bush administration reacted to the 2001 ter-
rorist attacks by erecting a costly national security 
infrastructure and prosecuting two major conflicts 
abroad. The worsening recession led to the enact-
ment of a massive government stimulus program 
at the end of Bush’s term and several more sets of 
stimulus funding during the first years of the Obama 
administration. The net effect of decreased revenues 
and the huge growth in expenditures sent the federal 
debt to record levels and created strong structural 
pressures to contain future spending. But budgetary 
challenges are being felt not only at the federal level.
According to some analyses, the American economy 
has, for the past several decades, undergone a fun-
damental shift from manufacturing to services and 
information technologies, a trend that the latest re-
cession greatly accelerated. As Don Peck wrote in a 
2001 Atlantic article:
From 2007 to 2009, total employment in pro-
fessional, managerial, and highly skilled technical 
positions was essentially unchanged. Jobs in low-
skill service occupations such as food preparation, 
personal care, and house cleaning were also fairly 
stable. Overwhelmingly, the recession has destroyed 
the jobs in between. Almost one of every 12 white-
collar jobs in sales, administrative support, and non-
managerial office work vanished in the first two years 
of the recession; one of every six blue-collar jobs in 
production, craft, repair, and machine operation did 
the same. (Peck 2011)
These jobs were already imperiled. Due to global-
ization and computer-aided production techniques, 
these less skilled middle class jobs are becoming 
scarce in the United States. Large numbers of work-
ers are relegated to lower paying jobs without the 
possibility for promotion. Whereas experience and 
seniority often led to higher wages and entry-level 
employees could steadily advance to management, 
the gap between the skills sets needed to operate 
a machine versus a highly educated technician to 
adjust it has now become so large that this tradi-
tional path to upward mobility is no longer possible 
(D avidson 2012). It is conceivable that the job re-
ductions by corporations during the recession con-
stituted the shedding of excess fat from the labor 
pool: many of those jobs may not be returning. Peck 
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argued that “the overall pattern of change in the 
U.S. labor market suggests that in the next decade 
or more, a larger proportion of Americans may need 
to take work in occupations that have historically re-
quired little skill and paid low wages” (Peck 2011). 
Such developments can contribute to long-term 
reductions in U.S. productivity, competitiveness, 
and wealth creation. While the economic effects 
of marked growth in domestic shale oil and gas ex-
traction, for example, has been felt in some areas of 
the country – a development that may potentially 
have strategic consequences – its cumulative effect 
remain uncertain. Even as the U.S. economy ap-
pears to be rebounding, some economists are ob-
serving that much of the growth does not appear to 
be accompanied by corresponding increases in em-
ployment. The risks of a “jobless” recovery and its 
consequences for many Americans may have reper-
cussions beyond economics.
These market tendencies exacerbate another eco-
nomic trend: the growing inequality in the distribu-
tion of wealth in the United States. Even though 
median incomes have stagnated over the past thirty 
years, the middle class still enjoyed an increased 
(albeit artificial) standard of living as housing prices 
rose considerably and families leveraged the equity 
accrued through home ownership to purchase ad-
ditional goods and services. As the housing market 
declined, many Americans were left with huge debts 
that now could not be covered through home owner-
ship alone. This income gap was recently highlighted 
by President Obama in an interview with the New 
York Times, in which he argued that income inequal-
ity was fraying the social fabric of the country and 
eroding Americans’ belief in opportunity and social 
mobility (Calmes and Shear 2013).
Journalist George Packer has argued that an unwrit-
ten social contract has existed in the United States 
between the elites and the masses, guaranteeing a 
wide distribution of post-World War Two prosper-
ity – a contract that has been violated by the elites. 
The income gap has combined with the influx of 
organized money into politics from the 1970s on-
ward to marginalize the lower and middle classes in 
influencing politics. (Packer 2011, Bennet 2012). 
Packer argued that income inequality erodes trust 
among citizens, generates anger at elites and gov-
ernment in general, reduces the willingness to find 
collective solutions to collective problems, and gen-
erally undermines democracy (Packer 2011). Traces 
of this sentiment can be seen throughout the country 
and have contributed to an even greater skepticism 
of Washington. 
POLITICAL POLARIZATION AND LEGISLATIVE 
GRIDLOCK
When Barack Obama won the 2008 presidential 
election, he was already conscious of the growing 
partisan divisions in the country and campaigned 
in part on a promise of healing those divisions. In 
his victory speech, he urged Americans to “resist 
the temptation to fall back on the same partisan-
ship and pettiness and immaturity that has poisoned 
our politics for so long,” proclaiming that the nation 
had “never been a collection of red states and blue 
states; we are, and always will be, the United States 
of America” (NPRNews 2008). That ambition was 
never realized and President Obama has presided 
over an almost unprecedented level of political dis-
cord. Although partisanship has long been an ele-
ment of American politics, the level and intensity 
of polarization have grown to the extent that it now 
hinders Congress from performing basic governmen-
tal functions.
The opposition to President Obama among con-
servative voters in the United States – inspired by a 
combination of anti-elitism, skepticism to his collec-
tivist and expensive center-left policies, or perhaps 
simply a reaction to his international upbringing or 
even the color of his skin – has been surprisingly 
intense. The Tea Party phenomenon, the influence 
of which has varied since its peak in 2010–12, 
reinvigorated the strongly conservative wing of the 
Republican Party and forced Congressional leaders 
to shun attempts at consensus building. Meanwhile, 
left-leaning Democratic voters who felt that victory 
in the presidential election should translate into the 
passage of their legislative agenda have not been 
willing to concede much political ground either. The 
dramatic drop in approval ratings for one of the Re-
publican Party’s rising stars, Senator Marco Rubio, 
has been attributed to his outspoken support for a 
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politically moderate legislative solution for immigra-
tion reform. 
An interesting trend that has surfaced over the past 
several years in the United States is the rise of the 
libertarian voters. In the 2012 Republican presi-
dential primary contests, fringe candidate Ron Paul 
placed surprisingly well and raised over $40 mil-
lion. His son, Rand Paul, the newly-elected senator 
from Kentucky, recently made headlines with a long 
“filibuster” on the Senate floor protesting against the 
administration’s use of drones and their potential 
misuse for domestic targeting of U.S. citizens. Other 
recent issues – including the legalization of marijua-
na, gay marriage, and reactions to the Snowden rev-
elations of domestic electronic surveillance programs 
– have reinforced the impression that Americans, 
who have always harbored a healthy skepticism of 
government power, appear to be growing even more 
wary (Blake 2013, Cillizza 2013). The most in-
teresting aspect of the libertarian trend, which cur-
rently remains quite limited, is its particular appeal 
to younger voters and the potential for the political 
philosophy – which normally exhibits a strong resis-
tance to an active global role for the U.S. – to evolve 
into an influential political movement.
Scholars and journalists agree that disagreement 
between voters of opposing parties has grown over 
the past several decades. Partisan polarization has 
been described as the “new normal” – with deep 
divides among both elites and regular voters over 
fundamental issues such as the size and scope of 
government, as well as a range of social issues (Balz 
and Cohen 2012). Foreign and security policy is-
sues have not been immune to this polarization ten-
dency, although a fairly broad consensus on many 
of these issues remains. The clearest divisions exist 
over how voters rank the importance of issues such 
as a strong overseas military presence, the role of 
the United Nations, and efforts to counter climate 
change (Smeltz 2012).
Due to the procedural frameworks in Congress re-
quiring a de facto “supermajority” to end debate 
and bring legislation to a vote, political divisions be-
tween (and, importantly, within) parties have regu-
larly ended in deadlock. The past several sessions 
of Congress have been significantly less productive 
and fundamental tasks such as crafting an annual 
federal budget have proven impossible, with the 
U.S. government operating on temporary spending 
bills (“continuing resolutions”). This has negatively 
impacted security spending processes, complicat-
ing long-term procurement contracts and hindering 
the ability of the Defense Department to move funds 
among the various accounts in order to lessen the 
impact of reduced appropriations. 
The sequestration mechanism in the Budget Con-
trol Act was the direct result of an acknowledge-
ment by both parties that a solution for budgetary 
policy needed to be forced into existence by creating 
a self-enacting mechanism so onerous (if no agree-
ment were reached) as to coerce the parties into a 
deal. When the parties still could not agree, the se-
questration mechanism – which was labeled by sev-
eral military leaders as one of the nation’s greatest 
security threats – went into effect. Disagreements 
have spilled over into foreign policy processes that 
traditionally have been without such divisions: the 
adoption of the New START Treaty and the con-
firmations of John Brennan (CIA) and Chuck Hagel 
(Defense) come to mind.
The unwillingness to seek compromise on the most 
fundamental issues – but in particular budgetary de-
cisions – has led to political brinkmanship as Con-
gressional representatives respond to voter pressures 
and party leaders focus on tactical political victories 
rather than implementing effective policies. This cri-
sis mentality, exemplified by sequestration and the 
continuous battles over raising the nation’s debt 
ceiling, encourages political maneuvering and a fo-
cus on short-term solutions without any hope of a 
long-term “grand bargain.” As then-Defense Secre-
tary Leon Panetta stated in February 2013, 
today, crisis drives policy. It has been too politically 
convenient to simply allow a crisis to develop and 
get worse and then react to the crisis … the price to 
be paid is that you lose the trust of the American 
people. You create an aura of uncertainty that per-
vades every issue and gradually undermines the 
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very credibility of this nation to be able to govern 
itself. (Panetta 2013)
The prospects for correcting this damaging trend 
seem to be disappointingly poor. Growing parti-
sanship among voters, and the tendency for more 
strongly opinionated activist voters to influence the 
early “primary” elections deciding which candi-
dates each party fields in the general election, has 
led many representatives in Congress to adhere to 
a much stricter and less compromising voting pat-
tern to avoid being challenged from within the party 
by an even more uncompromising candidate. The 
process of redrawing voting districts has resulted in 
more politically homogeneous districts that reward 
party-line votes, and an increasing number of voters 
obtain their news from sources that appeal to their 
political views, thereby reinforcing their existing po-
sitions and reducing the willingness to compromise. 
The climate in Washington is such that a significant 
number of politically moderate Congressmen and 
Senators have chosen to retire, which weakens the 
legislature’s ability to find consensus and taps the 
Congress of “institutional memory” – particularly 
with regard to politicians that have foreign and de-
fense policy backgrounds (Samuelsohn and Gaskell 
2012). There is little reason to assume that these 
tendencies will abate with a shift from Democratic to 
Republican leadership in the White House.
CONCLUSION
For a democratic state to effectively mobilize the 
military, economic and diplomatic elements of its 
national power, the policies must be approved and 
funded by the legislature: in this case the U.S. Con-
gress. In general, public opinion has surprisingly little 
influence on either the formulation or the implemen-
tation of security policy, but the general population 
holds some indirect sway over the positions held 
by representatives in Congress. In general, the U.S. 
voting public is both uninterested and uninformed 
about foreign policy decisions, making their general 
attitudes toward these issues both unreliable and 
easily influenced. Despite this disinterest, the politi-
cal positions held by the voting public – particularly 
by party activists during primary season – have an 
increasingly strong hold on the political landscape, 
encouraging uncompromising positions on domestic 
issues that are having a carry-over effect on foreign 
policy issues.
The defense budget will likely continue to contract, 
partly due to the 2011 Budget Control Act that 
crafted the sequestration mechanism now being 
implemented and partly due to structural budgetary 
trends in the United States that will continue to re-
quire an increasing proportion of the federal budget 
for entitlement programs. The economic situation in 
the U.S. is improving, but exhibits some structural 
weaknesses that may affect the long-term growth 
potential for “Main Street USA,” if not the finan-
cial sector on Wall Street. These socio-economic 
trends combine with the political polarization that 
has worsened over the past several decades to cre-
ate an atmosphere of distrust and resignation over 
the political process. The political gridlock in Con-
gress appears to have become an almost permanent 
fixture in Washington, disrupted only intermittently 
by self-created crises that inspire a flurry of activ-
ity and a new temporary solution. Due to the self-
exacerbating tendencies of many of these trends, the 
situation will most likely continue to worsen.
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CONCLUSIONS
The United States finds itself in a precarious strate-
gic position. After a decade of conflict that strained 
the all-volunteer force and a deep economic reces-
sion that strained both the populace and the federal 
budget, the country’s leadership is re-evaluating its 
role in a fluctuating international system charac-
terized by economic shifts and political upheaval. 
The perceived threats to U.S. national security have 
not diminished, but the experiences in Iraq and 
A fghanistan have provided the nation with a greater 
appreciation of the complexity of those threats and 
the limitations of U.S. military and diplomatic tools 
in dealing with them. At the same time, a disorga-
nized and raucous debate over the size and scope of 
the federal government has consumed much of the 
political oxygen within the United States and mostly 
paralyzed the legislative process. Both in security 
policy and in domestic matters, the United States 
stands at what some have termed an “inflection 
point”: a crossroads imbued with political choices 
that have deep-seated philosophical implications 
– more international engagement or less, more do-
mestic federal programs or less.
In this study, an attempt was made to separate pro-
cess from substance in order to assess the near-term 
future of U.S. security policy and the strategic impli-
cations of that future for the NATO alliance. Accord-
ingly, these concluding observations will be divided 
into three parts. First, some parting observations will 
be made concerning patterns in the security policy-
making process. This will be followed by a number 
of observations about the substance of that policy 
and a number of inherent tensions that will likely 
arise. Finally, combining these observations about 
process and substance forms the basis for a number 
of possible implications these trends may have for 
the NATO alliance and for Norway.
FOUNDATIONS OF U.S. SECURITY POLICY
The president and his administration wield an enor-
mous amount of influence over the direction and 
substance of U.S. foreign and security policy. Par-
ticularly regarding the use of force, the occupant of 
the Oval Office has an almost unencumbered power 
as commander in chief to order the engagement of 
American military forces abroad or, just as impor-
tantly, refrain from engagement. The expansion of the 
power of the executive branch over the past decades 
in security and foreign policy has occurred in parallel 
with an enhanced ability to gather information. This 
ability, however, comes at a price: the available data 
is oftentimes difficult to analyze simply due to the 
overwhelming volume of information to which the 
government has access. Nevertheless, the executive 
branch has a centralized decision making apparatus 
with a significant amount of control over the flow of 
information – allowing it even greater flexibility in 
the execution of security policy.
The style of leadership of each president appears to 
have a significant influence over how decisions are 
made – especially regarding the level of detail in poli-
cy decisions and the speed with which such decisions 
are made. President Obama is extremely involved 
in the policy details – which has the advantage of 
challenging certain issues for which a sort of bureau-
cratic momentum has developed behind a particular 
option. On the other hand, such micromanaging also 
leads to decisional delays and an overreliance on the 
judgment of one individual can negate the benefits of 
having a group of trusted advisers, from whose input 
a collective policy solution might be formed. In ad-
dition, the highly personalized nature of presidential 
decision making can result in dramatic policy shifts 
from one administration to the next. The potential 
for such shifts in policy is most relevant for the ap-
plication of military force or diplomatic initiatives, as 
other types of action are more dependent upon de-
fense policies with more bureaucratically ensconced 
foundations. The president has greater control, for 
instance, over the use of military force and much less 
60
© Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, Oslo 2014. ISSN 1894-4795
IFS Insights 1/2014 Trends in U.S. security policy
control over the composition of that force in terms of 
personnel and equipment.
The continuous evolution of U.S. defense policy is 
much more complex and involves a greater number 
of actors, whose individual influence is oftentimes 
difficult to gauge. Pentagon planners are cognizant 
of the changing strategic landscape and must strike 
a balance between possible and the probable contin-
gencies. With unconstrained budgets and unlimited 
training time, it might be possible to field adequate 
forces and weapons systems for all possible contin-
gencies, but compromises must be made. Strategic 
documents such as the National Defense Strategy 
or Quadrennial Defense Review take their cues from 
the White House’s National Security Strategy or De-
fense Strategic Guidance documents. While much 
of the drafting of a QDR has been institutionalized 
and is therefore a highly bureaucratized process, 
such documents remain meaningful for strategic 
planning purposes. The most recent documents re-
flect a greater awareness of the economic constraints 
to U.S. strategy than previous versions. The 2014 
QDR may be extremely important: will it confirm the 
existing defense policy trajectory staked out in the 
2012 Defense Strategic Guidance document or will 
it seek out yet a new direction?
The United States has gradually moved away from 
the “two war” force planning construct and has be-
gun to rebalance its forces toward the Asia Pacific, 
though both of these trends should be understood as 
incremental changes rather than abrupt shifts. The 
military has begun its return to high intensity warfare 
– both doctrinally and through procurement patterns 
– with a focus on deterrence, shows of force, and a 
capacity to forcibly gain entry into denied areas. New 
partnerships and regional alliances are being formed 
with the United States acting as an enabler, whereby 
regional stability can be maintained without a siz-
able U.S. presence. Maintaining a deterrent posture 
will gain added significance with increased reliance 
on submarines, ballistic missile defense, unmanned 
systems for ISR and strike, as well as strategic and 
tactical aircraft. New military weapons systems con-
tinue to be highly complex with advanced technolo-
gies and sizable price tags – limiting quantities in 
search of quality and enhanced survivability. After a 
decade of land-based conflicts, the near-term future 
role for U.S. forces will likely be as a deterrent – that 
is, these systems will be deployed with the hope that 
their use in combat will not be necessary. Kinetic 
counterterror operations will generally be limited to 
SOF missions and aerial strikes from unmanned sys-
tems in ungoverned regions, as these are a relatively 
low-risk and low-cost way to keep the terrorist threat 
in check. Stabilization operations will be viewed with 
extreme skepticism.
On the domestic front, a worrying set of trends gives 
little cause for optimism regarding the ability of the 
United States to find long-term solutions for many 
of the fundamental challenges it faces. The struc-
tural capacity of the United States to continue to 
fund global security operations is complicated by 
uncontrolled growth in entitlement programs, due 
to rising health care costs and the imminent retire-
ment of the wave of so-called “baby boomers” born 
after World War Two. Without fundamental reforms 
in some domestic programs, these costs will con-
sume an unsustainable portion of the budget. Due 
to the strongly polarized political climate, however, 
consensus-based reforms are difficult to reach as 
partisan politics and an almost permanent election 
cycle encourage tactical maneuvering and position-
ing on issues rather than serious attempts at long-
term solutions.
These tendencies exacerbate a set of powerful 
trends outside the Washington Beltway. The deep 
economic recession appears not only to have elimi-
nated a significant number of “middle skilled” jobs 
that may not return, but the economic downturn 
has also worsened the income disparities between 
socio-economic classes. The lack of social mobility 
and economic inequality may negatively affect na-
tional cohesion, further erode trust in government, 
and ultimately undermine the democratic process. 
These economic pressures, when combined with 
growing political polarization among the population 
and legislative gridlock in Washington, give voters 
little incentive to support consensus-based solutions 
and reward moderate politicians at the polls. The 
most worrying aspect of the domestic political situa-
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tion is that it is self-exacerbating. In such a climate, 
it is likely that more voters will turn inward rather 
than offer continued public support for international 
operations.
TENSIONS AND DILEMMAS IN U.S. SECURITY POLICY
Given the trend lines described in this study, there 
are a number of significant tensions that may af-
fect future policy outcomes. In general, it may be 
expected that the United States will continue along 
its current trajectory of domestic political stalemate 
and indecision, but shuffling along in a foreign policy 
context. Nevertheless, trends seem to indicate an 
overall weakening of the structural foundations of 
the U.S. global leadership position that will, with-
out any course corrections, lead to an erosion of its 
power and influence on the international stage.
AGENT OR STRUCTURE
This classic agent-structure in political science has 
been aptly illustrated during the past five years as 
the Obama administration repeatedly pursued hard-
line defense policies despite his liberal Democratic 
pedigree. Some of the surprise and disappointment 
felt by fellow Democrats in the U.S. and liberal Euro-
peans came as a result of strong dissatisfaction with 
his predecessor, George W. Bush, and a somewhat 
misguided and glorified idea of the changes that 
would occur under President Obama. Once in office, 
he found that many of the issues he hoped to ad-
dress had deeper, structural explanations than sim-
ply constituting misguided Bush policies – including 
the prison at Guantanamo Bay, resentment of the 
United States in the Middle East, poor relations with 
Russia, nuclear proliferation worries, and the level 
of secrecy related to national security operations at 
home and abroad. In some instances – most notably 
in counterterrorism operations – President Obama 
pursued more aggressive policies than Bush, autho-
rizing and becoming personally involved in a wide-
spread campaign of secretive extra-judicial targeted 
killings utilizing unmanned aerial vehicles.
The application of military force is among the most 
dramatic and costly policy decisions for any nation, 
and in the United States that decision rests almost 
solely with the president. The policymaking com-
munity and network of advisors within the executive 
branch can often shape the decision-making frame-
work through informational access and bureaucratic 
maneuvering, but the final decision remains in the 
hands of one person. The world view and leadership 
style of a president will have the greatest impact on 
U.S. policy when responding to crises or other short-
term endeavor. The ability of the president to affect 
policy deceases as the policy’s time line increases – 
long-term trends in force structure and posture are 
much less affected by one individual president. At 
the same time, the capabilities at the president’s dis-
posal define his options: whether it be a reaction to 
North Korean provocation with or without the pro-
tection of an effective missile defense system or a 
raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan 
with stealthy helicopters and a highly trained special 
operations unit. Given the current trajectory of U.S. 
force planning, a future president will have fewer op-
tions for deploying stabilization or counterinsurgen-
cy forces, and a greater number of options for smaller 
incursions in Asia and Africa or shows of force to 
deter and dissuade state actors in the Asia-Pacific.
CAPABILITY OR CAPACITY IN U.S. FORCES
Apart from the usual buzz surrounding the draft-
ing and release of such documents, the impending 
2014 Quadrennial Defense Review Report is viewed 
by some as a potentially valuable tool for making a 
number of strategically crucial choices that may 
have long-term implications. Current and future re-
ductions to the U.S. defense budget will compound 
long-standing dilemmas regarding the balance be-
tween quality and quantity. As was outlined in Chap-
ter six, weapons systems are increasingly capable 
due to the inclusion of advanced technologies, but 
this development has led to much higher unit costs. 
As a result, fewer numbers of these systems can be 
purchased and fielded under constrained budgets. 
This trend applies equally to naval vessels, fighter 
aircraft or the equipment carried by an infantryman. 
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The more complex and capable the weapon system, 
the fewer units of that system can be purchased. Ad-
ditionally, there is a trade-off between investing in 
current technologies that can be fielded in the near 
term against current threats, and modernization to 
prepare for future threats.
With the reduced defense budget, these choices are 
becoming even more acute. Defense Department 
leaders and analysts now speak of a balance between 
“capacity” and “capability.” Analyst John Arquilla ex-
plained in this way:
By “capacity cuts,” the Hagel team – which con-
ducted a comprehensive internal strategic review 
this past spring – means basically numbers. Of 
troops, tanks, ships, planes, and so on. “Capabil-
ity cuts” refer to quality-oriented matters, ranging 
from modernization of weapons, transport, and 
information systems to expanding capabilities in 
such key areas as special operations and cyberwar. 
The underlying sense of the review is that the U.S. 
military now confronts something of a zero-sum 
situation: Holding on to capacity means sacrificing 
capability; emphasizing capability requires loss of 
capacity … keeping a very expensive procurement 
program in place – like the F-35 fighter plane, 
with production costs of about $400 billion, and 
even more in operations and maintenance – im-
poses pressure to reduce troop levels. (Arquilla 
2013)
David Barno and Nora Bensahel of the Center for a 
New American Security argue that the 2014 QDR 
should find answers to the crucial question of how 
the United States should “balance investments in 
military capabilities today to position the nation to 
fully deal with less clear threats of tomorrow,” given 
that the Defense Department seems to prioritize 
investments in new versions of existing weaponry. 
They point out that the F-35 fighter exemplifies this 
dilemma as the largest single defense acquisition 
program:
Yet most defense thinkers expect future strike avi-
ation to be dominated by long-range unmanned 
(and perhaps autonomous) strike platforms that 
are currently a low priority among all three ser-
vices. This tactical aviation paradox is emblematic 
of the “today vs. tomorrow” investment, a capac-
ity vs. capability dilemma that has a parallel in 
almost every DOD modernization program. There 
are simply not enough resources in future budgets 
to support both approaches. (Barno and Bensahel 
2013)
At a time when technological advances are occurring 
rapidly and pressures to retain technological advan-
tages are strong, the United States has also shifted to 
a more deterrence-based posture that relies largely 
on sustaining a constant presence – particularly in 
the Asia-Pacific – and for which a sufficient capac-
ity is necessary. The 2014 QDR may provide more 
strategic guidance regarding such decisions, but the 
fact remains that the U.S. has global security obliga-
tions, costly weapon systems, and an historic aver-
sion to making tough strategic choices.
US ABILITY TO INFLUENCE
In a broader sense, the ability of the United States 
to exert influence in order to shape events and poli-
cies around the globe that affect its national security 
appears to be in decline. One reason for this is the 
expanded concept of security in the post-Cold War 
and particularly the post-9/11 world. The security 
environment is understood to be increasingly com-
plex and interconnected, with non-state actors hav-
ing greater access to destructive technologies. Some 
analyses of the future security environment even 
foresee a “post-state” world in which the relevance 
of state governments is substantially diminished.
The potential for regional political instability that 
may harm U.S. economic interests or the security of 
U.S. allies cannot easily or effectively be reduced by 
U.S. actions, whether it be the spread of weaponry 
with 3D printing allowing production anywhere on 
the globe or internet access enabling the spread of 
information about biological agents. Terrorist or-
ganizations based in ungoverned spaces can still 
launch horrific attacks on civilian populations. The 
Arab Spring – rooted in political and economic re-
pression that itself has proved difficult to address – 
transpired in part due to the effective use of social 
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media. Piracy off the coast of Somalia – which has 
now abated somewhat due in part to the effective 
deployment of NATO forces – also had political and 
economic causes which led sub-state actors in this 
remote country to cause such disruptions to interna-
tional shipping that the action of a military alliance 
was needed to address it. Some reports project dra-
matic security implications from the effects of global 
climate change, as rising sea levels and changing 
weather patterns cause mass migration, droughts, 
water shortages, and conflict over dwindling re-
sources.
The need to accept a greater degree of risk regard-
ing such outcomes has increased – and it appears 
as though the United States is becoming more ac-
ceptant of these risks – while at the same time the 
potential costs of ignoring these problems has in-
creased due to improved access to advanced tech-
nologies. Over the past decade, the United States 
has attempted to address its security issues in the 
Middle East and Central Asia through a combina-
tion of military, diplomatic, and economic efforts. By 
focusing on governance issues, Washington hoped 
to find long-term solutions to seemingly intractable 
security challenges. Efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan 
appear so far to be less successful, and seem to have 
convinced U.S. policymakers of the futility of nation-
building. Less ambitious governance projects begun 
during the Bush administration, such as the Millen-
nium Challenge Corporation, have also struggled. 
With a greater number of political, economic, so-
cial, and demographic factors impacting the security 
landscape, the United States has less ability to effect 
change and exert influence. Washington has tradi-
tionally been predisposed to military solutions for 
solving its security challenges, and many current and 
future security challenges do not lend themselves to 
military solutions. With the administration’s state-
centered rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific and 
the expensive capabilities being developed for that 
theater, future U.S. presidents will have even fewer 
options in other parts of the world to influence the 
complex set of factors upon which regional stability 
rests. A further complication may be the growing re-
luctance of the American public to support the costs 
associated with maintaining a global power projec-
tion capability, an attitude held by the growing num-
ber (albeit still a minority) of libertarian voters in the 
United States.
POTENTIAL COMPLICATIONS IN THE PACIFIC
In August 2012, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham 
Clinton traveled to Beijing and met with Chinese 
leaders. On her way, however, she first stopped in 
Rarotonga, Cook Islands for the Pacific Island Fo-
rum to emphasize the continuing engagement of the 
United States in the Pacific (Richter 2012). While 
Secretary Clinton’s remarks focused on transna-
tional threats, maritime issues and economic oppor-
tunities, journalists and experts suspected a more 
traditional motive lay behind the visit. The strategic 
importance of the Pacific island nations has grown 
considerably with the rebalancing of military capa-
bilities toward the Asia-Pacific region. Plans for new 
U.S. military bases in the region have been formal-
ized, including locations in Australia and Singapore, 
and others discussed in Vietnam, Thailand, and the 
Philippines. The U.S. military presence on the island 
territory of Guam is being greatly expanded, military 
testing facilities in the Marshall Islands continue to 
be important and frequently utilized, discussions 
have commenced with the Philippines regarding a 
renewed military partnership at Subic Bay, and even 
the island nation of Palau has offered its territory for 
a U.S. base.
Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), 
and the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), along 
with the U.S. territory of Guam, are in close proxim-
ity to what both U.S. and Chinese planners have re-
ferred to as the “second island chain,” a strategic area 
symbolizing the flank of the U.S. military presence in 
the region in an eventual regional conflict between 
the great powers. These three states – Palau, RMI, 
and FSM – have entered into a Compact of Free As-
sociation (COFA) with the United States, whereby 
they retain the status of sovereign states but receive 
economic assistance and military protection from 
the U.S. in exchange for access to its territory and 
the expressed exclusion of other states’ involvement 
in economic or military activities. This may become 
even more relevant as China expands its economic 
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and political activity in the region, a trend identified 
with apprehension by the most recent Australian de-
fense white paper. A low-level “great game,” such 
as that which has simmered in Central Asia for the 
past several decades and in which states balance the 
great powers against each other for maximum ben-
efit, could easily transpire in the Pacific.
At the same time, the international scientific com-
munity continues to issue warnings about the se-
verity of global climate change. The ability of the 
international community to act in a prompt and co-
ordinated manner so that the most severe effects of 
climate change, the so-called “two degree guardrail,” 
can be avoided, appear to be in doubt, thereby sig-
nificantly increasing the likelihood that the projected 
environmental effects of climate change will occur. 
The Pacific island states that represent such geo-
strategically relevant territory are also among those 
areas that will be most adversely impacted by the 
effects of climate change, including increased fre-
quency and intensity of tropical storms, flooding due 
to rising sea levels, and changes to local plant and 
animal life, which could impact societal sustainabil-
ity and cause mass migrations. PACOM commander 
Admiral Samuel Locklear stated in March 2013 
that climate change “is probably the most likely 
thing that is going to happen . . . that will cripple 
the security environment, probably more likely than 
the other scenarios we all often talk about” (Bender 
2013). Even in a region where interstate competi-
tion dominates, a host of non-state factors may have 
a substantial impact on U.S. security policy – and are 
factors over which the U.S. has limited control. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO
As the Obama administration began publicly dis-
cussing the rebalancing of U.S. military assets to-
ward the Asia Pacific, it spoke of a “pivot” to Asia. 
The symbolism was that of Washington turning its 
back on the transatlantic security partnership. While 
U.S. officials moved to reassure European capitals of 
continued American military presence and commit-
ment to the region, there are some inescapable facts 
that arise from the trends. While it has been argued 
here that the rebalancing to Asia should be seen as 
an incremental adjustment to policy rather than a 
radical shift, there are consequences of the adjust-
ment regardless of its incremental approach. Other 
trends in U.S. security policy will likely act to rein-
force the U.S. rebalancing away from Europe as well.
HOLDING DOWN THE FORT
Many policy trends point in the same direction, that 
is, towards the Asia Pacific with interstate conflict-
centric deterrent capabilities arranged (with limited 
numbers) in a defensive posture. With reduced mili-
tary budgets, the hard choices are now being made. 
With the gradual reduction in the threat from al-
Qaeda and similar terrorist organizations, for which 
a low-risk and relatively low-cost strategy has now 
been found, the perceived risks from state actors 
such as China, North Korea, and Iran have now 
come to the fore. With concepts such as AirSea Bat-
tle, the United States is now focusing on countering 
the threat to its freedom of movement and to the 
global commons posed by other state actors. Need-
less to say, the systems required for these types of 
operations are distinctly different from those needed 
to perform COIN operations in Central Asia – and in 
many instances more costly. While it is not impos-
sible to re-mobilize for stability operations, the po-
litical and logistical costs simply add an extra barrier 
to such a decision being made.
Despite this rebalancing, the complex array of 
threats that have kept the U.S. engaged in what the 
Bush administration viewed as an “arc of instabil-
ity” stretching from Africa through the Middle East 
and on to Central and South Asia will not dissipate. 
The situation across the entire Greater Middle East 
remains extremely precarious, with fragile govern-
ments in place as a result of the Arab Spring – most 
significantly in Egypt. The civil war in Syria continues 
to rage, increasing the likelihood of even greater in-
volvement by other regional actors, and the risk of a 
regional conflict. Further south, unrest and extremist 
groups are active in western Africa and threaten sta-
bility in places such as Nigeria and Mali. European 
governments – with France taking a particularly ac-
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tive role – will often be compelled to act, whether 
out of humanitarian grounds, to counter the risk of 
mass migrations to Europe or to address security 
risks from terrorist groups or transnational criminal 
networks. 
The U.S. rebalancing to Asia will entail a reduced 
capacity to contribute to such security missions in 
Europe’s near abroad. This is not to say that the 
U.S. will abandon its obligations within the NATO 
alliance, but for those missions relying on voluntary 
contributions – such as Operation Unified Protector 
in Libya – the alliance may have fewer assets avail-
able from the United States. Therefore, NATO will to 
a greater extent than before need to have the capa-
bilities and wherewithal to act without U.S. leader-
ship or its enabling capabilities such as ISR assets 
or midair refueling capabilities. Even so, the United 
States will continue to rotate a sizable force through 
Europe for training purposes, and deploy assets un-
der the guise of the Phased Adaptive Approach for 
NATOs ALTBMD ballistic missile defense program.
If the United States is willing to accept a greater 
degree of strategic risk in these regions, European 
NATO members will have to decide whether they are 
comfortable with the same level of elevated risk or 
be willing to undertake operations that can reduce 
those risks. The U.S., for its part, will likely continue 
to pursue a strategy of containing (rather than roll-
ing back) the terrorist threat throughout Central Asia 
and Africa with SOF and UAVs. Despite the politi-
cal fallout from this reliance on targeted killings and 
a temporary slowdown in those types of missions, 
the Obama administration quickly accelerated drone 
strikes in Yemen after tangible threats to U.S. assets 
were uncovered – a pattern of use that is likely to 
be repeated (Dilanian 2013). It is important to note 
that the U.S. rebalance to the Asia Pacific is reliant 
on the containment of security threats in Europe’s 
near abroad. Continued stability in Europe is an im-
portant pre-condition for U.S. activities in Asia, par-
ticularly given the likely reductions in U.S. defense 
budgets.
CONTRIBUTING TO THE ARSENAL OF DE-
MOCRACY
The choice for European NATO members appears 
to be threefold. First, they can contribute to regional 
security in their own backyards through coopera-
tive ventures with other NATO allies and policies 
that exude strength while avoiding conflict. Second, 
NATO members can build capacities that can be uti-
lized in the troubled regions across Europe’s south-
ern borders, in what the Bush administration called 
the “arc of instability”: Africa, the Middle East, and 
Central Asia. Even though the United States might 
de-emphasize the strategic importance of these re-
gions, they will continue to breed security challeng-
es. European nations can build assets for security 
and stabilization missions and continue developing 
rapid reaction forces to deal with crises in their stra-
tegic neighborhood. Finally, Europeans can contrib-
ute smaller numbers of costly and highly specialized 
weapon systems that are in demand both in Europe 
and the Asia Pacific. 
For a country such as Norway, with a relatively solid 
defense budget but limited military personnel, the 
third type of contribution might be logical. Smaller 
nations will never be able to contribute in sizeable 
numbers to stabilization operations, but may have 
more of an impact with well-trained personnel op-
erating a limited number of highly capable ballistic 
missile defense assets such as the SM-3 interceptor 
or by contributing to ISR missions with a number of 
unmanned aerial systems. As these systems will also 
be utilized by the United States primarily in Asia, 
but may be in demand in other regions, the ability 
of NATO allies to reduce the operational demands 
for precisely these assets in the European and the 
Middle East/Central Asian regions may be a wel-
come contribution.
ADJUSTING TO AN INSULAR AMERICA
The United States has a long tradition of global en-
gagement and the predominant view in both politi-
cal parties is one of international leadership: through 
institutions and liberal interventions within the 
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Democratic Party and through unilateral, alliance 
or coalition-based military interventions within the 
Republican Party. However, a growing number of 
voters are subscribing to a minimalist form of gov-
ernment – libertarianism – that eschews an active 
international role. Even without the libertarian trend, 
many Americans are war-weary and ready to reduce 
government spending – including defense spend-
ing. Continued reductions in military appropriations, 
combined with uncertain political support for an 
active role in world affairs, could lead to a reduced 
role for the United States. The merits of continued 
active engagement or strategic retrenchment have 
been actively debated in the international security/
international relations scholarly journals – where a 
significant number of respected scholars question 
the benefits of continued global military primacy.8 
This point of view represents by no means the fringe 
of the U.S. policy elite. Even though the majority of 
policy experts from both parties supports an active 
U.S. role, momentum is building for retrenchment. 
Even President Obama has spoken of concentrating 
on nation-building at home.
The continued development of new energy sources 
in the continental United States through the extrac-
tion of oil and gas reserves from shale rock through 
the process of hydraulic fracturing or “fracking” may 
have security implications. While the world energy 
market is highly interdependent and shortages in 
one area affect the global market, it is nonetheless 
a strategic vulnerability to be dependent on foreign 
sources of energy. The fact that the United States 
may soon be self-sufficient with regard to its energy 
supply may have repercussions such as reinforcing 
calls for a reduced role in the Middle East and else-
where. Such scenarios should not be exaggerated, 
however. Energy extraction must be economically 
feasible and the U.S. retains important allies in the 
Middle East (such as Israel) that would be politically 
difficult to abandon.
Nevertheless, the United States appears poised to 
redefine its leadership role in the world. As the Syr-
ian civil war and the ongoing tensions with Iran or 
North Korea illustrate, there is a limited number of 
viable options open to Washington – particularly 
after two long military interventions produced few 
tangible security benefits for the United States. The 
political, economic, and defense policy trends sug-
gest that a policy of strategic balancing with China 
will remain the principle focus of the U.S. military, 
with lesser contingencies receiving attention only 
when absolutely necessary. NATO alliance members 
should be prepared not for the disappearance of the 
United States from the global stage, but rather, in 
keeping with the structural and political trends, a 
significant reduction in the U.S. contribution to in-
ternational security and stability.
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SUMMARY CHART: TRENDS AND FUTURE OUTLOOK
TRENDS & PROCESSES SUBSTANCE OUTLOOK
PROCESSES 
OF STRATEGIC 
EVALUATION
POLICY PROCESS
Presidential involvement – Dynamic
Greater degree of integration
Militarized policy & weak State Dept
Stronger
Weaker
Steady
STRATEGIC EVALUATION 
Duality – more Big War than COIN
Cyber and asymmetric threats
Continued Regional Instability
Steady
Stronger
Stronger
GRAND STRATEGIC 
APPROACH
Light Footprint – SOF/UAV/mil-mil
Greater strategic risk
Great power balancing
Stronger
Stronger
Stronger
DEFENSE POLICY 
PLANNING FORCE STRUCTURE & 
PLANNING
Hybrid warfare and greater uncertainty
No SASO structure, A2/AD &AirSea
UAVs
Capability vs. capacity dilemma
Steady
Stronger
Steady
Steady
MILITARY ACQUISITIONS
Modernization: Complex/costly systems
Concurrency – delays, reliability?
A2/AD and high intensity systems
USA – modernized, USN – ok, USAF – 
less so b/c waiting for F35
Stronger
Steady
Stronger
Steady
FORCE POSTURE
Shift to Asia Pacific
Light Footprint
Smaller, flexible basing
Stronger
Stronger
Steady
FORCE DOCTRINE
End of COIN
A2/AD posture and tactics
AirSea Battle
Steady
Stronger
Stronger
DOMESTIC POLICY
FUNDING SECURITY 
POLICIES
Less support but still strong
Rise of retrenching libertarians
Structural budget crunch – guns or butter
Steady
Steady
Stronger
DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR 
OVERSEAS OPERATIONS
Retrenching libertarians
“Iraq syndrome,” distaste for more war
Steady
Weaker
DOMESTIC POLITICAL 
ENVIRONMENT
Economic disparities, eroding middle class
Polarization and Congressional gridlock
Stronger
Stronger
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NOTES
1. See also Mark Bowden, The Hunt for Geronimo, Vanity Fair, November 2012; and Nicholas Schmidle, Getting 
Bin Laden, New Yorker, August 2011. 
2 The Obama administration merged the National Security Council Staff with the Homeland Security Council Staff, 
forming the “National Security Staff”.
3. Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Global Threats to National Security, 18 April 2013, attended 
by the author.
4. The study of bureaucratic politics and decisionmaking has a broad and rich academic body of literature; the 
seminal work in the field remains Graham Allison’s classic 1971 study of White House deliberations during the 
Kennedy Administration, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis.
5. This point is also made in a column by David Ignatius, In Syria, US Credibility at Stake, Washington Post, 28 
August 2013.
6. This reflects the formal procedures currently in effect, based on changes made over the past decade.
7. Each of the eleven programs is numbered: 01 Strategic forces; 02 General purpose forces; 03 C3, intelligence 
and space; 04 Mobility forces; 05 Guard and Reserve forces; 06 Research and development; 07 Central supply 
and maintenance; 08 Training, medical and other; 09 Administrative and associated activities; 10 Support of 
other nations; 11 Special operations forces.
8. See for example Stephen Brooks, G. John Ikenberry and William C. Wohlforth, Don’t Come Home America: The 
Case against Retrenchment, International Security, 37(3) Winter 2012/13: 7–51; and a reply by Daniel Drez-
ner, Military Primacy Doesn’t Pay (Nearly as Much as You Think), International Security 38(1) Summer 2013: 
52–79.
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